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The relations between the government and its informers are of
extreme delicacy. Not to profit by timely information were a
crime; but to retain in government pay and to reward spies and
informers, who consort with conspirators as their sworn accom-
plices and encourage while they betray them in their crimes, is a
practice for which no plea can be offered. No government, in-
deed, can be supposed to have expressly instructed its spies to
instigate the perpetration of crime; but to be unsuspected, every
spy must be zealous in the cause which he pretends to have es-
poused; and his zeal in a criminal enterprise is a direct encour-
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agement of crime. So odious is the character of a spy that his
ignominy is shared by his employers, against whom public feel-
ing has never failed to pronounce itself, in proportion to the in-
famy of the agent and the complicity of those whom he served.'
"FBI's Tipster Said He Built N.Y. Bomb."'
I. Introduction
Informant mishandling and misconduct victimizes many innocent
people. Examples of the resulting harm include: prosecutions based
upon informant perjury; false arrests due to unreliable informants;
non-disclosure of informant information by prosecutors in criminal
proceedings; informant abuses promoted through rewards; and feloni-
ous activity committed with the knowledge and, at times, assent of the
police and prosecutors.
As used here, the term "handler" refers to the governmental law
enforcement agent who has contact with, uses, and controls or at-
tempts to control the informant. Thus, the handler could be a prose-
cutor, police officer, FBI or other federal agent, sheriff, or jailer. The
term "informant" denotes a person who provides information, assist-
ance, or some other benefit to a law enforcement agency in exchange
for some benefit, whether immediate or in the future, tangible or in-
tangible, personal or third party.
Informants are undoubtedly important in policing "invisible
crimes:" where there is no victim, or the victim is reluctant to come
forward and complain. Law enforcement practitioners primarily
claim informants are vital or indispensable to drug and conspiracy in-
vestigations.4 Within a particular investigation, the benefits of infor-
mants include: (1) information that opens probes and starts
investigations; (2) information that is more accurate, efficient, and
comprehensive than that available from other sources; (3) corrobora-
1. 2 THOMAS E. MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 277-78 (1863).
2. FBI's Tipster Said He Built N.Y. Bomb, Ca. TmB., Dec. 15, 1993, § 1, at 7.
3. Mark H. Moore, Invisible Offenses: A Challenge to Minimally Intrusive Law En-
forcement, in ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
21-23 (Gerald M. Caplan ed., 1983); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCmTY 115-16 (2d ed. 1975).
4. James R. Farris, The Confidential Informant" Management and Control, in CRm-
CAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 29 (Michael J. Palmiotto ed., 1984); MALACHI
HARNEY & JOHN CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 27 (2d ed. 1968); JACK
MORRIS, POLICE INFORMANT MANAGEMENT, § I at 10-11 (1983) (because only criminals
can "gain ... acceptance"); PETER RETIER, DISORGANIZED CRIME 148 (1983) ("the en-
forcement of laws against operators of illegal enterprises is critically dependent on infor-
mants"); JAMES Q. WILSON, TAE INVESTIGATORs 62 (1978); Moore, supra note 3, at 34.
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tive information; (4) the introduction of undercover personnel to per-
sons, groups, and organizations involved in crime; (5) the
consummation of illegal purchases; (6) a communications link be-
tween criminal groups and police; and (7) the timely receipt of infor-
mation to prevent crimes.5
Law enforcement practitioners, grouped into the "conventional-
ist" and the "realist" models, agree on these basic precepts.6 How-
ever, the conventionalists elevate law enforcement goals above all
other considerations.7 The conventionalists are very deferential to the
police and believe the confidentiality and security of informants must
be maintained at great cost.8 Conversely, the realists examine how
law enforcement functions, in reality, to reach goals and set expecta-
tions specific to informants. Although the realists view informants as
a necessary evil in law enforcement's battle against crime, they ac-
knowledge and account for the difficulties in attempting to control or
handle informants, as well as the inherent shortcomings in their man-
agement.9 Because the realists evaluate the effectiveness of control
. 5. MICHAEL D. LYMAN, PRACTICAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT 132 (1989); MORRIS,
supra note 4, § I at 6; see also WILSON, supra note 4, at 62. Judicial treatment of informants
has resulted in categorization as well. The typical informant fulfills one of three roles in
criminal justice: the relation of information, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432
(1973); the infiltration of organizations, see, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1984); and the establishment of criminal transactions, United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d
1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980); Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1092-93 (1951). See generally
Michael F. Brown, Criminal Informants: Some Observations on Use, Abuse, and Control,
13 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMin. 251 (1985).
6. These labels are my own construct. Herbert Packer utilized the labels "crime con-
trol" and "due process" to depict a similar division among the legal community's approach
to criminal justice issues. HERBERT PACKER, Tim LiMrrs OF T= CrnumiAL SANCTION 158-
73 (1968).
7. Their views extend so far as to implore officers to treat informants with respect,
avoid pejorative labels such as "snitch" and "stool pigeon." The conventionalists prefer a
short, non-descript definition of informant. See, e.g., Farris, supra note 4, at 29 ("source of
information"); HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 4, at 65 ("source," "complainant," or "special
employee"); MORRIS, supra note 4, § I at 7-9 ("contributor" or, according to the FBI, "any
person or entity furnishing information"). The realists prefer a longer, more incisive defi-
nition. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 3, at 17, 33 ("covert governmental patrols reporting
more or less regularly on a variety of possible offenses and offenders").
8. See generally HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 4. "Perhaps the biggest single weak-
ness in the handling of informers by the American police-as far as we have seen the
practice is worldwide-is the police's acceptance of the underworld attitude and vocabu-
lary toward the informer." Id. at 64 (noting that, although informers are scum, unsavory
and despicable, they still have feelings). Harney and Cross also believe that all informers
should be confidential. Id. at 71.
9. The realists see a clear distinction between theory and reality given the personali-
ties and the circumstances. See, e.g., Peter Reuter, Licensing Criminals: Police and Infor-
IVol. 22:81
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and account for the inherent faults of informants, their views accu-
rately represent how the mishandling and misconduct of informants
persists and can be addressed.
The courts appear to have accepted the conventionalists' view
when analyzing informant behavior.1" While the vast majority of sup-
port for informant success is anecdotal," conventionalists and courts
use this "success" to justify using informants in nearly every type of
criminal investigation.' 2 In adopting the conventionalists' approach,
mants, in ABSCAM ETmIcs: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 100,
103 (Gerald M. Caplan ed., 1983).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 134-231 (on criminal cases), notes 232-292 (on
civil cases), and notes 350-87 (on courts and conventionalists).
11. WILSON, supra note 4, at 61; HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 4, at 21-22,26 (discuss-
ing catching John Dillinger and others).
12. Farris, supra note 4, at 29 (political corruption, business fraud "and a myriad of
other crimes"); HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 4, at 24 (national security); Id. at 29 (tax
fraud). Additional crimes include, among others, gambling, prostitution, loan sharking,
and fencing. Farris, supra note 4, at 29 ("and a myriad of other crimes"); HARNEY &
CROSS, supra note 4, at 21-22,26 (includes all associated crimes as well); Moore, supra note
3, at 34 (gambling and prostitution); see also FINAL REPORT ON THE SELECT COMM. TO
STUDY UNDERCOVER AcnvrrEs OF COMPONENTS OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE, S. REP. No.
682, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1982) [hereinafter ABSCAM REPORT]. Moore sees a second
layer of informant use as yet untapped, including investigations of police brutality and
obstruction of justice. Moore, supra note 3, at 34. From its inception, the FBI relied sub-
stantially on informants. ABSCAM REPORT, supra, at 34. Early emphasis was placed on
maintaining the cover of informants and the risks of agents provocateurs. 3 SENATE SE-
LECT COMM. To STUDY GOv'TAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT To INTELLIGENCE Acrvs-
TIES FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 383, 385 (1976) [hereinafter
CHURCH COMMIrEE]. Concern for civil liberties and rights trampled by informant leads in
1920 following the Palmer Raids, id. at 385, and led to the first congressional investigation
of the FBI. Id. at 382-88. As Congress investigated the Bureau, the FBI sent covert agents
to investigate members of Congress. DON WHITEHEAD, THE FBI STORY 63,65 (1956) (his-
tory written with Hoover's cooperation). At that time, J. Edgar Hoover was appointed FBI
Director to clean house and did not favor the use of such informants. ABSCAM REPORT,
supra, at 35. Hoover was concerned primarily that the use of undercover informants would
raise criticism of the Bureau. 111; 3 CHURCH COMMrITEE, supra, at 391.
In 1936 President Roosevelt changed this by directing the FBI to undertake investiga-
tions of subversive activities, including communism and fascism. Id. at 396. The Bureau
relied heavily on informants in these endeavors. Id. at 391-399. Hoover continued to
avoid investigations of racketeering out of concern over scandal and fear that the agents
would be compromised. ABSCAM REPORT, supra at 36; WILSON, supra note 4, at 3. Dur-
ing World War II, the FBI began using informants to break in and install electronic devices
or to search and seize information. 3 CHURCH COMMrrrEE, supra, at 422-26.
The FBI's counterintelligence (COINTELPRO) program was the product of this nar-
row focus where the Bureau decided that the current laws were insufficient to provide
domestic security. Individuals and groups that Hoover felt threatened domestic security
were infiltrated, disrupted, and burglarized, resulting in a severe trampling of basic civil
liberties. 2 CHURCH COMMrEE, supra, at 10, 211-25; 3 CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra, at
358.
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the courts disregard the realistic difficulties in handling informants 13
and the effectiveness of law enforcement techniques absent large scale
informant use.' 4
The current curative suggestions from law enforcement-new
guidelines, training, lists of do's and don'ts, and large scale investiga-
tions without any meaningful results' 5-do not target and will not re-
solve the problems. Informant abuses might be corrected if the
responsible official or officials were investigated, disciplined, re-
trained, terminated, or criminally prosecuted. Law enforcement offi-
cials, however, are difficult to prosecute;' 6 internal investigations
usually result in exoneration." In addition, the effectiveness of any
In 1972, Hoover's successor, Clarence Kelly, openly employed informants in these un-
savory areas. Dick Lehr, Law Enforcement, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 16, 1988, at A28 ("With-
out informants, we're nothing." Also quoting DEA official David Westgate stating that
informants were "indispensable."). See also Basler, infra note 38, at B3 (depending more
and more on informants); WILSON, supra note 4, at 35. The FBI also undertook investiga-
tions with other federal and local law enforcement agencies. ABSCAM REPORT, supra, at
40.
13. See infra notes 356-381 and accompanying text.
14. GARY T. MAP.X, UNDERCOVER POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 108-28
(1988).
15. See infra notes 314-326 (discussion of guidelines); INVESTIGATION OF THE IN-
VOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN Los AN-
GELES CouNTY, REPORT OF TrE 1989-90 Los ANGELES GRAND JURY 50 (1990)
[hereinafter GRAND JURY REPORT] (deputy sheriffs had similar training but had a wide
range of definitions of informants, thus widening the range of persons eligible for protec-
tive custody); Id. at 149-51 (grand jury recommendations vague and superficial).
16. Absent a written record, the promise of reward for false testimony is impossible to
prove. Ironically, the impossibility arises from a disinclination to prosecute an official us-
ing the same informant used to convict another criminal defendant. As a result, in Califor-
nia, the grand jury was only willing to criticize the Los Angeles County prosecutor and the
sheriff. Ted Rohrlich, Perjurer Sentenced to 3 Years, L.A. TIMEs, May 20, 1992, at B1, B4
[hereinafter Perjured Sentenced]. In United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839-40 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990), the court refused to read a disciplinary code to
bar all contact between the U.S. Attorney and represented persons. Instead the court de-
cided that the provision did not relate to or cover undercover operations unless the inform-
ant was acting as the alter ego of the U.S. Attorney. Id. But see United States v. Friedrick,
842 F.2d 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (conviction of FBI agent for giving false statements re-
garding the handling of Jackie Presser reversed due to failure to advise defendant of his
rights during questioning); Ted Rohrlich, Jail Informant Owns Up to Perjury in a Dozen
Cases, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1990, at A25 (lawyer indicted for asking a jailhouse informant to
give perjured testimony); Michael D. Harris, Regional News (California), UPI, Mar. 23,
1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (prosecutor prosecuted); Richardson's
Prosecutor Admits Withholding Evidence, UPI, Apr. 7, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File (prosecutor admitted withholding evidence).
17. The FBI investigation and report into the handling of Gary Thomas Rowe exoner-
ated the organization and the individuals. Gregory Gordon, Washington News, UPI, Dec.
15, 1980, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. However, the Los Angeles investi-
gation found that the police had requested Cisneros to lie. Ted Rohrlich, Jailhouse Inform-
[Vol. 22:81
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existing standards that do exist is highly questionable.' 8 When a scan-
dal does emerge, the investigator usually attacks the weakest links and
the informants are prosecuted for perjury or another crime. Those
whose conviction was based on the informant perjury, however, re-
main incarcerated unless a writ of habeas corpus is granted.19
Commentators have offered considerable criticism and many sug-
gestions for reform in response to the courts' conventionalist view on
informants.20 The vast majority of these critics take a rights-based ap-
ant Says He Lied at 3 Murder Trials, L.A. TrmEs, Nov. 5, 1989, at Al, A38, A39, A40
[hereinafter Jailhouse Informant Lied]. After a court order, the Los Angeles District At-
torney sent letters to trial and appellate lawyers in 150 cases saying that a jailhouse inform-
ant testified and that counsel might want to re-examine the case. Gigi Gordon & Casey
Cohen, An Update on the Jailhouse Informant Scandal, CAL. Ar-y's FOR CRIM. JUsT. F.
17, (Mar.-Apr. 1989).
18. See infra notes 314-326 and accompanying text.
19. Leslie White pled guilty to two counts of perjury. Rohrlich, Perjurer Sentenced to 3
Years, supra note 16, at B1, B4. Sidney Storch was also indicted for pejury. Id. Rohrlich,
Jailhouse Informant Lied, supra note 17, at A38. Storch died fighting extradition to Cali-
fornia. Id. The State of Alabama tried to prosecute Gary Thomas Rowe for participating
in the Klan killings, however, the U.S. District Court enjoined the state from prosecuting
Rowe because of his previous grant of immunity. Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524 (11th Cir.
1982); Regional News (Alabama), UPI, Dec. 17, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
Kevin Dykes's request for a new trial was denied. Ted Rohrlich, Challenge to Using
Informers Dealt Blow, L.A. Tnims, Nov. 8, 1989, at B1 [hereinafter Challenge Dealt Blow]
(court found ample other evidence to convict although the original prosecutor described
informant testimony as "critical"). William Bonin's writs of habeas corpus were denied.
Bonin v. Vasquez, 807 F. Supp. 589, 595 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (Los Angeles conviction); Bonin
v. Vasquez, 794 F. Supp. 957, 961 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (Orange County conviction).
However, Carlos Herrera Vargas's conviction was overturned because the jury could
not test the credibility of Stephen Cisneros who admitted to lying about Vargas's confes-
sion. Rohrlich, Jailhouse Informant Lied, supra note 17, at A38. James Richardson was
freed after 23 years, including one year on death row. Richardson's Prosecutor Admits
Withholding Evidence, supra note 16. Arthur Grajeda was granted a new trial. Ted Rohr-
lich, D.A. Admits Murder Trial Was Unfair, L.A. TImES, Aug. 2, 1990, at B1, B8 [hereinaf-
ter Trial Unfair].
20. George E. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TFx. L. REv.
203, 207 (1975); Donnelly, supra note 5; Dolores A. Donovan, Informers Revisited: Gov-
ernment Surveillance of Domestic Political Organizations and the Fourth and First Amend-
ments, 33 Burs. L. REv. 333,336 (1984); Robert L. Misner & John H. Clough, Arrestees as
Informants: A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29 STAN. L. REv. 713,716 (1977); Geoffrey
R. Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret
Agents and Informers, 1976 AM. B. FouND. Rns. J. 1195, 1195-96; James J. Tomkovicz, An
Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and
the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 3 (1988); Welsh S. White, Regulating
Prison Informers Under the Due Process Clause, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 103, 103-06; Jana
Winograde, Jailhouse Informants and the Need for Judicial Use Immunity in Habeas Corpus
Proceedings, 78 CAL. L. Rnv. 755, 782-85 (1990); Evan Haglund, Note, Impeaching the
Underworld Informant, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1405, 1440-41 (1990); Bruce D. Lundstrom,
Note, Sixth Amendment-Right to Counsek Limited Postindictment Use of Jailhouse Infor-
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proach to protecting the public. This approach is predicated upon the
assertion that individuals need not assume the risk of informant con-
tact where basic constitutional rights are strengthened.2' This view,
however, assumes that the basic informant-handler relationship does
not need reform.2 2 Other critics suggest expanded defense cross-ex-
aminations of informants, prior judicial review for informant use, and
expansion of habeas corpus relief for those convicted with perjured
testimony.23
The rights-based approach significantly contributes in identifying
violations of specific constitutional rights resulting from the mishan-
dling or misconduct of informants.24 Absent a thorough development
mants is Permissible, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 743 (1986); David R. Lurie, Note,
Sixth Amendment Implications of Informant Participation in Defense Meetings, 58 FoRD-
HAM L. REv. 795 (1990); Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE L.J. 994, 1012-13
(1967) [hereinafter Judicial Control]; Robert L. Bergstrom, Comment, The Applicability of
the "New" Fourth Amendment to Investigations by Secret Agents: A Proposed Definition of
the Emerging Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 45 WASH. L. REv. 785 (1970); Bruce D.
Pringle, Comment, Present and Suggested Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents and In-
formers in Law Enforcement, 41 U. CoLO. L. REv. 261, 279 (1969) [hereinafter Suggested
Limitations]. See infra notes 284-310 and accompanying text.
Professor Donnelly, one of the first to criticize judicial control of informants, cynically
concluded that the nature of the political times will dictate how courts deal with agents.
Donnelly, supra note 5, at 1130-31. Other commentators have merely targeted certain as-
pects of informant use for criticism without presenting alternatives or improvements. See,
e.g., Milton Hirsch, Confidential Informants: When Crime Pays, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 131,
134-36, 154 (1984) (deals directly with contingent fees and targeting, but glibly suggests
that criminal defendants still retain a panoply of legal means to address informant
misconduct).
21. See infra notes 284-310 and accompanying text. Dix, supra note 20, at 210-15 (de-
fining interest affected by undercover investigations); Donovan, supra note 20 (Fourth
Amendment); Misner & Clough, supra note 20, at 731-45 (Thirteenth Amendment); Stone,
supra note 20, at 1205-220; Tomkovicz, supra note 20, at 83 (Sixth Amendment); H. Rich-
ard Uviller, Evidence From The Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the
Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1147 (1987) (Due process
argument for "highly offensive" informant conduct not governed by specific Bill of Rights
provisions); White, supra note 20, at 118-41 (due process); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery
in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 587-601 (1979) (due process); Lundstrom,
supra note 20, at 764-69 (Sixth Amendment); Lurie, supra note 20, at 802-05 (Sixth
Amendment).
22. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 20, at 207-09 (solution presented presumes the continued
use of informants); White, supra note 20, at 119-40 (same); Haglund, supra note 20, at 1407
(same).
23. See, e.g., Winograde, supra note 20, at 781-85 (habeas relief); Haglund, supra note
20, at 1424-33 (cross-examination); Judicial Contro4 supra note 20, at 1015-19 (judicial re-
view); Martin L. Perschetz, Comment, Domestic Intelligence Informants, The First Amend-
ment and the Need for Prior Judicial Review, 26 BuFF. L. REv. 173, 195-202 (1976-77)
(same); Suggested Limitations, supra note 20, at 283 (same).
24. For example, Professor Dix thoroughly develops the law with respect to rules that
can be developed for law enforcement investigations involving informants. See Dix, supra
[Vol. 22:81
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and incorporation of the nature of the informant-handler relationship,
however, this approach fails. Without an effective deterrent, inform-
ant mishandling and misconduct are destined to continue.
Suggestions to investigate and rethink the basic nature of the in-
formant-handler relationship need to be further developed. One set
of commentators has argued that the compulsion and indebtedness
inherent in deferring the prosecution of an arrestee based upon an
agreement to inform establishes a prima facie case of peonage under
the Thirteenth Amendment.' Another commentator asserted that in-
formants should be considered state actors within a Sixth Amendment
framework of analysis when the government encourages the offending
activity.26 Both focus primarily on remedies that impact the criminal
process and, as a result, instill only a limited amount of responsibility
and accountability.
The proper solution necessitates creating greater accountability
and responsibility for informant mishandling and misconduct. This ar-
ticle proposes a framework that builds on established constitutional
rights and incorporates the nature of the informant-handler and in-
formant-state relationships. The key to incorporating the informant
relationship is to apply a rebuttable presumption that informant con-
duct is state action (as required by the Fourteenth Amendment) and
action under color of law (in accord with § 1983). This presumption
will instill responsibility in law enforcement agencies for their choice
in using informants. This new state action/color of law relationship
will have a significant impact upon how courts view informants in both
criminal and civil litigation. In both contexts, the presumption creates
a linkage between the government and the informant that necessitates
the abandonment of both the assumption of risk doctrine and the dis-
tancing of the informant from the handler. In the criminal context,
informants will no longer be free agents, but integral parts of the law
enforcement apparatus. In civil litigation, plaintiffs will have an essen-
tial element for a § 1983 action and agency for a state tort claim or
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim. The presumption that the in-
note 20. However, his basic premise, that law enforcement officials will abide by the stric-
tures, once formulated, for handling informants, is highly suspect. See infra notes 314-326
and accompanying text (ineffectiveness of informant guidelines).
25. Misner & Clough, supra note 20, at 731-34. Skolnick argues that the compulsion
has at least one additional layer. SKOLNICK, supra note 3, at 264. If A is arrested based
upon informant B's information, then unless A cooperates and makes a deal, B's identity
will no longer be secret because of the need to testify against A. Skolnick calls this "lateral
snitching." Ia See also infra notes 275-293 (on confidentiality).
26. Tomkovicz, supra note 20, at 74.
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formant is a state actor, employee, or agent will also narrow the proxi-
mate causation gap necessary to hold law enforcement officers and
agencies responsible and accountable.
This article first presents a history of informant misconduct and
mishandling by law enforcement officials. Section I of this article de-
scribes recent instances of informant misconduct and mishandling.
This section also describes the system of providing rewards to infor-
mants for information. Section II of this article presents judicial mod-
els of analysis of informant misconduct in both criminal and civil
litigation. Section III discusses and critiques suggestions on informant
control. Section IV discusses the correlation between current judicial
doctrines on informants and the conventionalist law enforcement
practitioner's approach. In addition, this section presents current
legal standards for state action and action under color of law, and the
similarity between these standards and the realist's law enforcement
approach.
Section V presents the linkages between law enforcement and in-
formants. These linkages are first discussed in the historical perspec-
tive of how informants have been associated with the criminal justice
process, why certain aspects of that relationship were altered, and how
many troubling aspects of informant use persist to this day. Next, the
section shows how informant conduct meets the color of law require-
ment of § 198327 and the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2" Finally, this section addresses some of the conse-
quences of this presumption in both civil and criminal cases.
H. Recent Informant Abuse
The documented mishandling and misconduct of informants in-
volves federal, state, and local police, prosecutors, and jailers. The
mishandling of informants has recurred in a somewhat cyclical pattern
since the earliest days of the English common law. The pattern typi-
cally starts with widespread informant use, which is then curtailed af-
ter publicized misconduct or mishandling.2 9
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. The presence of informants seems to permeate every major criminal investigation
of late. See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Defense Lawyer's Question Informers' Part in Bomb
Plot, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1993, at 29 (World Trade Center Bombing); Political Dragnet,
257 THE NATION 304 (Sept. 27,1993) (same); see infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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A. The Ku Klux Klan
The most widely noted occurrence of informant mishandling in-
volved Gary Thomas Rowe." Rowe joined the Ku Klux Klan as a
Federal Bureau of Investigation informant in 1960."' While an in-
formant under FBI handling, Rowe participated in a number of
crimes. These crimes included: the murder of Viola Gregg Liuzzo,32
the bombing of an African-American Church that resulted in four
deaths, the shooting of black man, an attack on an elderly African-
American couple,33 and an attack on the Freedom Riders.34
Prior to the Freedom Riders' demonstration in Birmingham,
Rowe informed the FBI of the upcoming Klan attack on the group.35
Rowe and the Birmingham police agreed to allow the Klan fifteen
minutes of uninterrupted brutality before law enforcement would in-
tervene. 6 The FBI, however, decided not to intervene, allowing the
Klan to attack and mercilessly beat the unarmed and unwitting Free-
dom Riders.37 The FBI's decision illustrates how law enforcement
balances using informants and tolerating their abuses.38 Specifically,
30. Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Bergman v.
United States, 551 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Mich. 1982), affd, 844 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1988).
"[T]he FBI had developed a full and complete knowledge of the precise nature of the
conspiracy between the Birmingham Police Department, the Alabama Klans and others."
Bergman, 565 F. Supp. at 1386. Based upon the FBI involvement and statements, Rowe in
fact thought the FBI would stop the violence. Id. at 1388.
31. Bergman, 565 F. Supp. at 1382.
32. Bergman, 551 F. Supp. at 421.
33. Bergman, 565 F. Supp. at 1382.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1384.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1381.
38. FRANK DONNER, PROTECrORS OF PRIVILEGE 308-12 (1992). Gary Thomas Rowe
had previously impersonated an FBI agent and had been convicted of impersonating a
police officer when the FBI started using him as an informant. Bergman, 565 F. Supp. at
1381-82. The FBI not only ignored, but conveniently overlooked the fact that they had
approved Jackie Presser's hiring of ghost employees at a Cleveland union. United States v.
Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1276-77 (6th Cir. 1988). At one point, Presser's handler wrote on a
memo that if any of Presser's activities involved political figures or potential violence, the
Director's approval should be necessary. Frank Swoboda, Ex-FBI Head Was Told
Presser's Illegalities Were Authorized, Court Papers Say, WASH. PosT, Apr. 8, 1988, § 1, at
A18. Despite these and other ongoing criminal activities, the FBI continued to use Presser
as an informant. Id.; Stephen Engelberg, F.B.I. and Jackie Presser: Who Used Whom for
What?, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 8, 1985, § 4, at 3 (also noting that Michael Orlando was over-
heard discussing criminal involvement while an informant, but was not arrested).
Melvin Weinberg was a convicted con man, whose informant status had been canceled
once before when the FBI retained him to function as the central figure in Operation
ABSCAM. Guccione v. United States, 847 F.2d 1031, 1032 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1020 (1990).
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this case shows not only how informants will oftentimes exercise a
great deal of control over law enforcement, but also how law enforce-
ment will usually accede to the wishes of the informants.
B. The World Trade Center Bombing
The involvement of an informant, Emad Salem, with the FBI in
February, 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and planned
bombings of other New York targets is ripe with allegations of inform-
ant mishandling. The FBI had a continuing relationship with Salem,
who infiltrated circles of Muslim groups, in particular that of Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman. Throughout his relationship with the FBI, Sa-
lem recorded conversations with targets of the investigation and his
handlers.3 9
According to the tapes, Salem obtained the timer for the bomb to
be used at the World Trade Center for the group. The FBI, however,
took the timer and gave Salem a replacement. When Salem intro-
duced the replacement timer to the group producing the bomb, the
FBI, fearing a connection to the bombing, entered the site and stole
The New York police closed a file on a robbery committed by Kenny O'Donnell while
O'Donnell was an informant. Barbara Basler, City Police Paid $500,000 Last Year for In-
formants, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 1982, at B3. Steven Woodworth had been convicted twice
of theft and was required to seek mental health counseling as a condition of probation
when the Bowling Green, Ohio, police signed him as an informant. The police then re-
fused to arrest him when he bragged about his immunity from charge. Woodworth failed
to raise in court his probation violations, his threats to others, his informant status, and his
abuse of the informant position. Hiser v. City of Bowling Green, 3:93 CV 702, slip op.
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 1993); Mark Reiter, Bowling Green Hit with Lawsuit Regarding 1992
Murder of Woman, TOLEDO BLADE, Feb. 5, 1993, § 2, at 9.
In Illinois, John Thttle had a history of drug and alcohol abuse when the FBI started to
employ him as an informant. Kevin Cullen, When Irish Eyes Aren't Smiling, CHi. TRIB.,
July 4, 1993, (Magazine), at 18, 24. Later, the FBI approached two suburban Chicago mu-
nicipalities about dropping charges (assault and battery and drunk driving and assault)
against him. Id.
In San Diego, two policemen had an ongoing sexual relationship with an informer who
was a prostitute. Mark Platte, Some Evidence of Misconduct by Police Found, L.A. TiMES,
July 27, 1991, at B1. Problems with informants were rampant as police would allow infor-
mants to keep portions of narcotics used in drug buys. One female informant who testified
against several police was found murdered. Mark Platte, Probe of Police Reveals Only
Petty Offenses, L.A. Tims, July 31, 1991, at B1.
Hilmer Sandini's fie included a memo stating that he should never again be used as an
informant. Anthony M. DeStefano, Undercover Perils: The Dan Mitrione Story, NEwSDAY,
Sept. 23, 1988, § 2, at 2. Subsequent to the placement of the memo into his file, he became
an informant with agent Daniel Mitrione. Id. Mitrione became deeply involved in drug
trafficking, taking $850,000 in profits. Id.
39. Ralph Blumenthal, Tapes in Bombing Plot Show Informer and FBI at Odds, N.Y.
TimEs, Oct. 27, 1993, at Al; Robert D. McFadden, Spector of Terror, N.Y. TiMEs, June 26,
1993, § 1, at 1.
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the timer. In order to mollify Salem, the FBI told him they would
return the timer. Later revelations show that Salem played a still
larger role in the bomb production.4°
The tape recordings also contain repeated references to Salem's
assertions that the FBI had the ability to prevent the bombing. FBI
handlers, however, dissuaded Salem from raising this complaint to
higher levels in the FBI and the bombing occurred as planned. For his
informant work, the FBI paid Salem at least $500 a week, although
the tapes reflect conversations and negotiations involving one million
dollars.41 Salem justified these expenses because of the cost of build-
ing the bomb.
C. Jalihouse Abuse of Informants
Jailhouse informants are the most readily mishandled, and able to
take advantage of their targets.
1. The Fulminante Case42
Oreste Fulminante was jailed in New York following his convic-
tion for firearm possession.43 There, Anthony Sarivola befriended
Fulminante."4 Unbeknownst to Fulminante, Sarivola, (who presented
himself as an organized crime figure), was in fact a former police of-
ficer imprisoned for extortion.45 Sarivola was also a paid FBI inform-
ant.46  Sarivola approached Fulminante and mentioned that
Fulminante was a suspect in the murder of his step-daughter in Ari-
zona.47 Fulminante maintained his innocence and stated that she was
killed by bikers looking for drugs.48 Later, Sarivola told Fulminante
40. Ralph Blumenthal, Tapes Show FBI Agreed To Return Timer for Bomb, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1993, at B3; Patricia Cohen, Defense: Spy Was Bomber, NEWSDAY, Dec. 15,
1993, at 7; FBI's Tipster Said He Built N.Y. Bomb, supra note 2, at 7.
41. Richard Bernstein & Ralph Blumenthal, Bomb Informer's Secret Tapes Offer a
Rare Glimpse Into Dealings With the FBI, N.Y. TiMEs, October 31, 1993, at A16; Ralph
Blumenthal, Plot Warning Is Reviewed By the F.B.L, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1993, at B1;
Blumenthal, supra note 39, at Al; Ralph Blumenthal, Tapes Depict Proposal to Thwart
Bomb Used in Trade Center Blast, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 28, 1993, at Al.
42. See infra notes 147-153.
43. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 282 (1991). Prior to that time, Fulminante
lived in Arizona with his wife and step daughter, Jeneane Michelle Hunt. Id. He reported
Jeneane missing while he was supposed to be caring for her. Id. After she was found shot
to death, the police suspected Fulminante but, in the end, filed no charges against him. Id.
44. Id. at 282-83.
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that Fulminante was in physical danger because other inmates sus-
pected him of the murder.4 9 Sarivola offered to protect Fulminante
on the condition that Fulminante tell him the truth about the mur-
der."0 Fulminante then confessed to Sarivola. 1 Fulminante was con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death.
52
2. The Dykes Case
Kevin Dykes was arrested and placed in the protective custody
section of the Los Angeles County jail because he was a witness to a
murder.53 The protective custody area is reserved for "keep away"
inmates and detainees, such as persons suspected of murder, wit-
nesses, informants, and any other inmates who are guilty of a serious
offense or are at risk of physical injury.5 4 The jailhouse informants
incarcerated at the jail vied for the chance to "make" Dykes confess
to the murder he had witnessed.55 Three informants claimed to be
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Specifically, Sarivola told Fulminante that he knew he was "starting to get
some tough treatment and whatnot" as a result of the suspicions. Id. Then, after the offer
of protection, Sarivola said, "You have to tell me about it.... For me to give you any
help." Id. Later, during a car ride with Sarivola and his fiance, the subject was again raised
and Fulminante again implicated himself in the murder. Id See infra note 186.
52. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 284.
53. Ted Rohrlich & Robert W. Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches: Trading Lies for Freedom,
L.A. TiMEs, Apr. 16, 1989, § 1, at 31 [hereinafter Jailhouse Snitches].
54. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 9. The investigation revealed that little
consistency existed in determining who should and who should not be placed in protective
custody. Id. at 50. Commonalities among these inmates include high rates of recidivism
and long sentences. Id. at 10.
The jailhouses at issue are the Central Jail and the Hall of Justice, which house "un-
sentenced male prisoners who are charged with non-bailable offenses or who are finan-
cially unable to post bail." Id. at 46. In addition, some prisoners who were currently
serving sentences were transferred to testify. Id.
Studies have shown that jailhouse informants tend to be the most aggressive and
feared inmates. James W. Marquart & Julian B. Roebuck, Prison Guards and "Snitches",
25 Birr. J. CRIMINOLOGY 217 (1985). The obvious irony, and great potential for breeding
problems, was that the most manipulative prisoners were placed with the most susceptible.
That is, suspected murderers were placed with informants. Absent Leslie White's public
disclosure, it is unclear when, if ever, the process would have been revealed.
55. Rohrlich & Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches, supra note 53, at 31 (informants included
Willie Battle, Jesse Williams, and Leslie White). Edward Moran, another jailhouse inform-
ant, testified for Dykes about how the others lied about Dykes's confession. Rohrlich,
Trial Unfair, supra note 19, at B1, B8.
When a new suspect enters protective custody the informants start to devise how to
"book" the person (tell the authorities of untruthful incriminating statements) and write
their own ticket out of jail. GRAD JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 16 n.9, 18 (inmates
would discuss all day); Ted Rohrlich, Jail Informant Owns Up to Perjury in a Dozen Cases,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1990, at A24 [hereinafter Informant Owns Up]. If general information
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recipients of his confession. 6 Ultimately, Dykes was convicted based
on his alleged confessions to the three jailhouse informants. 7
3. The White Case
Leslie Vernon White exposed the ease and depth of the inform-
ant misconduct in the Los Angeles County jails. White spent a
lengthy amount of time in the protective custody area of the county
jail. To gain informant rewards, he fabricated plausible confessions of
detainees.5 While impersonating prosecutors, deputy sheriffs, police,
or bail bondsmen, White used the jail telephones to contact various
law enforcement agencies. During these conversations White ob-
tained sufficient information about an inmate or detainee to fabricate
a confession. 9 White then made another call and fabricated a record
precedes the suspect into the informant tank, each informant may try a story "changing a
word here or there," taking into account law enforcement's corrections of each, until some-
one gets the story right and accepted. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 18, 30.
Many were "trained" to fabricate confessions through experience in jail. Id. at 20-25.
Others used the coroner's officer for information or memorized an officer's badge number
to use. Id. at 29. In one case, eight informants testified to confessions at one preliminary
hearing. Id. at 38.
56. Rohrlich & Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches, supra note 55, § 1, at 31.
57. Id.
58. White admitted to committing peijury in a dozen cases, mostly major felonies.
Rohrlich, Informant Owns Up, supra note 16, at Al. Often, knowing that this would en-
hance his credibility, White would tell the prosecutor that the accused threatened witnesses
or the prosecutor. Id. at 24. White even committed perjury before a grand jury to get a
defense lawyer indicted for soliciting perjury. Id.
59. In one of several demonstrations on the process, Leslie White was given a name
and a telephone.
The informant, representing himself to be an employee of a bail bond company,
called the jail's Inmate Reception Center and was able to obtain the inmate's
booking number, date of birth, color of eyes and hair, height, weight, race (Cau-
casian), bail ($100,000), case number, date of arrest, arresting agency (Sheriffs
Special Enforcement Bureau), next court date, and where the inmate was housed
in the jail.
The informant next called the records section of the District Attorney's of-
fice. He said he was a Deputy District Attorney and asked for information on the
inmate's case. He was given the name of the Deputy District Attorney prosecut-
ing the case, the Deputy District Attorney's telephone number, and the name of a
witness.
A few calls later, the informant called Sheriff's Homicide and said he was
"Sergeant Stevens" at the Central Jail. He was able to obtain the name of the
murder victim, and the victim's age and race.
The informant then called the Deputy District Attorney who was handling
the case, initially identifying himself as "Sergeant Williams" with the Los Angeles
Police Department. The Deputy District Attorney responded to the informant's
questions by stating, "I'll tell you anything you want to know about the case," and
proceeded to provide details about what the victim was wearing, where his body
was found, the fact that the coroner's report said that death resulted from suffoca-
tion and/or drugs, that the victim's blood contained a fatally high amount of
methamphetamine, that the defendant confessed to stuffing the victim in a trunk,
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to prove that he and the accused were in jail together.6" In the wake
of public attention to this scandal, many other informants came for-
ward to tell of their ability to abuse the system. 61
Other Los Angeles County jailhouse informants utilized a wide
variety of means to obtain the necessary information.6' Informants
would continuously fabricate confessions if one confession did not re-
sult in sufficient benefits. Thus, the informants established a "track
record" for credibility and received bigger rewards.
These examples illustrate both the active and tacit approval of
jailhouse informant misconduct. In other instances, however, jailers
have helped "set up" the accused.63 Such jailers have provided infor-
and the prosecutor's personal opinion of the likely defense in the case. Near the
end of the conversation, the informant gave his name as "Sergeant Johnson."
GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 70. The Sheriff's Department and the District
Attorney's offices each issued directives and guidelines requiring the verification of callers.
After this, the informant did an equally successful demonstration for the television show,
"60 Minutes." Id. at 72-73. See also Robert Berke, An Update on the Informant Scandal,
CAL. Arn's FOR CrM. JUST. F. 11, (July-Aug. 1989).
60. "The informant called a department of the Superior Court in Van Nuys, identifying
himself as "Deputy District Attorney Michaels" with the Organized Crime Unit down-
town. In response to the informant's request, the court bailiff ordered the informant and
the inmate to be transferred to Van Nuys the following day." GR*,AND JURY REPORT, supra
note 15, at 70-71. See also id. at 46-47; Rohrlich & Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches, supra note
53, at 30.
61. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 76-85. Stephen Cisneros stated that he
committed pejury in five murder cases. Ted Rohrlich, Jailhouse Informant Lied, supra
note 17 at Al. Daniel Armenta said he lied about hearing a person's to hear that person's
confession. Rohrlich & Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches, supra note 53, at 30. Sidney Storch
said he provided at least 12 false confessions (at least three for murder) and was only
caught when he was trying to teach the system to someone else who informed on him. Id.
A subsequent Grand Jury investigation identified 153 cases in which jailhouse infor-
mants testified between 1978 and 1988 in Los Angeles County. GRAND JURY REPORT,
supra note 15, at 4.
62. The methods of others varied. Sidney Storch investigated a name in the newspa-
pers, then sold the information to others who were with the detainee to use to fabricate a
confession. Rohrlich & Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches, supra note 53, at 30.
63. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 22-31. "[Mjany informants believe
that law enforcement officials have directly or indirectly solicited them to actively conduct
themselves to secure incriminating statements from other defendants." Id. at 19. Infor-
mants claimed that jailers made announcements to the general inmate population sug-
gesting that an inmate was an informant in order to transfer that inmate to the informant
section. Id. at 21.
Daniel Armenta said that the sheriff twice placed him with a suspect from his neigh-
borhood in an effort to get information. Rohrlich & Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches, supra note
53, at 30. Because of his lies about the information, the suspect was held on high bail for
over one year. Id.
Richard Slawinski was denied informant status until the sheriff visited a cellmate and
provided enough information for Slawinski to create an acceptable confession. Id. at 31.
The suspect was held on high bail for a year. Id.
rVol. 22:81
mants with information from which a confession could be fabricated."4
Jailers have also physically or psychologically pressured inmates to be-
come or stay informants.65
D. Prosecutorial Abuse of Informants
Prosecutors also mishandle informants. In the United States At-
torney's Office in Chicago, prosecutors catered to nearly every whim
of several high ranking El Rukn gang members who agreed to testify
against other gang members.66 While the witnesses were housed at
the Metropolitan Correctional Center, the prosecutors allowed pri-
vate contact visits between witnesses and their wives and girlfriends. 67
The witnesses participated in sexual relations during these visits, and
received (and later used) illegal drugs.68 The prosecutors permitted
the witnesses to obtain contraband (Ex Lax) to facilitate the passage
of drugs through the witnesses' bodies.69 The prosecutors knew of
sexually explicit telephone conversations between witnesses and a
paralegal,70 suppressed positive drug test results, interceded on the
In ABSCAM, the FBI allowed informant James Davenport to pose as a disgruntled
ex-FBI agent and meet with indicted Congressman Richard Kelly, and his attorney.
United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130,132-33 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Davenport discussed defense
strategy with Kelly and his attorney and stole documents from Kelly's office, including a
list of witnesses to be called. Id. at 133. Davenport then gave the documents to Melvin
Weinberg who sold them to the FBI. lIL
64. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 22-23 (supplying information on
crimes); id. at 26 (left informant with defendant's file and prosecutor's telephone number);
id. at 28 (feeding critical information).
65. On pressure, see id. at 23 (threat of torture); id. at 23-24 (threat to return to gen-
eral population); id. at 24 (Deputy Sheriff broke informant's glasses when informant
threatened to disclose the informant system and law enforcement's complicity); id. at 24-25
(pressure from other inmates).
66. United States v. Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1993); United States v. An-
drews, 824 F. Supp. 1273 (N.D. Ill. 1993); United States v. Burnside, 824 F. Supp. 1215
(N.D. Ill. 1993); Matt O'Connor, Ex-paralegal Says Prosecutor Used Drug Deals Against
Rukns, CHm. Tam., Dec. 15, 1993, § 2, at 6; Matt O'Connor, Official Called Rukn Floor
"Out of Control," Judge Says, Cm. TRm., Jan. 20, 1994, § 2, at 4; Matt O'Connor, Ruling
Threatens Rukn Convictions, CHi. TRB., June 5, 1993, § 1, at 1; Matt O'Connor, Rukn
Prosecutors Are Accused of Side Deals with Ex-gang Chiefs, Cal. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1993, § 1,
at 5.
The Los Angeles Grand Jury found that informants "are permitted an unusual degree
of contact with prosecutors." GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 31 (accept tele-
phone calls, act as intermediaries). Similarly, while not informants per se, the rewards
given to these witnesses reflect the vast range of the government's power to tempt and
placate, and the witness/informant's ability to turn the situation to his or her advantage.
67. Boyd, 833 F. Supp. at 1323-27.
68. Id. at 1325-26.
69. Id. at 1307.
70. Id. at 1328-29.
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witnesses' behalf at the jail, and provided the witnesses with money,
gifts, and access to government telephone lines. 71 This information
was not disclosed to defense counsel at the trials in which the wit-
nesses testified and the defendants were convicted.
In selecting informants, prosecutors have also failed to investigate
or have simply ignored informant backgrounds. Prosecutors have
held preparation sessions with informants, planted informants, and or-
dered the taping of conversations with represented persons.72 At trial,
prosecutors have continued to prosecute defendants despite having in-
formation that the informants have lied73 or that an informant's status
or background was not properly disclosed.74 Prosecutors have also
71. Id. at 1289-322 (drug use and prosecutor's knowledge); id. at 1323-27 (contact vis-
its); id. at 1327-28 (telephone privileges); id. at 1328-29 (sexually explicit telephone calls
with paralegal); id. at 1331-32 (gifts, clothing and parties); Burnside, 824 F. Supp. at 1225-
38 (drug use and prosecutor's knowledge); id. at 1250-64 (Brady violations); id. at 1241-45
(contact visits); id. at 1245-46 (telephone privileges); id. at 1247-48 (gifts); id. at and 1248-
49 (sexually explicit telephone calls with paralegal).
72. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 99-101 (for individuals as well as groups
of informants); Deborah Squires, 2d Circuit Modifies Ruling on Informants, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
27, 1988, at I (U.S. Attorney set up meeting between informant and represented accused in
violation of disciplinary rules).
73. Leslie White had told prosecutors, ten years earlier, of his perjury. In addition, he
had been labelled a "flake." Berke, supra note 59, at 11. Israel Isaacs said he witnessed a
murder, but was in jail at the time. When confronted with the lie, he continued to change
his story until it conformed to reality. The prosecution noted that he was a liar, but still
intended to use him as a witness. Isaacs was released, but the suspect was kept in jail for 10
weeks before the charges were dismissed. Rohrlich & Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches, supra
note 53, at 31.
In another case, the prosecution knew the informant had more felony and perjury
convictions than he admitted in testimony. James Rainey, Defense Will File Complaints
Against McMartin Prosecutor, L.A. TimEs, Jan. 27, 1990, at B3.
See also Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1986) (knowing use of false
testimony in non-informant setting); GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 16 (all but
one informant admitted committing perjury at least one time).
74. United States v. Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277, 1335-51 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Burnside, 824 F.
Supp. at 1238-41, 1251-64. The Los Angeles Grand Jury found significant evidence that the
District Attorney's staff had full knowledge of informant abuses prior to the public disclo-
sures. GRAND JuRy REPORT, supra note 15, at 97-111. Edward Moran's previous lies in a
murder case were not disclosed to the defense. Rohrlich, Trial Unfair, supra note 19, at B8.
Prosecutor Frank Schaub admitted to withholding evidence and allowing perjured testi-
mony that later helped free a murder convict after 23 years. Richardson's Prosecutor Ad-
mits Withholding Evidence, supra note 16. The conviction was based upon alleged
confessions to jailhouse informants. Id.
In the case of informant John Tulittle, the prosecution claimed that Thttle had a tape
with incriminating statements made by the defendant. Cullen, supra note 38, at 18. The
prosecution, however, lied in order to keep the case pending. A year later, the charges
were dismissed because the tape did not exist. Id.
In ABSCAM, the prosecution did not disclose the identity of James Davenport to the
defense. United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130,132 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Davenport posed as an
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obtained short-term release for informants through misrepresenta-
tions.75 Thus, prosecutors, jailers, and police have great discretion in
handling informants that often results in their misuse.76
E. The Rewards System
Prosecutors, sheriffs, and police rely on the reward system to mo-
tivate informants. This system is the link between informant and han-
dler in each of the above examples.77 All levels of the informant-
handler relationship are equally susceptible to abuse because the in-
formant expects rewards and favors from the handler without any for-
ex-FBI agent and met with defendant Kelly and his attorney. Id. at 133. Davenport then
stole documents from them during a meeting. Id.
75. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 34 (not for investigatory purposes); id. at
35 (informant arrested while out on temporary release in exchange for cooperation); id. at
35-36 (court revoked temporary release order when parole officer complained). Prosecu-
tors have also abused the rewards of favorable resolution of charges, sentencing or incar-
ceration. Id. at 75 (submitting letters and giving testimony to obtain dismissal of charges,
lesser sentences or reducing terms of imprisonment). See also Boyd, 833 F. Supp. at 1351-
65.
76. Other instances of harm arise not from a single source of mishandling, but rather
from layers of mishandling by police, prosecutors, and jailers because of natural overlap in
the criminal justice system. For example, a number of people were convicted due to the
testimony of informant Stephen Cisneros, who claimed to have committed perjury several
times. The police and prosecutors indiscriminately used, supported, and defended Cis-
neros even though a psychologist previously described him as an "inveterate liar." GRAND
JURY REPORT, supra note 58, at 16; Informant Lied, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 1990, at 6. The
prosecution had this information, chose to ignore it and did not provide it to the defense
when using the informant as a witness. New Murder Trial Granted in Informant Scandal,
UPI, Dec. 15, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The informant, Stephen
Cisneros, had been an informant on the street and in jail. Rohrlich, Jailhouse Informant
Lied, supra note 17, at A38; Ted Rohrlich, Deals Won Jail Informant Freedom to Attack
Again, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1989, at Al [hereinafter Deals Won]. He admitted to commit-
ting perjury in five murder cases. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 16; Rohrlich,
Jailhouse Informant Lied, supra note 17, at A24. He also stated that his lies were at the
behest of police. Ted Rohrlich, Scandal over Jail Informants Forces Retrial, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1989, at Al [hereinafter Rohrlich, Scandal Forces Retrial]; Rohrlich, Jailhouse
Informant Lied, supra note 17, at A40. In two instances he said that the police gave him
the story to tell, in another they gave him the paperwork, and in another they connected
him with another informant. Rohrlich, Jailhouse Informant Lied, supra note 19, at A39.
James Richardson was charged with poisoning his children. The prosecutor used the
fabricated confessions of three jailhouse informants to convict him of capital murder and
effectively cover up the local sheriff's complicity in the murder of the children. Richardson
v. State, 247 So. 2d 296, 303 (Fla. 1971) (relying upon corroboration of jailhouse inform-
ant's testimony by each other). Richardson was initially on death row until then existing
capital punishments laws were declared unconstitutional in 1972. He then served 23 years
on a life sentence until an informant came forward. Witness Recants Testimony, UPI, Dec.
12, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
77. RICHARD H. BLUM, DECEIVERS AND DECEIVED 170 (1972) (symbiotic working
relationship between criminal informants and police).
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mal controls on either party to the agreement.78 In prison, the lure of
rewards and the resulting manipulative ability of prisoners lead, not
only to direct abuse of the rewards system, but also to inmate influ-
ence on the criminal process. 79
Informants have come to expect rewards from handlers. These
expectations are satisfied in a variety of forms depending upon the
circumstances and demands of the parties. A prisoner may seek bet-
ter conditions in prison, or some benefit to a third party.80 An inform-
ant who faces pending charges may seek favorable consideration when
charged, sentenced, or released. 81 Other informants may simply seek
78. Although prosecutors do have a duty to follow up on information, such as from the
FBI and its agents, Bergman v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 407,417 (W.D. Mich. 1982), this
appears to be far from routine. In general, the prosecution has a duty to seek the truth and
correct any misleading testimony. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959); In re Ferguson, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Cal.
1971); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILI EC 7-13 (1983).
79. One attorney testified that after his client witnessed an incident, he was then
placed with informants. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 38-39. At his client's
preliminary hearing eight informants testified that his client had confessed. Id. Thereafter,
more informants called him and he became concerned that they might claim that he said
something. Id. "You become at the mercy of these people." Id.; See also supra notes 58-61
and accompanying text.
80. On better conditions, see GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 12 (extra tele-
phone calls, visits, food, movie or television access); id. at 13 (transfer to a cell with a
television and coffee pot); id. at 14 (transfer to a better jail); id. at 15 (spared disciplinary
procedures); Berke, supra note 59, at 11 (private stereos and televisions).
On third party benefits, see GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 13 (decrease
bond on girlfriend); id. at 15 (paid $100 to informant's wife).
81. According to the Grand Jury Report, informants even asked the Special Counsel
appointed in the probe for help after testifying. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 22.
On the charges, see id. at 13 (drop charges); id. at 92-94; People v. Wtlliams, 751 P.2d
901, 906 n.5 (Cal. 1988) (testimony of informant reduced the charges against him), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 975 (1988); Cullen, supra note 38, at 24 (FBI interceded in assault and
battery, then in drunk driving and assault charges); Reiter, supra note 38, at 9 (local police
ignored request to arrest informant for violating probation); Rohrlich, Challenge Dealt
Blow, supra note 19, at B1 (dismissal of charges); Rohrlich, Deals Won, supra note 76, at
A24 (prosecutor sent commendation letter to prosecutor of informant); Witness Recants
Testimony, supra note 76, at 2.
On sentencing, see GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 13 (reduced sentence; in
one instance three police officers testified for an informant at sentencing); id. at 92-95;
Mark Platte, 3 Officers Suspended in Team Inquiry, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7,1991, at B1 (prosti-
tute's sentence for passing bad checks reduced two months after she gave police informa-
tion linking officers and prostitutes); Reiter, supra note 38, at 9 (informant began working
for police after arrested for writing bad checks); Rohrlich, Deals Won, supra note 76, at
A26 (rape sentence reduced from six years in a mental institution to two years in jail);
Rohrlich, Jailhouse Informant Lied, supra note 17, at A40 (robbery sentence reduced from
15 to two years).
A federal statute specifically includes latitude to incorporate informant benefits for a
downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. "Upon motion of the Government,
the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute
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cash payments or gifts. 2 Government budgets finance this reward
system. 83 The rewards system instills not only the desire and need for
as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investiga-
tion or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." 28 U.S.C. § 994(n)
(1988).
Thus, the sentencing guidelines anticipate a wholesale departure where the prosecutor
seeks lenience for someone who cooperated as an informant. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS § 5k1.1 (1987); Tony Garop-
polo, Downward Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 26 CRIM. L. BULL.
291, 300-01 (1990). However, the guidelines provide for no such departure in the case of
government and/or informant misconduct. James A. Plaisted, Softening Tough Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, N.J.LJ., Apr. 18, 1991, at 11. However, some courts have done this
on their own. United States v. Medina, No. 89-0592CR, 1990 WL 106785, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
July 27, 1990) (downward departure where government coerced or provoked defendant's
behavior through informant); United States v. Ferrand, No. 89-0592CR, 1990 WL 106783,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1990).
On release, see GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 13-14 (release 10 days after
sentenced for manslaughter); id. at 33-34 (informant drafted letter of recommendation to
Board of Prisons, the contents of which were not verified); id. at 92-94; Basler, supra note
38, at B3 (most informants are "working off" their cases to reduce their sentences); Rohr-
lich, Challenge to Using Informants Dealt Blow, supra note 19, at B8 (furloughs); Rohrlich,
Deals Won, supra note 76, at A26; Rohrlich & Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches, supra note 53,
§ 1, at 31 (Isaacs released).
82. On cash payments, see GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 14 (pocket
change); id. at 15 ($100 to $300 after release; $300 for testimony); id. at 133-39; United
States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (FBI paid Melvin Weinberg $1000 a
month from 1978-1979 and $3000 a month thereafter in ABSCAM); Basler, supra note 38,
at B3 (police paid $1000 per kilogram of 80% pure heroin not to exceed $5000); Cullen,
supra note 38, at 19 (FBI paid John Tuttle $20,000 over nine months). Of New York's 300
confidential informants in 1981, 40-60 worked for direct cash payments. Basler, supra note
38, at B3. In ABSCAM, Melvin Weinberg was paid $133,150 plus a lump sum contingent
upon the overall operation's success. MARx, supra note 14, at 153.
In California, money from the Victim-Witness Protection Fund is allocated to infor-
mants. During the 1989-1990 fiscal year, $100,000 was used where informants cited a
threat, charges had been filed, and a witness would testify. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra
note 15, at 135. There is no follow-up procedure to check the veracity of the information
given, aside from requiring receipts, once the officer makes his request for payment. Id.
Specific federal statutes empower the Attorney General to authorize payments to in-
formants. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(g)(3) (1988) (allowing informant compensation from
forfeiture proceeds for violations of RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988)); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1619 (1988) (allowing compensation to informers for providing information on customs
and navigation law violations of 25% of the proceeds up to $50,000); 21 U.S.C. § 886(a)
(1981) (allowing Drug Enforcement Administration appropriations to be paid to infor-
mants); 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (1988) (allowing Secretary of Treasury to pay informants for in-
formation on Internal Revenue Code violations); 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(B)-(C) (allowing
for payment of informant expenses).
On gifts, see GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 14 (cigarettes, candy, doughnuts,
cookies); id. at 15 (lunch outside prison and free apartment rent after release); Basler,
supra note 38, at B3 (rent, phone bills, hotel and restaurant tabs, or even interest on loans);
Rohrlich, Jailhouse Informant Lied, supra note 17, at A38 (cigarettes).
83. Between 1991 and 1993, the federal government paid more than $1.5 million to
informants for information to locate and prosecute terrorists. Reward to Be Offered for 2d
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more rewards in the informant, but also establishes the systemic sup-
port for the informant to maximize the benefit at any cost. For exam-
ple, government handlers are given wide discretion, little guidance,
and little training in making this assessment. Most contemporary po-
lice departments do not have standards or guidelines for informant
control.' Prosecutors are generally "left to individual discretion" on
handling informants. District Attorneys have promulgated no regula-
tions or guidelines to direct prosecutors on the disclosure of informant
information to the court. Thus, prosecutors are not instructed as to
when rewards may be too enticing or counter-productive. Without
such guidelines, law enforcement easily avoids any balancing of
rights.85
III. Judicial Models Addressing Informant Misconduct
The U.S. court system has countenanced the use and tolerance of
informants since its inception.86 Courts confront and address inform-
ant misconduct or mishandling in both criminal and civil litigation.
Often courts fail or refuse to recognize the handler's accountability
and responsibility for the informant. This approach denies the exist-
ence of linkages between the handler and the informant while simulta-
neously denying adequate relief to the victims of informant
misconduct. Denying the handler's accountability represents the per-
vasive impact of the court's assumption of risk doctrine as developed
Fugitive in Bombing, AP, Sept. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File. In
1988 the Drug Enforcement Administration released information indicating an annual in-
formant budget of two to four million dollars. Lehr, supra note 83 at A27. In 1981, the
New York Police Department spent almost $500,000 on informants. Basler, supra note 38,
at B3. In 1975, the FBI spent $2 million on the purchase of information and $3.5 million on
informants. WILSON, supra note 4, at 77.
84. David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can The Violence be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 465, 474 (1992).
85. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 76-84 (examples); id. at 95 (letters). In
California, prosecutors have an obligation to the jury to aid in performing their function.
People v. Phillips, 711 P.2d 423, 432 (Cal. 1985).
86. In United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951), Judge Learned Hand was faithful to the traditional law enforcement view in provid-
ing the oft-quoted statement: "Courts have countenanced the use of informants from time
immemorial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other cases when the crime consists of preparing
for another crime, it is usually necessary to rely upon them or upon accomplices because
the criminals will almost certainly proceed covertly." See also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545,557 (1977); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,445 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 315 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Legal
commentators agree also. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 20, at 210; Tomkovicz, supra note 20,
at 3 (1988); Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interroga-
tion"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 69 (1978).
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in the context of Fourth Amendment challenges to searches and
seizures.
Courts typically find an informant's misconduct to be independ-
ent of the government handler or sufficiently distanced from the han-
dler to break any causal connection. Most courts hold that people
assume the risk of their statements when they confide in others, in-
cluding informants.8 7 The only cases in which courts consistently find
informants to be acting under color of law are those which fall under
the Federal Wiretap Act.88 Thus, the courts are generally unreceptive
to victims' pleas of informant misconduct and mishandling.
The judicial doctrines of assumption of risk and distancing per-
meate both civil and criminal proceedings. More often than not, the
court will find that no linkages exist between handler and informant.
In the criminal context, the victim can raise known misconduct in a
suppression hearing, a motion to dismiss the charges, or a motion for a
new trial.89 In applying the assumption of risk and distancing doc-
trines, the motion may be denied because the harm was not error or
only harmless error.90 In the civil context, the victim may bring a state
87. "The due process clause does not protect [a defendant] from voluntarily reposing
his trust in one who turns out to be unworthy of it." United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d
1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987); see infra notes 98-133, 158-175
and accompanying text. Courts have even imposed on the government a duty to protect
informants. Swanner v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (M.D. Ala. 1967), rev'd on
other grounds, 406 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1969).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1988); Obron Atlantic Corp. v. Barr, 990 F.2d 861, 863-64
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); United States v. Shields, 675 F.2d 1152, 1156-57 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 475-77 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978). 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1988) reads: "It shall
not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a
wire, oral, or electric communication, where such person is a party to the communication
or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception."
Informants are typically considered acting under color of law when "there is sufficient
government involvement." Thomas v. Pearl, 793 F. Supp. 838, 841 (C.D. Ill. 1992), affid,
998 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 688 (1994).
89. See United States v. Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277, 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (granting El
Rukn defendants a new trial because the Assistant U.S. Attorney knowingly allowed key
witnesses to use illegal drugs, have contact visits involving sexual intercourse, and to have
sexually explicit conversations with a paralegal in his office, among other things).
The prosecution then has to decide whether or not to retry the defendant in light of
the new limitation. At times, the defendant is released from custody.
90. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1991) (holding that at times a
coerced confession can constitute harmless error); White, supra note 20, at 103 (discussing
framework for analyzing due process violations arising out of informant misconduct).
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tort action,9 ' a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 92 or
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).93 Only in the
rarest cases, however, is civil relief reasonably obtainable because the
court may find no action under color of law (necessary to a § 1983
claim) or no agency relationship (necessary to many state tort claims
and the FTCA).9 4 The assumption of risk and distancing doctrines
also fatally weaken the essential element of proximate cause.
91. This is typically a negligent hiring or entrustment claim. See, e.g., Liuzzo v. United
States, 508 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (plaintiffs claimed government, through wrong-
ful acts of FBI informants and agents, was responsible for their mother's death).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This section states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. The statute was originally the first section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871,
ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.; See, e.g., Slagle v. United States, 612 F.2d 1157, 1158 (9th
Cir. 1980) (plaintiff brought suit against government after being shot and paralyzed while
accompanying a federal drug informant).
94. See, e.g., Beard v. O'Neal, 728 F.2d 894, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1984) (informant is not
liable for witnessing, but failing to prevent, a crime), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984);
Bond v. Asiala, 704 F.2d 309, 312 (6th Cir. 1983) (court remanded for determination of
imposition of liability for police negligence); Slagle, 612 F.2d at 1163 (government not lia-
ble for informant's acts); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 625 (7th Cir. 1979) (inform-
ant liable for conspiracy to violate civil rights arising out of the raid and murders at the
apartment of several Black Panther Party members), rev'd in part, 446 U.S. 754 (1980);
Coffy v. Multi-County Narcotics Bureau, 600 F.2d 570, 579 (6th Cir. 1979) (use of under-
cover investigative techniques and procedures by drug agents were proper police activi-
ties); Brown v. State's Attorney, 783 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (government not
liable unless an official policy caused the asserted constitutional violation); Matje v. Leis,
571 F. Supp. 918, 927 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (improper investigative tactics under color of state
law precluded good faith immunity); Bergman v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 407, 411-13
(W.D. Mich. 1982).
This is due to a number of factors including the nature of the investigation. For in-
stance, in the El Rukn situation the defendants were charged with serious drug offenses
and linked to the El Rukn "gang," neither of which would garner much sympathy from a
jury. In general, any serious crime suspect faces the prospect of a grueling civil trial. Cf
Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir. 1993) (murder suspect claimed police
tortured him).
Further, a large number of these complaints come in First Amendment challenges to
the infiltration of legitimate political organizations. See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1,
13 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs claim unreasonable government interference in First Amend-
ment rights), cert. denied sub nom. Brennan v. Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Ghandi v.
Police Dep't of Detroit, 823 F.2d 959, 963-64 (6th Cir. 1987) (affirming the involuntary
dismissal of FBI agents and informant where the informant was instructed to maintain a
passive, legitimate role as an unpaid information-gathering informant, but did more), cert.
denied sub nom. Ghandhi v. Fayed, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988).
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These doctrines are also incorporated in other areas of the legal
process, usually to the benefit of the informant and handler. Judges
rely upon the prosecution when evaluating informants as witnesses or
deciding whether to reduce charges, to reduce a sentence, or other-
wise to benefit a charged or convicted informant.95 Similarly, juries
generally identify informants with the prosecution and the truth-seek-
ing process. For example, the prosecution will make a "deal" with the
informant to collect information and testify in exchange for benefits.
Many informants, however, will lie and state that they have not been
promised anything because they have not yet received any benefit
(i.e., the benefit will arise after the informant's testimony when the
prosecution advises the court of an informant's cooperation at a sub-
sequent sentencing).96 Thus, a court's unwillingness to seriously in-
quire into the informant-handler relationship allows both the handler
and the informant to misrepresent or mischaracterize facts.97
A. The Assumption of Risk Doctrine
The thrust of the assumption of risk doctrine is the principle that
the Constitution will not protect individuals who unknowingly divulge
incriminating information to informants or undercover law enforce-
ment officials. In Gouled v. United States,98 a federal informant and
business acquaintance met with the defendant under the pretense of a
social visit.99 Left alone in the office, the informant seized and carried
away several documents.10° The Court found the search and seizure
unconstitutional and refused to distinguish the surreptitious act of the
informant from that of a law enforcement officer due to the pre-ex-
isting relationship between the defendant and the informant.10' Over
the next half century, the Court whittled away at Gouled until the
holding no longer had any substance.
In On Lee v. United States,"° the Court found no Fourth Amend-
ment violation where a wired informant, a former employee of the
defendant, engaged On Lee in conversation."0 3 On Lee made several
95. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 123.
96. Id. at 84. The Grand Jury also documented instances where other law enforcement
officials actually told informants to deny any benefits. Id at 89 n.33.
97. Id. at 19. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (on informant rewards);
infra notes 329-333 and accompanying text (on informant motivations).
98. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
99. Id. at 1304.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 304-06; Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966).
102. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
103. Id. at 754.
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incriminating statements. 1' 4 The Court held the informant's actions
constitutional because the informant entered with On Lee's consent
and no trespass occurred.- 5 The Court narrowed Gouled, by ruling
that only the search, and not the entry, would receive constitutional
protection."° The Court specifically relied on the "connivance" of
one of the parties to the conversation as removing any constitutional
taint.10 7
Next, in Lopez v. United States,0 8 the Court found no Fourth
Amendment violation where a government agent surreptitiously
taped a conversation. 09 Lopez offered a federal agent a bribe." 0 Af-
ter this first encounter, the agent returned with a recording device."'
The agent went along with the scheme to elicit incriminating state-
ments." 2 The Court distinguished Gouled because nothing was taken
"surreptitiously without [Lopez's] knowledge," only statements that
he should have known could be used against him." 3
Two cases decided on the same day in 1966 further articulated the
assumption of risk doctrine. In Lewis v. United States,"4 a federal un-
dercover agent telephoned Lewis, misrepresented himself, and told
Lewis that a mutual friend said Lewis could sell him drugs." 5 Lewis
agreed and directed the agent to Lewis' home where the sale took
place." 6 The Court found no Fourth Amendment violation in the
home entry because Lewis invited the agent into his house for the
express "purposes contemplated by the occupant.""17 Furthermore,
the agent only removed the drugs as agreed."'
In Hoffa v. United States," 9 the Court upheld the placement of an
informant in Jimmy Hoffa's entourage while he was on trial in Nash-
104. Id. at 749.
105. Id. at 751-52.
106. Id. at 751.
107. Id. at 754. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (telephone wiretap is
not search due to absence of physical entry into the defendant's home or office); Stone,
supra note 20, at 1221.
108. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
109. Id. at 438.
110. Id. at 430.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 431.
113. Id. at 438; id. at 465-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing on assumption of risk).
114. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
115. Id. at 207.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 211.
118. Id. at 210-13.
119. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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ville.' 2 The informant, a Teamsters official, was privy to many meet-
ings and conversations, including discussions regarding jury
tampering. 21 The informant duly reported the information to the fed-
eral authorities. 22 In exchange, the informant's wife received $1,200
from the government and the informant's pending state and federal
charges against him were dropped.'" A plurality of the Court found
no Fourth Amendment violation because Hoffa invited the informant
into his suite and Hoffa simply misplaced his confidence in the inform-
ant.124 The majority and dissent both agreed that this type of inform-
ant use was vital to the effective functioning of our criminal justice
system.' 5 In dissent, however, Chief Justice Warren stated that the
government would not tolerate a criminal defendant's comparable
tactics against the government. 26
120. Id. at 303.
121. Id. at 317.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 298. The government obtained a release for Edward Partin, a Teamster offi-
cial who was under indictment in Louisiana, and sent him to Nashville to join, observe, and
listen as Hoffa was on trial. Id. at 317 (Warren, CJ., dissenting). Partin desperately wanted
to get out of jail and, according to the affidavit of his cellmate in Louisiana, concocted a
story about his close ties to Hoffa in order to obtain release. Partin insisted to his cellmate
that he could "fix it up" if he did not obtain enough information from Hoffa. Id. at 318 n.2.
Clearly, Partin was acting solely out of self-interest and did not care about sacrificing
Hoffa. He stated, "I'm thinking about myself.... I don't give a damn about Hoffa." Id.
As a result of the federal officials' desire to get Hoffa at any cost, Partin's bail was
reduced from $50,000 to $5,000 and he was released. Id. at 319. Partin was "well paid"
through payments to his wife and promises not to pursue the indictments. Id. Compare
the similarity of this with the Los Angeles Jailhouse scandal. Supra notes 15-61 and accom-
panying text.
124. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
125. Id. at 311 (Stewart, J.,); id. at 315 (Warren, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren
distinguished Hoffa from Lewis and Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). Hoffa,
385 U.S. at 314-21. In Osborn, a police officer had been approached by Osborn to bribe a
relative of the officer who was on the jury. Osborn, 385 U.S. at 316-17. The authorities
employed the officer to confirm the conversations and protect the officer's credibility. Id.
In contrast, Chief Justice Warren believed that Partin had overstepped his limited potential
role as an informant because of his background and the obscure nature of the mission the
authorities had in mind. Id at 320-21 (This situation contains "a serious potential for un-
dermining the integrity of the truth-finding process in the federal courts. Given the incen-
tives and background of Partin, no conviction should be allowed to stand when based
heavily on his testimony."). Id. at 320.
The majority placed weight on the cross-examination and jury instructions to address
any motivation on Partin's part to lie. Id. at 311. Partin was cross-examined for a week,
the defense was given wide latitude in cross examination, and the judge specifically in-
structed the jury on the defense theory. Id. at 312 nn.12 & 13.
126. "Certainly if a criminal defendant insinuated his informer into the prosecution's
camp in this manner he would be guilty of obstructing justice." Id. at 321.
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Next, in Katz v. United States, 27 the Court reviewed whether the
police had violated the Fourth Amendment by placing a warrantless
listening device on a public telephone.1'8 The Court found a Fourth
Amendment violation because "what [the defendant] seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be con-
stitutionally protected."129 This decision, however, appears not to
limit the conduct of informants.
In United States v. White,'30 a majority of the Court held that
while the Fourth Amendment specifically controls the recording of
conversations by informants, this same constitutional protection does
not extend to the use of informants in general.''
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize
and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police....
[I]f he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has,
the risk is his. In terms of what his course will be, what he will
or will not do or say, we are unpersuaded that he would distin-
guish between probable informers on the one hand and prob-
able informers with transmitters on the other.' 32
Therefore, the full influence of the assumption of risk doctrine
insulates the police informant while the police themselves are unpro-
tected. The government can actively place informants, in the name of
law enforcement, into situations solely at the risk of the target. Fur-
ther application of the assumption of risk theory to situations where
companies turned over customer records to the government signals
the complete erosion of Gouled133
B. Informant Misconduct in the Criminal Cases
In criminal cases, courts typically encounter challenges to the use
of informants in suppression hearings regarding warrants or confes-
sions. Court analysis generally focuses on the defendant (not the in-
formant), the constitutional right at issue, and the relief requested.
These foci insulate the law enforcement arrangement with the inform-
ant, avoid consideration of the linkage between the two, and offer no
127. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
128. Id. at 348-49.
129. Id. at 351.
130. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
131. Id. at 753 (White, J., writing for four members of the Court); id. at 787 (Harlan, J.,
agreeing on only this point).
132. Id. at 752.
133. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (telephone company); United States v.
New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (telephone company); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976) (bank); California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (bank); see
also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
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recognition of, insight into, or relief from the broader problems of
informant misconduct and mishandling.
The constitutional claims raised in cases involving informant mis-
conduct and mishandling include violations of the right to due process
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment,3 and the right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment. 35 In instances of extremely outrageous
conduct on the part of the informant, the individual may obtain rever-
sal of the conviction. 136 However, even when the doctrinal approach
addresses questionable informant tactics, the courts almost never
question or analyze the systemic use of informants.'3 7 An in-depth
review of two particular areas, jailhouse confessions and entrapment
or set-ups, confirms these findings.
1. Jailhouse Confessions
In general, active deliberate solicitation of statements relating to
pending charges is not constitutionally permissible. An agent, how-
ever, may passively listen to obtain spontaneous statements about
pending charges. Even within this framework, courts defer to law en-
forcement and distinguish between informants and law enforcement.
Several particular factors are at issue in determining the constitution-
ality of a jailhouse confession: (1) whether the right to counsel has
attached (Sixth Amendment); (2) whether the informant actively or
passively interacted with the defendant (Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments); and (3) whether the discussion was coercive (Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments).
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, once it has attached, pro-
hibits the State from denying the accused the ability to consult with
counsel prior to making an incriminating statement. In Massiah v.
134. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[TMhe suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution."); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 at 303-04, 310-12
(1966); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). See generally White, supra note 20.
135. See, e.g., Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 304-10. See generally Tomkovicz, supra note 20; Lund-
strom, supra note; 20 LURM, supra note 20.
136. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Brady, 373 U.S. 89; Roviaro
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53. See also infra notes 207-231 and accompanying text (cases on
outrageousness).
137. Courts, essentially, pay lip service to accountability for informants: "The Govern-
ment cannot disown [an informer] and insist it is not responsible for his actions.... The
Government cannot make such use of an informer and then claim disassociation through
ignorance." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373-75 (1958). "The principle... is
not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to
the accused." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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United States,138 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was violated when, post-indictment, an informant engaged
Massiah in a conversation during which he made several incriminating
comments. 139 The questioning, simultaneously overheard by law en-
forcement, violated Massiah's right to have counsel present during an
interrogation. 4 °
Later, in Brewer v. Williams,14 1 the Court clarified when this Sixth
Amendment right was triggered. 42 Williams was questioned by po-
lice after he had been arraigned on an outstanding arrest warrant.143
The Court held that the right to counsel is implicated "at or after the
time that judicial proceedings have been initiated.""
This protection allows the accused to see a lawyer once requested
and prevents law enforcement from actively extracting a confession
from the accused.' 45 It does not matter whether the defendant is re-
leased on bail or is in custody pending trial. 46 In United States v.
Henry, the Court held that the deliberate elicitation of statements
from Henry, while he was in jail awaiting trial, violated his right to
counsel. 47 Although the informant was instructed not to question
Henry, the Court found that making the informant's payment contin-
gent upon receipt of the information induced more active solicitation
than the Constitution can tolerate. 48
The holding in Henry focuses largely on the intentions of the in-
formant. Thus, in Maine v. Moulton,"4 the Court held that an inform-
ant's active discussions of defense strategy violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights.' 50 There, the State violated Moulton's
rights by wiring his co-defendant for a meeting where the express pur-
pose was to discuss trial defense strategy.151
138. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
139. Id. at 205-06.
140. Id.
141. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
142. Id. at 398.
143. Id. at 392-93.
144. Id. at 398.
145. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Massiah, 377 U.S. 201.
146. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
147. Id. at 274.
148. Id. at 268-70.
149. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
150. Id. at 176-77.
151. Id. Knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused
without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circum-
vent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportu-
nity. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating
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The Court has limited the right to counsel through the develop-
ment of several exceptions. In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 52 an informant
was placed in the defendant's cell for the purpose of listening for the
names of confederates.' 53 Although no such specific statements were
made, at trial the prosecution sought to use other statements made by
the defendant. 154 The Court held that the conduct did not violate Wil-
son's right to counsel because the statements were spontaneous and
unsolicited, and because the informant was instructed not to ask any
questions.15 5 The Court held that, for a constitutional violation to ex-
ist, the agent must go beyond mere listening, and must deliberately
attempt to elicit statements. 6
Sixth Amendment protection was further eroded in subsequent
decisions that allowed informants to intrude into discussions between
a defendant and counsel.' 57 In Weatherford v. Bursey, 5 8 the Court
held that informant attendance at meetings between the defendant
and counsel violates neither the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
nor the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.159 The Court
stated that no constitutional violation occurs if the attendance was not
for the purpose of seeking information, the informant did not ask
questions, the informant did not relay information to the government
statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a
confrontation between the accused and a state agent. Id. at 176. Prior to Moulton, the
Court had rejected similar arguments about uncharged crimes in Hoffa where the inform-
ant's purpose was to gather incriminating information about a crime other than the pend-
ing charges. See also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1991) (Miranda warnings not
necessary where the suspect spoke with an agent about non-pending charges).
152. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
153. Id. at 439.
154. Id. at 440.
155. Id at 440.
156. Id. at 459.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (ABSCAM defend-
ant challenged use of FBI informant to invade meeting with defense counsel and steal
defense related documents including a list of witnesses); see also GrNn JURY REPORT,
supra note 15, at 41-42 (because of problems with jailhouse informants many defense attor-
neys do not give defendants materials, which the wrong person could use to fabricate a
confession; this hinders trial preparation, burdens the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
and fosters a lack of trust in the defendant); Philip Halpern, Government Intrusion into the
Attorney-Client Relationship: An Interest Analysis of Rights and Remedies, 32 BuFF. L.
REV. 127, 153 (1983); Note, Government Intrusions into the Defense Camp: Undermining
the Right to Counsel, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1143, 1147 (1984); Lurie, supra note 20, at 795;
Comment, The Sixth Amendment Implications of a Government Informer's Presence at De-
fense Meetings, 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 535, 535 (1984).
158. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
159. Id. at 558.
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handlers, the attendance was only to maintain the informant's cover,
and no identifiable prejudice resulted. 160
Bursey and Weatherford were charged with vandalizing a selec-
tive service office in South Carolina. 6' Unbeknownst to Bursey,
Weatherford was an informant working with the police and had given
the police information leading to their arrests. 62 After release on
bond, each hired separate counsel.163 At Bursey's invitation, Wea-
therford attended two meetings between Bursey and his attorney.!64
On the day of trial, when the prosecutor decided to use Weatherford
as a witness, Bursey learned that Weatherford was an informant. 6
The Supreme Court refused to impose a bright line test regarding
meetings between a defendant and counsel attended by an inform-
ant. 66 However, the Court did outline circumstances which would re-
quire greater scrutiny: if Weatherford had testified regarding the
conversations, if any State's evidence came from the conversations, if
the statements had been used in any manner detrimental to Bursey, or
if the prosecution had learned of the conversations. 67 The Court re-
jected the argument that any information reported by Weatherford
would have been inherently detrimental. 68 The Court found no in-
herent detriment from an informant reporting to the prosecution be-
cause "[t]hough imaginative, this reasoning is not a realistic assessment
of the relationship between Weatherford and the prosecuting staff.'1 69
The Court, however, wholly credited the necessity of maintaining
Weatherford as an undercover informant for other assignments and
did not balance the interests at issue. 70 The Court relied on the as-
160. Id. at 556-58.




165. Id. at 547-49 (Weatherford had been seen in the company of police, thus his effec-
tiveness as an informant had diminished).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 554. Here, the Court specifically held that Black v. United States, 385 U.S.
26 (1966), and O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967), did not support a bright line
test, although both found surreptitious electronic surveillance of meetings with counsel in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 552. In addition, the Court drew on the lack of
any constitutional violation in Hoffa. Id.; see supra notes 119-126.
168. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 554.
169. Id. at 556.
170. Because of the assumption of risk, the Court reasoned, the bright line test of the
court of appeals would "cloud" the conviction if Weatherford had attended the meeting,
Bursey's attorney was suspicious, and as a result "the conversation was confined to the
weather or other harmless subjects." The Court also rejected the Brady claim and the
court of appeals' view that Bursey was "lulled ... into a false sense of security" and denied
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sumption of risk doctrine and stated that Bursey assumed the risk of
inviting an informant to the meeting.171
In dissent, Justice Marshall found sufficient prejudice in Weather-
ford's knowledge.172 Marshall stated that this would most probably
affect his testimony and give him an ability to formulate answers to
meet expected defenses. 173 He criticized the majority for not assum-
ing that the prosecution gained insight from the meetings and learned
Bursey's defense strategies.174 "Weatherford's acquiescence when
told of the prosecutor's decision to use him as a witness meant that the
defense did not suspect Weatherford or have any damaging informa-
tion about him.' '17
Even if informant questioning is coercive, active, and about
charged crimes, the confessions could be harmless error. The Court,
in Arizona v. Fulminante,176 analyzed the coerced confessions under
the Fifth Amendment. 177 The Court had three distinct 5-4 holdings
with varying coalitions of justices. 78
First, writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice White affirmed the Ari-
zona Supreme Court's reversal of the sentence because the confession
was coerced in light of the totality of the circumstances. 79 Second,
the opportunity to consider plea bargaining, investigate Weatherford's background, and
prepare to meet his testimony. The Court deferred to the prosecution's hesitation to use
Weatherford and to concerns that, once identified, many informants will not want to be
confronted and will disappear before trial.
171. Id. at 554.
172. Id. at 564 n.1.
173. Id. at 552.
174. Id. at 564.
175. The Court found no inherent detriment from an informant reporting to the prose-
cution because "[t]hough imaginative, this reasoning is not a realistic assessment of the
relationship between Weatherford and the prosecuting staff." The Court, however, wholly
credited the necessity of maintaining Weatherford as an undercover informant for other
assignments and did not balance the interests at issue. Id. at 565 n.4.
176. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
177. Id. at 286-88.
178. Id. at 281.
179. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286-88. In particular, the circumstances of the conversa-
tions resulted in the finding of coercion. Fulminante was in danger of physical harm from
other prisoners because he was an alleged child murderer. Id. Sarivola knew that Fulmi-
nante had received rough treatment. Using this knowledge, Sarivola offered protection in
exchange for a confession. Id. In response to these circumstances, Fulminante confessed.
Id. at 609. Further, the Court noted that additional factors, not relied on by the state court
below, supported the conclusion of coercion as well, including Fulminante's low intelli-
gence, lack of education, short height, slight build, and prior psychological problems in
prison, as well as Sarivola's friendship. Id., 499 U.S. at 286 n.2; see also GRAND JuRY
REPORT, supra note 15, at 31 (susceptibilities of naive or less astute are an "enticing oppor-
tunity to a wily informant").
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 5-4 majority, held that the harm-
less error rule applies to coerced confessions and that Fulminante's
circumstances were subject to harmless error analysis.' ° Third, Jus-
tice White wrote the 5-4 majority opinion that applied the harmless
error rule, affirmed that a new trial was necessary, and excluded the
confession to the informant, Sarivola.' 8 1
In this latter holding, Justice White raised concerns over the po-
tential untruthfulness of the coerced confession and the considerable
doubt surrounding Sarivola.1a 2 Sarivola had worked for organized
crime while a uniformed officer. 83 He was overzealous in gathering
information for which he was paid; he admitted that he had previously
fabricated a tape recording while an informant in a FBI investigation
where he had received immunity with respect to the information pro-
vided.' 4 His desire to be in the witness protection program estab-
lished a motive for giving detailed information regardless of the
truth.8 5 He only recalled details of the confession from Fulminante a
year later, and only then recalled a second confession to his fiancee. 86
180. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-11. Justice Kennedy separately concurred with Chief
Justice Rehnquist out of concern on this last point. Id. at 313. "If the jury believes that a
defendant has admitted the crime, it doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on that
evidence alone, without careful consideration of the other evidence in the case." Id.
181. Id. at 282-88. Justice Kennedy voted that the harmless error doctrine applies to
coerced confessions (Kennedy, J., concurring), Id. at 313. The majority found that the
confession in this case was the result of coercion and that the confession was not harmless
error. Id. at 302
182. [S]ome coerced confessions may be untrustworthy. Consequently, admission
of coerced confessions may distort the truth-seeking function of the trial upon
which the majority focuses .... More importantly, however, the use of coerced
confession, "whether true or false," is forbidden "because the methods used to
extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal
law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in
which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured
and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own
mouth." This reflects the "strongly felt attitude of our society that important
human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of
securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will," as
well as "the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal
methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves."
Id. at 293 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 299 n.9.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 299 & n.9. The second confession allegedly occurred while Sarivola and his
then-fiancee picked up Fulminante after his release. Id. at 298. Allegedly in response to a
question about why Fulminante wanted to go to Pennsylvania instead of Arizona, Fulmi-
nante confessed the brutal slaying to Donna Sarivola whom he had just met. Id. Although
In exchange for the information, Sarivola received a multitude of ben-
efits, including monetary payments, immunity from prosecution, and
placement in the witness protection program. 187
These cases demonstrate that while the Court prohibits the most
egregious mishandling, the assumption of risk doctrine supports and
encourages the nearly unlimited use of informants. The Court's opin-
ions allow the handler to be distanced from the informant's conduct.
Therefore, the handler's misuse of informants will not be penalized or
questioned.18 8 Meanwhile, the lines drawn by the court remain
unclear. 89
The courts need to impose meaningful and effective control on
jailhouse informant misconduct. For example, Justice White's concern
regarding Sarivola's credibility did not include the coextensive influ-
ence of the reward upon the finder of fact, nor upon the prosecutor
who influenced the finder of fact. 90 Nor did the Court address the
"disgusted" by both the confession and Fulminante, Donna Sarivola did not report the
information to authorities. Id.
Further credibility concerns arise because Sarivola did not report the presence of
Donna to the FBI, nor did he report the second confession for more than a year. Id. at 297
& n.8. At that time, Sarivola asked Donna if she would discuss the second confession with
authorities. Id. at 298.
187. Id. at 299 n.9. Donna Sarivola was also placed in the Witness Protection Program.
Despite mention, these concerns never entered into the Court's decision. See White, supra
note 20, at 104.
188. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1986) (although the handler instructed
the informant only to listen and not ask questions, the informant did tell the defendant that
his story "didn't sound too good"); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264,271 & n.9 (1980)
(the listening device "has no capability of leading the conversation into any particular sub-
ject or prompting any particular replies"); see also White, supra note 20, at 105 (describing
passive/active distinction as "problematic").
189. Tomkovicz, supra note 20, at 77-79 (noting lack of clarity concerning the word
"deliberate"). Grand jury testimony in Los Angeles revealed an unwritten policy of plac-
ing informants to deliberately obtain information. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at
59-68. In addition, the deputies testified that they received "no formalized training or in-
struction on the appropriateness and legality of placing informants to obtain information
from other inmates." Id. at 59. The investigation revealed the same problem with prosecu-
tors "placing" informants, supplying information upon request and having preparation ses-
sions during which they tell informants vital information to fabricate confessions. Id. at 99-
101.
190. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 292-95 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also relied
upon Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), where the conviction was reversed because the
judge had a financial interest in the outcome, despite absence of evidence that bias influ-
enced the outcome. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 294. See also White, supra note 20, at 127
(same criticism).
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reliability of the cross-examination of Sarivola to illuminate the faults
in his role.191
2. Informant Set-Ups and Entrapment
Criminal defendants also confront very active informants in the
context of the creation of criminal enterprises, criminal activity by the
informant, and entrapment. In each of these situations, the informant
actively pursues or sets up the defendant with the explicit or implicit
approval of the handler. The target raises a Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim in response. The courts reinforce the
uncontrolled use of informants by treating these situations similarly
and allowing all but the most extreme and outrageous of informant
and handler misconduct to persist.
In Sorrells v. United States,192 a government agent approached
Sorrells and gained his confidence through war-related stories and
conversation. 193 The agent repeatedly requested illegal whiskey until
Sorrells procured some as a favor for a fellow war veteran. 94 The
Court held that entrapment exists where the government agents "im-
plant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the
alleged offense and induce its commission."195 As such, entrapment is
a complete defense to the charges. 96
In Sherman v. United States,'97 the Court held that Sherman was
entrapped where an informant presented himself as a recovering ad-
dict, claimed to be suffering greatly, and appealed to Sherman to ob-
tain illegal narcotics for him.9 8 The government attempted to
distance itself from the informant and the claim of entrapment. 99
191. Justice White noted in detail that absent the admission of the confession to
Sarivola, he probably would not testify upon retrial. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 300 (noting
that absent the confession, potentially misleading impeachment of Sarivola "would have
had no relevance and would have been inadmissible at trial").
Some see the use of impeachment as an effective tool in controlling informants. See
generally Haglund, supra note 20, at 1423. This technique, however, focuses solely on the
credibility of the informants and overemphasizes their effectiveness. Previously in Hoffa,
the Court placed great reliance on the value of cross-examination. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 311-
12 & nn.12-14.
192. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
193. Id. at 439.
194. Id.
195. Id., at 442; see Donnelly, supra note 5, at 1098-99 (development of entrapment law
pre-Sorrells); id. at 1100-03 (on the theoretical distinction between the majority and minor-
ity opinions in Sorrells).
196. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 449.
197. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
198. Id. at 373.
199. Id.
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The Court, however, refused to allow the government to "disown
Kalchinian [the informant] and insist it is not responsible for his ac-
tions."2' The Court specifically noted that the government had given
the informant incentives regarding pending charges and neglected to
monitor his activity.2°1
Recent holdings narrow the entrapment defense. In United States
v. Russell,20 2 the Court held that no entrapment occurred where a gov-
ernment agent supplied chemicals and requested the production of il-
legal drugs from an on-going operation. °3 The Court held that the
agent's provision of the chemical was not determinative because the
defendant already produced the drug and had other sources to obtain
that chemical.' 4 Recent lower court opinions have similarly nar-
rowed the utility of the entrapment defense. °5 Where the govern-
ment repeatedly attempts to secure criminal activity from an
otherwise indisposed individual, however, the defense will be
available.2°
The decisions where a defendant challenges a government in-
formant or agent's conduct as outrageous based on due process
ground reflect the distancing of informants from handlers. This de-
fense is typically sought where the defendant concedes predisposition,
which renders the defense of entrapment unavailable.0 7 Some fed-
eral appellate courts have limited the application of this defense to
only the rarest of circumstances.208
200. Id.
201. Id. at 374 & n.2.
202. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
203. Id. at 436.
204. Id. at 428-29.
205. See United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1986) (no entrapment where
informant, who had a long history of presenting narcotic crimes to state and federal agen-
cies in exchange for money or favors, struck up a deal for cocaine, approached the FBI but
was turned down, then approached the local police and was accepted).
206. See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992) (government repeatedly sent
unsolicited catalog of child pornography); United States v. Skarie, 971 F.2d 317 (9th Cir.
1992) (defendant only committed crime after repeated threats by informant).
207. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,495 n.7 (1976) (Powell and Blackmun,
JJ., concurring); id. at 497 (Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (government
provided drugs used in sale); Russell, 411 U.S. at 432-33 (citing Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952)).
208. See United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 911 (10th Cir. 1992) (collecting few
cases finding outrageous conduct); United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244, 246 n.4 (6th Cir.
1977) (difficult to prove police involvement outrageous in contraband cases); cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1074 (1978); see also United States v. Pardue, 983 F.2d 835, 841-42 (8th Cir. 1993)
(not outrageous where government concocts particulars of murder-for-hire scheme), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 3043 (1993); United States v. Valdovinos-Valdovinos, 743 F.2d 1436, 1437
(9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that government creation of immigration crimes by
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Several distinct instances of outrageous governmental conduct
can result in a constitutional violation. First, a due process violation
will occur where the government utilizes unwarranted physical or
mental coercion that results in a crime.20 9 Government agents, how-
ever, can act in any manner consistent with the type of criminal activ-
ity under investigation. Thus, if drug dealers ordinarily hold out large
sums of money and make threats in order to do business, then courts
will not find a due process violation where informants or law enforce-
ment officials act similarly.210 Further, conduct such as sexual involve-
ment with the target is not actionable and is treated as an assumption
of risk.21'
Second, law enforcement's complete fabrication of the crime to
secure the arrest and conviction will violate the target's due process
rights. For example, in United States v. Twigg,212 the informant con-
tacted one defendant, suggested setting up a lab to produce
methamphetamine hydrochloride (speed), and assigned tasks to the
defendants.' 3 One defendant was to procure the money to set up a
speed lab, the other was brought in to assist.214 The informant set up
the lab with significant assistance from the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration, including the purchase of the essential ingredient and twenty
percent of the glassware, the rental of a farmhouse for production,
and the arrangement of chemical supply houses to facilitate the
purchase of the remaining suppliesm215
Third, a due process violation exists where the government con-
duct is extremely outrageous. Here, the typical court approach re-
flects a melding of the entrapment and outrageousness defenses. As
in entrapment, agents and informants can act in the same way as any
posing as employer and asking for illegal immigrants without proper papers was outra-
geous because the transporter had no standing to raise defense), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1114
(1984). But see United States v. T'wigg, 588 F.2d 373, 385-89 (3d Cir. 1978) (Adams, J.,
dissenting) (reading Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) to disallow the de-
fense); United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring) (citing Judge Adams' dissent in Twigg for the concept that the due process analysis
cannot change the entrapment defense).
209. See United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 912 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1987) (need brutality and coercion).
210. United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 1987).
211. See Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466.
212. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
213. Id. at 375.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 375-76; see also Mosley, 965 F.2d at 911-12; Greene v. United States, 454
F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971) (government agents collaborated with suspect to establish
bootlegging operation, then sustained operation as both supplier and sole customer).
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other participant in the illegal activity.2 16 For example, the ABSCAM
defendants presented an entrapment defense based on the outra-
geousness of the government's conduct in setting up the whole
scenario.217
This standard effectively separates the conduct of the informant
from that of the government handler, and specifically insulates the
government from the misconduct by finding that unless the handlers
can be actively implicated in the shocking conduct, no due process
concerns are raised.218 Two cases, both involving ABSCAM inform-
ant Melvin Weinberg, illustrate this point.219 In these cases, Weinberg
testified that he concocted the scheme (that wealthy Arabs needed
assistance in gaining permanent residence), established the fee
($25,000 to a member of the House and $50,000 to a member of the
Senate), and set the plan in motion.220 After Weinberg was recorded
coaching Senator Williams, United States Attorneys told Weinberg,
"at least if you're going to coach him you don't tape it."22 One dis-
trict court found the government's conduct outrageous, but the court
of appeals disagreed.2 1 Then-Judge Ginsburg, writing the majority on
this point, noted that the outrageousness argument depends upon the
existence of "coercion, violence or brutality to the person."22
In this respect, Judge Ginsburg applied a shocks-the-conscience
test to any sort of misconduct, whether evidentiary in nature or in-
fecting the entire operation. As a result, the court held that the AB-
SCAM operation, in the absence of any intrusion, did not result in a
denial of due process.224 Her approach calls into question only the
most extreme behavior leaving many seemingly outrageous situations
216. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (6th Cir. 1980) (Agent or
informant can engage in criminal activity, supply item of value to criminal enterprise, or
"further the interests of the criminal enterprise in some manner to gain the confidence of
the criminal elements with which he must deal.").
217. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
218. See Tomkovicz, supra note 20, at 20-21 & nn.90-91.
219. Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1462-63; United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 830 n.4 (2d Cir.
1982).
220. Myers, 692 F.2d at 830 n.4.
221. Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1464-65 (Once Kelly was approached and told he would receive
$25,000, the contact went back to Weinberg saying that the congressman wanted $250,000.
The contact further grossly exaggerated his previous dealings with the representative.);
Myers, 692 F.2d at 840 (Myers claimed that the other participants coached him as to what
to say on video and assured him that he would never be asked to do anything).
222. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460.
223. Id. at 1476 (quoting Irvine v. California,. 347 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1954)).
224. Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1474.
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unremediable.21 This standard becomes even more difficult to sur-
mount in light of the courts' routine deference to law enforcement
justifications for their practices.
The difficult outrageousness standard merely adds to the courts'
inability to exercise control when needed." 6 One court of appeals
stated that government direction of the informant is not questionable
unless the government conduct "amount[s] to the 'engineering and di-
rection of [a] criminal enterprise from start to finish."'"2 7 Thus, only
in cases like Twigg, where the government provided or facilitated the
procurement of almost all the drug manufacturing supplies and rented
the site for the production, will courts find law enforcement participa-
tion demonstrably outrageous.228
In both entrapment and outrageousness cases much latitude is
given to the informant, usually to maintain the cover or confidence of
the targets.229 Courts examine a number of factors in entrapment and
225. See, e.g., United States v. Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding
informant's buying and selling of cocaine with the defendants was only passively tolerated
by the government and reversing the dismissal of the indictments), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
417 (1992); United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding no due
process violation where the government informant, a prostitute, was known to be engaging
in sexual activity with the suspect prior to the heroin sale for which he was charged);
United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34,40 (2d Cir. 1982) (requiring bodily invasion), cert.
denied 459 U.S. 835 (1982); United States v. Bowling, 666 F.2d 1052, 1054 (6th Cir. 1981)
(finding no outrageous conduct where government informant suggested out-of-state
targets and participated in robberies where charge was interstate transportation of stolen
articles), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 960 (1982); United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1212-13
(6th Cir. 1980) (same criminal activity as in Bowling); Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d 851, 855
(10th Cir. 1980) (threat to use catheter for urine sample not shocking), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 876 (1980); United States v. VanMaanen, 547 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1976) (falsification of
police reports, advising witnesses to leave town and failure to disclose existence of inform-
ant prior to trial not shocking). For additional support see the cases cited in Kelly. 707
F.2d at 1476 n.13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
226. The Myers court noted that in the decade since Russell, Twigg was the only deci-
sion to find a due process violation. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 837 (2nd Cir.
1982).
227. Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d at 1092 (quoting United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889,
897 (9th Cir. 1991)). "[P]assive tolerance ... of a private informant's questionable conduct
[is] less egregious than the conscious direction of government agents typically present in
outrageous conduct challenges." Id. at 1092 (quoting Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1468).
228. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373,375-76,380-81 (3d Cir. 1978) (comparing the
situation to Russell); see also Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (revers-
ing conviction where agent was involved for two years in illegal manufacture of alcohol,
offering to supply materials, operator and location, and actually supplying sugar at whole-
sale prices).
229. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (gain confidence); United States v. Bowling, 666 F.2d
1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1981) (keep credibility and maintain effectiveness). The reliance is
drawn, in large part, from the ill-premised notion that informants are vitally necessary to
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outrageousness challenges, including the informant conduct, the type
of criminal activity targeted, the instigation versus infiltration of the
criminal activity, the degree of government direction or control (ver-
sus acquiescing in the criminal conduct), and the strength of the con-
nection between the government and the criminal acts committed. 30
The chief concern in both, however, is criminal law enforcement, not
responsibility for the informant's mishandling or misconduct.231
deal with crime. See, e.g., United States v. Pfeffer, 901 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir. 1990)
("stealth, strategy, or deception"); United States v. McQuin, 612 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.
1980) (infiltration of criminal ranks long recognized), cert. denied 445 U.S. 954 (1980);
Twigg, 588 F.2d at 380 (infiltration of criminal enterprises "accepted and necessary");
United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316,1319 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Tomkovicz, supra note
20, at 74 n.287 (deference to prosecution on the question of agency relationship between
informant and government).
In Twigg, the government granted the informant, a multiple convicted drug manufac-
turer who had run 50 to 100 speed laboratories, a reduced sentence in order to convict the
defendants. Neither of the defendants had any prior drug manufacturing experience, any
apparent criminal designs or any expertise to set up even a single drug laboratory. Twigg,
588 F.2d at 381 n.9.
230. United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980). The government can
use those tactics and methods present in the criminal world, even furthering the criminal
enterprise. In ABSCAM, the defendants attacked the government's use of an admitted
con-man as the architect of the scheme. This was rejected as merely the government's use
of an expert in the field, with the credibility and contacts necessary to encounter the
criminals. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
On criminal activity targeted, see Brown, 635 F.2d at 1213 (noting that the infiltration
of burglary rings is important to "a more expeditious and thorough investigation"). Drug
related crimes are peculiarly acceptable targets for this. Hampton v. United States, 425
U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1461.
Instigation crosses the line of permissibility. United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111,
115 (2d Cir. 1979) (facilitation of scheme in progress is permissible), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
975 (1979). On government control, see Russell, 411 U.S. at 426 n.3; Brown, 635 F.2d at
1213; United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 151 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949
(1975). Finally, the closer the causal relationship, the more likely government has ex-
ceeded the permissible bounds of conduct. Spivey, 508 F.2d at 150 ("The more immediate
the impact of the government's conduct upon the particular defendant, the more vigor-
ously would be applied Russell's test for constitutional impropriety.").
231. In Brown, the court expressed this particular concern solely in terms of the quan-
dary facing law enforcement who wanted to catch as many criminals and minimize poten-
tial harm to society while attacking a preexisting criminal enterprise. Brown, 635 F.2d at
1214 ("They were compelled to decide whether to arrest [the burglars] when their criminal-
ity became known or to delay those arrests with the prospect of casting a much larger net,
and of eliminating a much broader range of criminality.... The difficulty of the problem
was exacerbated by the fact that either alternative chosen would result in some harm to
society. .. ").
In United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 890 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1074
(1988), the defendants, to support an argument for entrapment, wanted to present evi-
dence that the FBI failed to follow its own guidelines for the hiring, using and monitoring
of informants. The court found that evidence indicating that the informant should not
have been hired or his use discontinued was irrelevant to show whether the defendants
were predisposed to commit the crime. Id. Professor Donnelly examined the criminal
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C. Treatment of Informants in Civil Litigation
Courts have been equally unwilling to recognize linkages be-
tween the informant and law enforcement handlers in civil litigation
challenging informant mishandling or misconduct. In this context,
courts most often encounter civil rights actions for constitutional vio-
lations brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or tort claims brought under
the FTCA. 32 The distancing of the informant from the handler in
these cases is derived from the assumption of risk doctrine. The dis-
tancing of informant and handler also removes a necessary element of
proof from the claims, that the violation be under color of law accord-
ing to § 1983 or, that the violation be a non-discretionary act of an
agent or employee of the government under the FTCA. In addition,
distancing weakens proximate causation and insulates government of-
ficials from accountability or responsibility for the mishandling or
misconduct.
1. Weatherford and Section 1983 Claims
Under § 1983, a claimant must show a violation of a constitu-
tional or federal right committed by a person acting under color of
"any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State." 3
In the informant situation, the more difficult aspect of proof lies in
showing that the informant acted under color of law when inflicting
the injury. Courts typically find that an informant acts under color of
law only where the informant and government have a close
relationship.
Judicial findings for the plaintiffs are usually on the pleadings,
where the close relationship is sufficiently pled through handler direc-
liability of informants, particularly in light of entrapment and spying on political organiza-
tions. Donnelly, supra note 5, at 77.
232. In the civil context, courts also address informants when individuals and organiza-
tions challenge law enforcement employment of agent provocateurs to inform, through
infiltration or otherwise, on minority political organizations. Since the late 1800's police
intelligence units have watched, infiltrated, burglarized, and attempted to sabotage legiti-
mate political organizations that law enforcement agencies perceive as a threat to society.
The resulting litigation, while concerned with the individual acts of the provocateurs, typi-
cally does not address the informant misconduct or mishandling because the attention is
diverted elsewhere.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The one ele-
ment omitted here, the existence of a constitutional injury, will not be addressed for sev-
eral reasons. The nature of the injury, whether of constitutional magnitude or deprivation
of a federal right, will vary from case to case. Second, the weakness in addressing infor-
mants does not lie so much in discounting the injury as it does in a basic misunderstanding
of informants. Once informants are treated in a proper context, then any latent difficulties
in addressing the nature of the injury can be addressed.
tion of the informant. 34 But even these findings are inconsistent. On
a motion to dismiss, one district court presumed an agency relation-
ship between the informant and handler135 Another found that the
informant was not acting under color of law even though the inform-
ant was employed by the defendant police department.236 Still an-
other found the existence of a conspiracy, including the informant,
among private, not public, actors3 7 One court found a duty on the
part of handlers to exercise reasonable care, but vacated the district
court opinion and remanded for consideration of intervening Supreme
Court opinions3 8 Only in the rarest of instances will a court find
outrageous informant involvement and government conduct support-
ing civil liability post-trial.3 9 In these circumstances, the courts focus
on informant intention and authorization.240
In Weatherford,241 Bursey filed suit under § 1983 against Wea-
therford and his supervisor for violations of the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process right to a fair trial.242 The Court did not directly
address whether the informant's conduct was under color of law be-
cause it found no constitutional violation.243 The essence of the
Court's determination, however, was to distance the prosecutorial
handlers from the informant's presence during discussions between
Bursey and his counsel.2 " The Court relied heavily upon Bursey's
234. See, e.g., Brown v. State's Attorney, 783 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (on motion
to dismiss, officers directed informant to search and steal); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F.
Supp. 909 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (on motion to dismiss, police encouraged and monitored);
Matje v. Leis, 571 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (on motion to dismiss, drug operative's
investigation was authorized); see also Bond v. Asiala, 704 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983) (on
motion for summary judgment, failure to check informant's information).
235. Waller, 584 F. Supp. at 943.
236. Hiser v. City of Bowling Green, No. 3, 93CV7082, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D. Ohio Nov.
8, 1993).
237. Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
238. Bond, 704 F.2d at 312, 315 (intervening decisions included Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981), Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 455 U.S. 622 (1981)).
239. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1979) (informant infiltrated
Black Panther Party and facilitated armed raid and murder of leaders).
240. Brown, 783 F. Supp. at 1153-54 (handler direction); Hampton, 600 F.2d at 609-613
(integration of informant and handler activities); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909,
931-32 (N.D.N.C. 1984) (general encouragement and monitoring); Martje v. Leis, 571 F.
Supp. 918, 925 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (compensation).
241. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 556-58; see supra text accompanying notes
158-175.
242. Id. at 547.
243. Id. at 558.
244. Id. at 557.
Fall 19941 A NEW VISION OF INFORMANTS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
invitation to Weatherford and the latter's compliance to maintain his
cover. 45 Also, the Court noted the absence of a prosecutorial pur-
pose and that Weatherford did not directly relay information back to
the prosecution.2 46 As under the assumption of risk doctrine, it does
not matter that the prosecution was aware of the conduct, did not dis-
close Weatherford's role, and gained indirect insight based upon Wea-
therford's silence.247
In Ghandi v. Police Department of Detroit,'4 the Sixth Circuit
went to great lengths to minimize the role of the handlers. In this
case, plaintiffs challenged the FBI's investigation and infiltration of
their organization, the National Caucus of Labor Committees.249 Af-
ter the close of plaintiffs' case, the district court granted the defend-
ants' motion for a directed verdict °50 The persuasive facts were that
the informant, a member of the group, approached the FBI to provide
information and was instructed "to perform normal surveillance and
information gathering" but not any stealing, disruption, or violence. 51
The court of appeals found the only significant factor implicating an
informant/handler relationship was that the informant was paid for his
work. 2 However, because his payment was contingent on delivery of
information, the linkage was not as close as if he were paid a salary.
The court also noted that the informant entered the group on his own
and that any criminal acts committed were on his own behalf?25 3
245. Id.
246. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 556-58.
247. See supra notes 167-175 (on Marshall's dissent). The Court accepted the justifica-
tions for Weatherford even though the prosecution and police needs of confidentiality
evaporated when they nonchalantly "burned" him at trial. Weatherford's continued in-
formant status was dubious and this decision was made prior to trial, but only communi-
cated to the defense at trial. 528 F.2d 483, 485 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
248. 823 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Ghandi IF').
249. Id. at 960.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 961.
252. Id. at 964.
253. Ghandi, 823 F.2d at 960, 963-64 & n.5; see supra notes 77-83 (on variety of re-
wards). The court of appeals also affirmed the exclusion of any evidence regarding the
informant's background. Id. at 962-63 (no manifest injustice resulted from exclusion when
plaintiffs failed to include this in the pretrial order). In a prior decision in the same case,
the court of appeals reversed entry of summary judgment for the defendants and identified
other factors for consideration. In response to the defendants' motion, plaintiffs presented,
by affidavit, evidence that the informant was instructed "to suggest provocative actions
that were illegal," that certain items were stolen on behalf of the FBI and under FBI in-
struction, and that the FBI authorized and approved of the informant's actions. Ghandi v.
Police Dept of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 349-52 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Ghandi I"). The acts alleg-
edly included disruptions of party events, misrepresentations of party positions, theft, run-
ning for statewide office, and contriving circumstances to permit an FBI search of
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Courts tend to reward handlers who have unspoken, unclear, or
non-intrusive goals or motives and vague authorizations or instruc-
tions. In other cases, this tolerance for misconduct is more direct. In
Coffy v. Multi-County Narcotics Bureau, 54 an informant introduced
an agent to the plaintiff in a bar for the purpose of establishing drug
deals.25 The plaintiff claimed that the introduction of the informant
constituted a "nuisance." 6 The court of appeals found no liability
for the informant's drug dealing, and discounted the influence of the
informant. 57 The court cited informant use as an example of law en-
forcement "utiliz[ing] routine undercover investigation techniques to
identify and document illegal drug transactions." 8 As further evi-
dence of this discounting, the court found "inconclusive and of no pro-
bative value"" 9 evidence that the same officer approached an inmate
who had frequented the bar, told him that he could get out on proba-
tion if he testified, and in response to the inmate's own lack of recol-
lection, told him to "[fjust make something up. ' 260 Thus, in the § 1983
case context, the application of the assumption of risk doctrine severs
any linkage between handler and informant and nearly completely
bars recovery for the resulting misconduct or mishandling.
2. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Cases
The FTCA allows recovery for the negligent acts or omissions of
federal employees, but excludes discretionary acts and intentional
torts.2 61 In cases brought under the FrCA, courts insulate handlers
from liability by either finding that the handler had no duty to control
the informant, that the informant was not an employee, or that the use
of the informant or the informant's acts were discretionary. Here, as
with assumption of risk, the onus is on the target while the handler is
distanced from the informant.
plaintiffs' headquarters. The court of appeals held that, if true, these were not mere passive
activities, but asserted the informant in illegalities and positions of authority in the organi-
zation. Handler liability would exist if they "authorized or approved" the activities. Id. at
349-52. The two Ghandi opinions illuminate how handlers can react and tailor their con-
duct and interaction with informants to the assumption of risk doctrine and the court's
receptiveness to distancing.
254. 600 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1979).
255. Id. at 574.
256. Id. at 573.
257. Id. at 579.
258. Id. at 577.
259. Id. at 579.
260. Id. at 579 n.11.
261. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(a), (h).
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Civil actions under the FTCA were brought against the United
States as a result of Gary Thomas Rowe's conduct as an informant
within the Ku Klux Klan.26 These FTCA claims were unsuccessful in
obtaining relief against his handlers.263 In Liuzzo v. United States,2 64
the court rejected a claim that the government had a duty to prevent
informant crimes.265 The court was reluctant to impose "a duty on
informants to prevent crimes committed in their presence [because
that] would go beyond settled principles of tort law and would also
have effects on the use of informants. 266 In Peck v. United States,267
the court likewise rejected an argument advocating a common law
duty to protect or warn.268 In other contexts, courts have similarly
rejected FTCA claims resulting from an informant's conduct because
the handler did not have a duty to instruct an informant to stop a
crime and the informant himself had no duty to prevent crimes that
occur in the course of collecting information.269
In Peck, the court also rejected the respondeat superior claim and
found that the government failed to "direct" Rowe's actions.2  In
Liuzzo, the court permitted but weakened a similar challenge to the
hiring policy by allowing the negligent hiring claim to the extent that it
challenged the implementation, but not formulation, of policy regard-
ing the use of Rowe as an informant.271 Other claims have been simi-
larly rejected when it was shown that the informant was neither an
employee nor an independent contractor. 2  Other courts have also
rejected negligent supervision claims because the decision to use the
informant was discretionary.27 The lack of duty, the lack of a formal
relationship, and the deference to governmental discretion all operate
262. Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Rowe v. Griffen, 676
F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1982).
263. Peck, 470 F. Supp. at 1020; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 529.
264. 508 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
265. Id. at 935.
266. Id. at 936; see also Guccione v. United States, 847 F.2d 1031, 1035 (2d Cir. 1988)
(handler had no duty to supervise informant), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1020 (1989).
267. 470 F. Supp. 1003, 1014, 1016-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
268. Id. at 1016-17.
269. Beard v. O'Neal, 728 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1984) (suit against informant for not
preventing murder that he knew was going to happen while investigating a corrupt police
officer); Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1979) (suit against FBI handler for not
reporting criminal acts, including murder, committed by a corrupt police officer and for not
instructing O'Neal to prevent serious crimes like murder).
270. Peck, 470 F. Supp. at 1014.
271. Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 923, 931-32 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
272. Slagle, 612 F.2d 1157.
273. Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789, 794 (8th Cir. 1982) ("it is a policy judg-
ment to do so").
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to distance informants from their handlers as part of the assumption
of risk doctrine.
3. Discovery and Other Matters
Informant issues also arise in other stages of litigation. The
Court's approach is consistent with the assumption of risk doctrine
and also exhibits a distancing of handlers and their decisions from in-
formants and their conduct.274 For example, during the discovery
phase in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General,27 a civil action
brought against the FBI for its investigation, infiltration and disrup-
tion of the Socialist Workers Party, the plaintiffs sought files on infor-
mants used by the FBI in its operations2 7 6 The government disclosed
that 1,300 informants had provided information about the plaintiffs
and that 300 informants were actually members of the plaintiff organi-
zations.277 The government also provided the files of eight informants
whose identities were disclosed, but refused to provide the plaintiffs
with an additional eighteen files on informants whose identities were
not yet disclosed.2 7 8 The district court held the attorney general in
contempt for failing to provide the files and sought a writ of manda-
mus from the court of appeals.2 79
The Attorney General argued that revealing the identity of the
informants would severely undermine the FBI's ability to recruit,
maintain, and use informants.8 0 In granting the writ and vacating the
274. Many of these occur in challenges to "red squad" activities, where police infil-
trated and disrupted political organizations. For a complete history of red squad activity in
this country, see DONNER, supra note 38. See also In re United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (government infiltrated Communist Party and planted "snitch file" giving ap-
pearance that member was an informant), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 960 (1990); Hobson v.
Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (First Amendment challenge to FBI's COINTELPRO
investigation and infiltration in District of Columbia metropolitan area); Black Panther
Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (challenge to COINTELPRO operations
against Black Panther Party); United Klans of Am. v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.
1980) (challenge to COINTELPRO operations against Ku Klux Klan); Wahad v. Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 813 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (challenge to FBI monitoring of
Black Panther Party member in prison).
275. 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1979).
276. Id. at 60.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 60 & n.1.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 64 n.11 ("significantly detrimental effect on law enforcement by undermining
the pledge of confidentiality which the FBI makes to informants"). Here, the court also
noted that other informants would see this action, decide that the "United States would
not or could not continue to honor the pledge of confidentiality" and therefore be unable
"to attract and maintain sources or information." Id.
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district court's order, the court of appeals deferred to concerns regard-
ing informant use despite the gross disparity between the numbers of
informants used and those whose files were sought.281 Similarly, the
court downplayed the Attorney General's intentional non-compliance
with a court order, and found that holding the attorney general in con-
tempt "warrants more sensitive judicial scrutiny."
To preserve confidentiality, the FBI had been willing to concede a
presumption that any damages provable were the result of informant
conduct."83 Rather than impose that admission, the court of appeals
instructed the district court to review the fies and present plaintiffs
with general information, including the numbers of informants and
the areas of their activities.284
Another opportunity to examine the government's relationship
with Gary Thomas Rowe arose in Rowe v. Griffin.285 Rowe had
agreed to testify against two Klansmen responsible for the murder of
Viola Liuzzo in exchange for immunity from prosecution for her mur-
der.286 Rowe asserted that he was in the car, but did not fire a
weapon.287 Evidence later surfaced that Rowe may have lied.288 He
was subsequently indicted for the Liuzzo murder.2 9 Rowe filed suit
to enjoin the state court prosecution based upon the immunity agree-
ment.290 The court of appeals deferred to the government, discount-
ing Rowe's misconduct as a basis for overturning the prior
agreement.291 As to Rowe's candor, the court stated, "[t]he only evi-
dence in the record going to Rowe's lack of good faith is testimony
indicating that Rowe perjured himself when he testified before the
state grand jury and in the state trials." 2'
281. Id. at 60.
282. Id. at 64-65 ("Courts accordingly owe him respect as an official and, absent an
abuse of power or misuse of office, the most careful and reasoned treatment as party or as
litigant.").
283. Id. at 66.
284. Id. at 66-67 (method of recruitment, affiliated organizations, methods of obtaining
information from the plaintiffs, topics reported on, personal information reported on, doc-
uments copied, and photographed political events, voted in plaintiffs' elections and com-
pensation); id. at 68-70 (Appendix with sample representative findings for district court).
285. 676 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1982).





291. Id. at 528.
292. Id. at 525, 528.
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Eminently clear from the civil court decisions on informants is
that courts are unwilling to critically examine informant-handler rela-
tionships. Further, the decisions in Bursey, Ghandi, Peck, Socialist
Worker Party, and Rowe reflect little understanding of the workings,
use, and motivation of informants. By considering the underlying
roles, usages, and general nature of informants, courts can strike a
more realistic balance in the interests at stake.
IV. Suggestions for Reform of Informant Handling
The current critiques of informant control typically focus on two
elements. The first critique charges that the Court's assumption of
risk doctrine is ill-conceived and should be abandoned. The second
critique contends that the alternative to assumption of risk is to main-
tain or strengthen particular constitutional rights violated by the in-
formant conduct. This rights-based approach 93 is well intentioned,
but does not critically explore the basic decision by law enforcement
to utilize informants. Other avenues for reform have been suggested,
including suggestions from practitioners and law enforcement agency
guidelines for handling informants. However, as will be discussed in
Sections IV and V, none reach the heart of the problem, the inform-
ant-handler relationship.
A. Scholarly Criticism of the Assumption of Risk Doctrine
Professor Geoffrey R. Stone argues against the court's assump-
tion of risk approach on several grounds.294 First, he asserts that the
use of informants was not a known information-gathering technique at
the time the Framers drafted the Constitution.2 95 Second, he argues
that the basic premise of the approach cuts into the very fabric of
interpersonal relationships by assuming that we should question and
suspect those whom we naturally trust. For example, betrayal by a
friend may be likely, but the friend's collusive relationship with the
government is usually unexpected. The assumption of risk argument
presumes that people are by nature inclined to be cautious, and that a
person can actually detect the betrayal beforehand. In the end, Stone
rightly asserts that the assumption of risk argument is a superficial
shield to deflect attention from underlying issues, in particular the in-
formant-state relationship and accountability and responsibility for in-
293. See supra text accompanying notes 21-26.
294. Stone, supra note 20, at 1235-39.
295. Stone, supra note 20, at 1239-45.
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formant mishandling and misconduct.296 By focusing only on
constitutional rights, however, the rights-based approaches leave in-
tact the informant-handler relationship-the source of the problem.
Rights-based approaches focus on maintaining and expanding
constitutionally protected rights to address informant misconduct and
mishandling. For example, the rights-based approaches focus on the
rights to privacy, due process, counsel, and to be free from unreasona-
ble search and seizure. Specifically, there are two privacy rights-based
approaches. One is a public interest analysis that incorporates the na-
ture and impact of government conduct. The other is a multi-factor
test that incorporates the public interest analysis and the framers' in-
tent. Both suggestions, however, are underinclusive.
The public interest analysis explores and analyzes the nature of
the government's conduct, the degree to which surveillance intrudes
into places of solitude, the expectation of privacy, and the impact of
the intrusion on the individual and society. The nature of the govern-
ment conduct is defined in narrow terms with respect to particular
illegal conduct.297 Unfortunately, this mimics the approaches used by
the courts, distinguishing between handler and informant, rather than
analyzing the entire relationship as well as the resulting mishandling
and misconduct. As discussed above, the expectations of privacy ap-
proach and the balancing of "public" concerns approach defer to the
handler's concerns and lacks insight into the conditions examined.298
A rights-based approach that focuses purely on the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel is also flawed because the trade-off between ex-
pansion of protection and law enforcement is even more direct.299
The early attachment of the right to counsel3m assists the criminal de-
fendant, but does not directly address informant or handler conduct.
296. Stone, supra note 20, at 1241 (the assumption of risk doctrine assumes "wholly
unrealistic ability on the part of the ordinary citizen to detect deception"); id. at 1240
("[T]he Court's repeated invocation of the assumption of risk rationale in the secret agent
context is nothing less than an evasion of its responsibility to confront the problem forth-
rightly."). See also Donovan, supra note 20, at 367-379.
297. Donovan, supra note 20, at 355 (joined to hold a position of power, to cause dis-
cord, to steal membership lists or, generally, to monitor and disrupt). Donovan actually
defines the nature of the problem in a limiting manner: "(1) aggressive introduction of the
paid informer into the life of a citizen; (2) by means of deceit; coupled with (3) the seizing
of the contents of communications." Id. at 354.
298. See supra notes 134-231 and accompanying text (criminal cases) and notes 232-292
(civil cases).
299. See supra notes 138-190 and accompanying text. Lurie, supra note 20, at 799, 802
(noting the trade off, then suggesting the weakening of the Sixth Amendment in the inter-
est of investigations).
300. Tomkovicz, supra note 20, at 66-71.
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Likewise, expanding post-conviction remedies has only a limited ef-
fect because post-conviction review is quite narrow.301
The due process approach takes a broader perspective on the is-
sue of informants and considers the problems with informants and the
character of the prison environment. This approach, however, histori-
cally was unable to address police interrogation and is currently un-
workable with respect to the placement of informants in jail.3°
Professor Welsh S. White offers three suggestions for improving the
due process approach." 3 The first is a limit on the use of confes-
sions?. 4 The second limits the state's ability to use prison informants,
but does not address the problem of perjury. 0 5 The third excludes
unreliable informant testimony.3 °
Even his best choice, the exclusion of unreliable informant testi-
mony, leaves critical factors undefined, and to be resolved by the
courts.30 7 In determining the definitions of "unreliable" evidence and
"exorbitant" rewards, courts presumably will defer to the government
301. Winograde, supra note 20, at 774-85 (proposing the granting of judicial use immu-
nity to informants during post-conviction review). Simply, this suggestion presumes that
post-hoc attention is the only or best remedy.
302. White, supra note 20, at 106-07 (noting that Miranda and the Fifth Amendment
quickly took over); see Perkins v. Illinois, 496 U.S. 292 (1991); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279 (1991). Justice White's approach in Fulminante would require "credible threats of
physical violence." Id. at 287. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, would require the show-
ing of an overborne will. Id. at 303 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). White, supra note 21, at
605; White, supra note 20, at 118 & n.105.
303. White, supra note 20, at 119-28, 133-40. The due process approach aims to reform
informers through their handlers. In particular, the emphasis on disallowing individuals to
be targeted and the elimination of dangerous financial incentives is a step in the right
direction. However, concerns persist. These include crediting informants because they are
on the government's side, the persistence of and inability to detect perjury, and returning
to the rewards system of England. Id. at 129-31.
304. Id. at 119-28.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. This standard, relying on Supreme Court authority on suggestive identifications,
would preclude the use of highly unreliable prison informant testimony where the govern-
ment has contributed to this through rewards. Id. at 136-37.
[W]henever the government offers exorbitant rewards for prison informer testi-
mony, the risk of generating unreliable evidence far outweighs the benefits of the
additional reliable testimony likely to be produced.
Id. at 139. Thus, Professor White suggests that non-exorbitant rewards, in light of a typical
prisoner's means, would be permissible. For example, instead of release and/or a large sum
of money, the state could offer modest sums or a salary. Id. See also Lundstrom, supra
note 20, at 769 (placing limits on the rewards system - "more secretive, less tangible.").
Further, requiring evidence of corroboration, good character of the informant and of
the unattractiveness of the reward would bolster the soundness of the arrangement. White,
supra note 20, at 140.
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when dealing with informants."0 8 Thus, the unreliability of the in-
formant remains. In addition, the informant rewards remain, as well
as any informant expectation of a greater reward. °9
The other, non-ights-based approaches are even less helpful in
addressing the informant-handler relationship. The prior judicial re-
view approach, based on the Fourth Amendment, adapts the warrant
requirement to informant use. Thus, a law enforcement official would
need judicial approval prior to the use of an informant. The argu-
ments in support of the prior judicial review approach focus too nar-
rowly on distinct cases and neglect the general problems associated
with informant handling. For instance, coercion, an element of almost
every informant-handler relationship, is not treated as a general con-
cern, but as an issue specific only to one informant. Further, when
analyzed in the individual case context, courts have consistently re-
jected this argument.310
Cross-examination is yet another limit to informant abuse.
Although greater latitude on cross-examination permits the criminal
defendant to explore the shadiness of the informant and low levels of
government involvement, it cannot substitute for shifting more of the
burden of informant taint to the government or eliminating infor-
mants from the process.311 The success of cross-examination depends
on full disclosure of an informant's past, something not always known
even to the prosecution.312 This approach also places great reliance
upon and gives deference to law enforcement in its selection and
choices with respect to informants.313
308. Police and wardens can easily see that these terms are vague, and defer to the
court when they obtain the services of informants. There is no objective standard for relia-
bility to apply or to evaluate conduct against.
309. See White, supra note 20, at 136 (discussing the core unreliability of jailhouse in-
formers). An unfulfilled expectation may be more dangerous than one met given the ex-
tensive documentation of perjury from inmates.
310. Compare Note, Judicial Control, supra note 20, at 1002-06 with infra notes 399-400.
Compare Note, Judicial Control, supra note 20, at 1014-16, with United States v. York, 830
F.2d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1987); Compare Perschetz, supra note 23, at 195-202 with id. at 202-
06.
311. Haglund, supra note 20, at 1425-33 (generally assuming that the system can control
informants). Further, Haglund specifically states that excluding the use of informants
would undermine law enforcement. Id. at 1423.
312. If anything, this will raise more Brady claims once previously withheld or unknown
informant activity comes to light.
313. Haglund, supra note 20, at 1433-41. Viewing this, or any other alternative, as the
lesser of two evils is self-indulgent. Id. at 1417-22 (comparing to contingent fee arrange-
ments with informants and entrapment). This necessarily disregards Fulminante, decided
afterwards, in which the informant's contingent fee arrangement did not appear to concern
the court. White, supra note 20, at 125 & n.139. Haglund, after noting the necessity of
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B. Systems of Review and the Ineffectiveness of Guidelines
In the wake of informant abuse, investigations have attempted to
spur change. The U.S. Attorney General issued the first federal
guidelines on the use of informants in 1976 after revelation of the gov-
ernment's counter intelligence program, COINTELPRO.3 14 In 1980
these guidelines were superseded, primarily as a result of the revela-
tions associated with ABSCAM.31 5 At that same time, a select com-
mittee of Congress made numerous proposals for change, including
statutory guidelines on activities and reporting, threshold require-
ments for undercover agents, indemnification of citizen victims, and a
general reporting system. 316 However, the committee specifically re-
fused to make a failure to follow guidelines judicially enforceable by
informants to law enforcement, relegates the debate over informants to academia.
Haglund, supra note 20, at 1423-4.
314. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, USE OF INFORMANTS IN DOMESTIC SECUR-
ITY, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND OTHER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, reprinted in ABSCAM
REPORT, supra note 12, app. D at 531-35 [hereinafter INFORMANrS IN DOMESTIC SECUR-
rY]. These guidelines include the rote instructions that informants "shall not: 1. partici-
pate in acts of violence; or 2. use unlawful techniques... ; or 3. initiate a plan to commit
criminal acts; or 4. participate in criminal activities of persons under investigation [unless
the FBI determines that is necessary]." Id. at 533. The FBI did have some policy as early
as 1965, but the contours are unclear. Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923, 932 nn.5-6
(E.D. Mich. 1981).
315. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON
FBI UsE OF INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, reprinted in ABSCAM REPORT,
supra note 12, app. D at 517-30 [hereinafter FBI INFORMANT GUIDELINES].
316. ABSCAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 25-31. The legislation included broad statu-
tory grants of power to perform undercover operations, id. at 347-51, exemption from cer-
tain laws, id. at 352-61, new entrapment legislation, id. at 362-77, legislative identification
of circumstances warranting undercover operations, id. at 377-89, and indemnification of
the citizen victim of an operation, id. at 389-96. This latter legislation read:
1. the injury was proximately caused by conduct, of a federal employee or of
any other person acting at the direction of or with the prior acquiescence of fed-
eral law enforcement authorities, that violated a federal or state criminal statute
during the course of and in furtherance of a Department of Justice undercover
operation;
2. the injury was proximately caused by conduct, of any federal employee or
of any informant or other cooperating private individual, that violated a federal
or state criminal statute and that the person who engaged in such conduct was
enabled to commit by his participation in an undercover operation; or
3. the injury was proximately caused by negligence on the part of federal
employees in the supervision or exercise of control over the undercover opera-
tion; provided, however, that an action should not lie under this legislation for
injury caused by operational or management decisions that relate to the conduct
of the undercover operation.
Id. at 390.
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giving courts more power to void a conviction when violations oc-
cur.3 17 Periodically, other agencies issue similar guidelines.3 18
All of these guidelines state that laws should not be violated and
that any criminal conduct should be reported to local law enforcement
authorities.3 1 9 However, the FBI's 1980 guidelines specifically permit
criminal activity where the informant's role was extremely valuable.320
Further, all of these guidelines delegate a great deal of discretion to
the individual officer and his supervisor.321 A General Accounting
317. ABSCAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 396-97 (citing cases that state that convic-
tions should not be voided due to technical violations, but acknowledging that such judicial
power, including voiding convictions due to a violation of due process, would effectively
pressure agents to comply with guidelines).
318. See, e.g., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DOMESTIC OPERATIONS GUIDE-
LINES, reprinted in ABSCAM REPORT, supra note 12, app. D at 556-72 [hereinafter DEA
GUIDELINES]; UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, UNDER-
COVER GUIDELINES, reprinted in ABSCAM REPORT, supra note 12, app. D at 573-601.
319. OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS, reprinted in ABSCAM
REPORT, supra note 12, app. D at 510; FBI INFORMATr GUIDELINES, supra note 315, at
524-26; INFORMANTS IN DOMESTIC SECURITY, supra note 314, at 533; OFFICE OF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL, ATroRNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERA-
TIONS, reprinted in ABSCAM REPORT, supra note 12, app. D at 537, 548-50 [hereinafter
AG INFORMANT GUIDELINES]; DEA GUIDELINES, supra note 318, at 567-68.
320. The 1980 guidelines acknowledged the existence of licensing in the informant use
process.
Informants who are in a position to have useful knowledge of criminal activities
often are themselves involved in a criminal livelihood. It is recognized that in the
course of using an informant or confidential source, the FBI may receive limited
information concerning a variety of criminal activities by the informant or confi-
dential source, and that in regard to less serious participation in criminal activities
unconnected to an FBI assignment, it may be necessary to forego any further
investigative or enforcement action in order to retain the source of information.
However, whenever a Special Agent learns of the commission of a serious crime
by an informant or confidential source, he shall notify a field office supervisor.
The supervisor shall make a determination whether to notify appropriate state or
local enforcement or prosecutive authorities of any violation of law and shall
make a determination whether continued use of the informant or confidential
source is justified .... In determining whether to notify appropriate state or local
law enforcement or prosecutive authorities of criminal activity by FBI informants
and confidential sources, the FBI shall consider:
(a) whether the crime is completed, imminent or inchoate; (b) the seriousness of
the crime in terms of danger to life and property;... (f) the effect of notifica-
tion on FBI investigative activity.
FBI INFORMANT GUIDELINES, supra note 315, at 525-26. See supra note 319. Commenting
on the change, which occurred in the midst of the controversy over FBI informant Gary
Thomas Rowe's participation in Klan activity and prosecution for murder, FBI Director
William Webster stated that Rowe's participation in the murder was acceptable as long as
he did not actually kill her. If he shot to kill, then the FBI would turn over the informa-
tion. Gregory Gordon, Washington News, UPI, Dec. 15, 1980, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
321. Reuter, supra note 9, at 110. During the course of researching this article I made
several requests under the Freedom of Information Act (or the comparable state statute)
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to law enforcement agencies where informant handling had been a problem in the past.
These agencies included the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Al-
cohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department
of Justice, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, the Chicago,
San Diego and New York police departments, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and
the Illinois State Police. The FBI, DEA, Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), New York
Police Department (NYPD), and Illinois State Police (ISP) responded with copies of
guidelines.
None of the guidelines provided definitive terms or conditions under which the rela-
tionship with the informant should be terminated. The cover memo to the FBI guidelines
purported to do so, but the actual guidelines did not contain this information. William H.
Webster, Memorandum To All Special Agents, Re: Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI
Use Of Informants And Confidential Sources, Jan. 5, 1981, at 3 [hereinafter Memorandum].
In addition to Webster's Memorandum, the FBI provided § 137 of its Manual of Inves-
tigative Operations, which addresses informants. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVE GATION,
MANUAL OF INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS, § 137 (1987) [hereinafter MIOG]. The dates in
§ 137 range from 1/12/81 to 5/11/87. Certain sections require reassessment of informants at
least every sixty days and suggest that supervisors meet with informants to assess the han-
dling. Id. at § 137-2. The regulations also require an evaluative period, which can last from
1 to 120 days, of the informant's suitability and pertinence. During this time, voluntary
information is accepted, but the informant "may not be used to participate in criminal
activities or provide substantial operational assistance in an undercover proceeding." Id. at
§ 137-3.1(3). To determine suitability, agents must consider whether the informant is able
and willing to provide information, whether the informant is directed by others to obtain
information from the FBI, and whether the informant's background renders the informant
"unfit." Further, the agent should consider the informant's background (such as whether
he or she was engaged in serious criminal activity) with the importance of the investigation,
the informant's motive, alternative sources of the information, the informant's reliability,
the informant's record of conformity with instructions, the risk of infringing on privileged
conversations, and the risk that the informant will compromise the investigation. Id. at
§ 137-3.1.1.
The regulations specifically restrict the use of members of the news media, attorneys,
doctors and clergy as informants due to their respective legal privileges. Id. at § 137-3.3.
Agents are also instructed to admonish informants that: (1) their assistance is voluntary
and will not exempt them from prosecution for illegal activity "except where such viola-
tions were approved by a field office supervisor;" (2) they are not employees or agents; (3)
their relationship must be kept confidential; (4) they must report positive information as
soon as possible; (5) the FBI has limited jurisdiction; (6) they shall not participate in acts of
violence and should try to discourage violence; (7) they shall not use unlawful techniques;
(8) they shall not initiate a plan to commit criminal acts; (9) they shall not participate in
criminal activities unless approved; (10) the payments they receive are income; and (11)
their informant status will not protect them from prosecution for illegal acts unless ap-
proved. Id. at § 137-3.4.
The guidelines with regulating informant participation in criminal activity appear to be
less constraining than those previously promulgated. For example, while criminal activity
previously had to be for "paramount prosecutive purposes," FBI INFORMATrr GUIDELINES,
supra note 315, at 522; AG INFORMANT GUIDELINES, supra note 319, at 549, now it need
only be for "prosecutive purposes." MIOG, supra, at § 137-4(1)(a). Further, prior guide-
lines required approval for "ordinary" crimes, while current guidelines exempt such "rou-
tine purchase of stolen or contraband goods." Id. at § 137-4(1). Other criminal activity is
defined as "extraordinary." Id. at § 137-4(3).
Subsequent sections, although significantly redacted, address maintaining control
without exercising undue influence, reassessment upon receipt of false information, and
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Office (GAO) review of an FBI internal audit of the effectiveness of
these guidelines criticized the lack of informant control. The GAO
review revealed FBI reviewer bias, ineffective constraints, and unsuc-
cessful control of informants. 22 In addition, the Justice Department
keeping records, id. at § 137-5, informant files, id. at § 137-9, and informant payments. Id.
at § 137-10.
The DEA document provided (labeled "6612.33 Informant Statements") was heavily
edited and revealed only that agents must take statements from informants. The BOP
provided an excerpt from Program Statement 5270.07, entitled, "Discipline and Special
Housing Units." The document discussed the necessity of maintaining the confidentiality
of informants and the unreliability of informants. However, the document further stated
that in an unwitnessed assault, "the statement of a seriously injured victim could be suffi-
cient evidence to support a finding without corroborating evidence." (emphasis original).
The NYPD documents defined of informant and required (1) notice to superiors of
every informant, (2) interviews with informant prior to use, (3) documentation of the inter-
view to be reviewed by superiors, (4) registration of informants prior to use, (5) maintain-
ing a file on each informant whether active or not, and (6) bi-yearly evaluation of each
informant. NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, PATROL GUIDE, PROCEDURE No. 116-44,
Confidential Informants (Revision Nos. 84-7 & 87-4).
The ISP documents provide information similar to the NYPD guidelines. However,
the ISP directive also includes (1) investigation of the informant's background,
photographing and fingerprinting, and (2) restrictions on informant relations (no "gifts,
loans or any form of gratuities") and contact (need additional sworn personnel to corrobo-
rate). ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, DEPARTMENT DiREcrrvE No. 91-100, Confidential
Sources. Further, the guidelines address in some detail informant handling. Id. These
include: not divulging information or ISP activities, recommending two sworn personnel at
meetings but requiring two with informants of the opposite sex, limiting informant pay-
ments to authorized amounts and requiring supporting documentation (with signatures and
receipts), searches of informants when operation involves controlled substances, and
prohibiting "explicit or implicit promises or predictions regarding the likely disposition of
any criminal charges that are pending." Id. On using parolees, releasees or prisoners, the
guidelines require requesting authorization from the Department of Corrections and the
state's attorney. Id.
322. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GGD-80-37, FBI AUDIT CON-
CLUSIONS ON THE CRIMINAL INFORMANT PROGRAM SHOULD HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED
(1980) [hereinafter GAO FBI AUDIT] (study based on agent responses because FBI re-
fused access to individual informant files). The FBI's review is unpublished. MARX, supra
note 14, at 187 n.12. See also GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 51, 76, 104 n.39 (Los
Angeles Police Department guidelines on determining undesirable informants do not con-
sider past provision of false information); David Marc Kleinman, Out of the Shadows and
Into the Files: Who Should Control Informants?, POLICE MAG., Nov. 1980, at 36,40 (noting
that the N.Y.P.D. guidelines and registration requirements are largely ignored by the
officers).
The FBI's internal review found only one instance where an agent failed to report an
informant's criminal conduct. Reuter, supra note 9, at 111. The review also found that
twenty-three agents operated without adequate understanding of the guidelines, but no
indication was given as to what percentage this represented. MARX, supra note 14, at 187
n.12. In auditing this internal review, the GAO noted that the FBI conducted no inter-
views with agents or informants-agents only had to answer non-confidential question-
naires. GAO FBI AUDIT, supra, at 6 (FBI did not believe confidential questionnaires
would have increased reliability); Moore, supra note 3, at 111.
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acknowledged that no review can detect all transgressions. 323 Further,
the psychological risk to the prospective informant, the ethical sound-
ness of the venture, the duration of the operation, the handling of the
informant, and the level of risk to citizens' property, privacy, and civil
rights have not been primary, or at times even important, law enforce-
ment considerations.324
A wide variety of other suggestions to redress informant mishan-
dling have arisen. Most legislative enactments affect warrants, the dis-
closure of the informant's identity, funds paid to informants, the
examination of informants at trial, or the criminality of interfering
with someone trying to inform.3 Following informant scandals, sug-
gested reforms have included state bar association review of
prosecutorial misconduct, new local or national guidelines for law en-
forcement handlers, and jury instructions on informants.3 26
Further, the FBI did not evaluate compliance with the requirement of weighing the
value of the informant against the value the suspect seeks from the government. GAO FBI
Aurnrr, supra, at 9.
323. In addressing the shortage in reporting informant numbers, the Justice Depart-
ment noted "that no reasonable audit procedures will insure the detection of improprieties,
especially if collusion is involved." GAO FBI AuDrr, supra note 322, at 23.
324. DeStefano, supra note 38, § 2 at 2 (psychological risk); Basler, supra note 38, at
B3. In a particularly telling case, FBI agent Daniel Mitrione went undercover and met up
with career informant Hilmer Sandini to penetrate drug organizations. DeStefano, supra
note 38, § 2 at 2; Lehr, supra note 83, at A28. After years of working with Sandini and
little contact, support or direction from superiors, Mitrione became involved with and prof-
ited from the criminal activity. Id.
325. On warrants, see, ag., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41c (West 1985) (application
for warrant includes informant identity and the basis for reliability); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 813 (West Supp. 1993) (includes checklist for: number of years known, whether inform-
ant is mature, regularly employed, a student in good standing, a well-respected family or
business person, has truthful reputation, no motive to falsify information, no known associ-
ation with known criminals, and no known criminal record, as well as information on the
informant's reliability in the past (i.e. truth, arrests made based upon info)). On disclosure
of informant identity, see, e.g., CAL. EvnD. CODE § 1042 (West 1966) (not required to re-
veal identity of informant unless he or she is a material witness and then, only after a
hearing); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2510 (West 1993) (same).
On disclosure of funds paid to informants, see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-1000 (Law.
Co-op. 1986) (no disclosure of expenses to jeopardize law enforcement confidentiality, but
required reporting of total funds paid to informants). On examination of informants at
trial, see, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 537 (1988) (allowing examination for specific offenses without
giving up share or interest in penalty); 28 U.S.C. § 1822 (1988) (allowing examination of
anyone with an interest in a share of a fine). On criminal interference with informants, see,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 873 (1988) (criminalizes threat to inform or payment of money for not
informing); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-09-02 (1985) (use of deceit or threat, force or bribe to
stop information relating to offense).
326. In the McMartin preschool child abuse case in California, where the prosecution
relied in part on jailhouse informant confessions from a defendant, the criminal defense
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Inevitably, to reform the use of informants, one must incorporate
both the theory underlying informant use and the history behind their
improper methods. Adding the contextual analysis applied by the
courts to the examination of each reveals the need for a proposal that
truly redefines the relationship between the informant and the
handler.
V. Law Enforcement Handling and Control of Informants
Both conventionalists327 and realists among law enforcement
practitioners agree on a number of basic issues, such as the impor-
tance of identifying informant motives and implementing direct and
indirect control over the informant. 28 Their approaches, however,
differ regarding accountability and responsibility for handling infor-
mants. The judicial use of assumption of risk and distancing handlers
from their informants signifies the adoption of the conventionalists'
approach to law enforcement. The realists' approach, however, re-
flects a more palatable balancing of law enforcement and society's in-
terests. A true understanding of the realist approach requires
exploration into both schools of thought.
A. Informant Motivations and Control
Both conventionalists and realists agree that law enforcement of-
ficials are severely disadvantaged in handling or controlling an inform-
ant absent a clear, accurate, and complete understanding of the
counsel filed charges against the prosecution with the California State Bar Association
after the defendants were acquired. Rainey, supra note 73, at B3.
On new guidelines, see generally ABSCAM REPORT, supra note 12, at app. D (detail-
ing the reform guidelines of the Attorney General, the FBI, the DEA, and the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service); GRAD, JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 149-51
(recommending new guidelines in the district attorney and sheriff's office); infra notes 350-
355 and accompanying text (on conventional model). All of these efforts, if not acknowl-
edging the root problems, are destined to fail. See infra notes 356-371 and accompanying
text (on weaknesses).
After the jailhouse informant scandal, California adopted a new jury instruction on
the use of informant testimony. Rohrlich, Informant Owns Up, supra note 16, at Al, A24.
Federal pattern instructions all identify that an informant's testimony and credibility
should be treated with "caution," "great care" or "carefully." PATTERN JURY INsTRUc-
TION OF THE DIsrIcr JUDGES AssOCIATION OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL
CASES, SPECIAL INSTRUCrION 1.1 ACcompLICE-INFORMER IMMUNITY (1985); 1 DEvrrT ET
AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACrICE AND INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 15.02 CREDIBIL-
ITY OF WrrNEssEs-INFORMANT (1987).
327. See supra notes 98-133, 134-231, and 232-292 and accompanying text.
328. Certainly a multitude of other issues exist, including the recruitment of informants
and maintaining informant confidentiality. See generally Momus, supra note 4; HARNEY &
CROSS, supra note 4.
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informant's motivation for cooperating.3 29 Motivations can include
particular tangible rewards, some emotional impetuses, or both.
Common tangible rewards include favorable treatment in avoiding
arrest, sentencing, or incarceration.330 Common emotional impetuses
include the thrill of playing detective, fear, and survival.331 Some in-
formants, particularly those who work for money or out of greed, have
multiple motives, all of which should be known to the handler.3 32 The
motivation allows the handler to determine the informant's expecta-
tions and to predict the informant's conduct.333
The informant-handler relationship must be thoroughly con-
trolled by the latter. If the reverse occurs, then the relationship
should be terminated, even at the cost of undermining the investiga-
329. MORRIS, supra note 4, § II at 1 ("It is the common feeling throughout the justice
community that informant motives must be known whenever possible prior to the receipt
of informant information. Carmine Motto wrote: 'Without knowing his motive, it would be
nearly impossible to work with him, as his expectations may be far greater than the agency
could afford."' (emphasis original)); LYMAN, supra note 5, at 132 ("an informer's motives
could weigh heavily against the officer's safety or the credibility of the investigation");
MARX, supra note 14, at 152.
330. On avoidance of arrest, see MORRIS, supra note 4, § II at 1; WILSON, supra note 4,
at 65. On special sentencing considerations, see MORRIS, supra note 4, § II at 1; Ben Jacob-
sen, Informants and the Public Police, in CRIMINAL AND CrVIL INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK
4-63, 4-69 (Joseph J. Grau ed., 1981); WILSON, supra note 4, at 65. On reduced incarcera-
tion, see MORRIS, supra note 4, § II at 1; Farris, supra note 4, at 30; WILSON, supra note 4,
at 65.
331. On playing detective, see MORRIS, supra note 4, § II at 2; HANEY & CRoss, supra
note 4, at 47, 57-59. On fear and survival, see MORRIS, supra note 4, § II at 3; HARNEY &
CROSS, supra note 4, at 41-42; LYMAN, supra note 5, at 134 (including retribution from
associates). Some informants desire information for power over criminal competition.
MORRIS, supra note 4, § II at 2; HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 4, at 43-44 (elimination of
competition, to find out what the police know, lead the police away from informer's crimes
and to extort other criminals); Farris, supra note 4, at 30.
Some informants are motivated by other emotions, such as ego, revenge and jealousy.
MORRIS, supra note 4 § II at 3-4 (this includes vanity, ego, superiority, jealousy and re-
venge); HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 4, at 42-44 (egotistical, self-importance), 47 (revul-
sion at particular crimes), 47-48 (repentance), 49 (gratitude); LYMAN, supra note 5, at 134
(revenge, jealousy), 135 (ego and repentance); Jacobsen, supra note 330, at 4-70 (revenge,
jealousy); Farris, supra note 4, at 30 (revenge, civic mindedness and vanity).
Other informants are classified as nuisances. MoRRs, supra note 4, § II at 6 (this is
the person who bothers the police rather than being helpful or recruited); HARNEy &
CRoss, supra note 4, at 48 (demented or eccentric). Finally, some people tender informa-
tion to the police inadvertently. MORRIS, supra note 4, §11 at 7; LYMAN, supra note 5, at
135 (unwitting).
332. LYMAN, supra note 5, at 132-33, 135. On monetary rewards, see MORRIs, supra
note 4, § II at 4-6; HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 4, at 45-47 (extremely valuable device);
Jacobsen, supra note 330, at 4-70; Farris, supra note 4, at 30; WILSON, supra note 4, at 67.
333. MORRIS, supra note 4, §11 at 2.
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tion.334 In order to maintain a favorable balance, the handler should
keep detailed records on the informant, specifically instruct the in-
formant, obtain corroborative evidence, and avoid criminal activity by
the informant. Further, the law enforcement agency should establish
and maintain a managerial supervisor for officers working with
informants.335
The necessary documentation includes obtaining background in-
formation, keeping notes of meetings and evidence received, and re-
cording all benefits provided. Initially, the handler should obtain
detailed background information about the informant so that credibil-
ity and motives can be documented and evaluated. Detailed reports
should also be kept of all subsequent meetings, information and pay-
ments, including receipts for all benefits.33 6 To maintain control, the
handler should exclude the informant from strategy and decision-
making.337 At each significant stage, the informant should sign an
agreement. The agreement with the police should specifically identify
the terms offered, the method and amount of compensation or bene-
fit, and the information sought.338 The agreement with the prosecu-
tion should identify both prior arrests and the pending charges against
334. Id. § III at 8 ("If the control officer cannot dominate the contributor in every ac-
tion the two make together, it is surely better that the contributor be immediately dis-
carded regardless of the consequences to the case."); HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 4, at 69
(noting the need to maintain perspective, not cut deals and never offer portions of pro-
ceeds); LYMAN, supra note 5, at 140 ("must always remain in control"); James R. Farris, A
Model for Police Intelligence Units, in CRMICAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 79, 92
(Michael J. Palmiotto ed., 2d Ed. 1988) (control is "too important to be handled in an
informal, and possibly haphazard fashion.").
335. Interestingly, Farris reported in 1984 that two models were currently in use to
manage informants. Farris, supra note 4, at 33-39. The first model involved delegation of
discretion to officers with respect to selection and control of informants because "inform-
ant programs tend to be highly individualistic, fragmented, and competitive." Id. at 33. In
this approach, there is generally "no overall planning, evaluation and cost-effective analysis
governing the expenditure of funds to informants." Id. at 34. This approach was used by
both the FBI and the DEA. WILSON, supra note 4, at 76.
The second model increased management control and propagated guidelines to fol-
low. Farris, supra note 4, at 35-39. Basic control still rested with the officer, but the control
is monitored. Not surprisingly, when Farris wrote about informants in 1988, the first model
was not mentioned. Farris, supra note 334. Yet, the jailhouse informant scandal in Los
Angeles, see supra notes 15-61 and accompanying text, indicates that the first model was
still in use by large law enforcement agencies.
336. MORRIS, supra note 4, § H, §§ II-10 to -11, §§ IV-16 to -17, -20 to -21; HARNEY &
CRoss, supra note 4, at 62; LYMAN, supra note 5, at 133, 136 (documenting motives
through extensive interviews), 140; Jacobsen, supra note 330, § 4-71; Farris, supra note 334,
at 92-93 (recommending evaluation should be performed by management), 96; Farris,
supra note 4, at 36.
337. See MoRRIs, supra note 4; §§ 111-8 to -9.
338. LYMAN, supra note 5, at 137-39.
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the informant, as well as the content of all promises and the method
and amount of payments or benefits.339
With respect to instructions, the handler should always maintain
control over both incoming and outgoing information. Information
should always flow from the informant to the handler and never from
the handler to the informant, except when giving the informant spe-
cific instructions on what information is desired.3 40
The information from the informant should be corroborated so
that the handler can substitute other evidence and avoid the need for
the informant's testimony. The handler should obtain corroboration
of all informant information provided? 41 The handler should also try
to obtain and present probable cause for a warrant without using the
informant, unless absolutely necessary.342 The handler's ultimate goal
is to reduce the chances that the informant will have to testify.343 Fur-
ther, the handler should instruct the informant not to participate in
criminal activity and should not actually allow participation in crimi-
nal activity. If the informant either commits a crime or is wanted else-
where for a crime, the relationship should be terminated.3 4
Finally, some superstructure of alternative control-handlers and
management-level support should exist to oversee informant use.345
Management should maintain a department-wide directory of infor-
mants to avoid informants who may use more than one handler (re-
sulting in self-corroboration). 346 Such a directory will maximize
information and allow a handler to cross-check an informant's effec-
tiveness, reliability, and veracity, and will reveal activity including tes-
timony, use for warrants and court-ordered eavesdropping. 347 The
manager overseeing the superstructure will need informant-handling
expertise and will serve as a clearinghouse for all informant dealings,
information, and control. The manager should draft guidelines on the
339. See MORRIS, supra note 4, §§ IV-21 to -22.
340. Id. § 111-9 (recommending never give new information, never trade information),
§§ II-10 to -11; Farris, supra note 4, at 36.
341. This can either be physical evidence or another source. See Mogms, supra note 4,
§ 111-9; HARNEY & CRoss, supra note 4, at 79; LYMAN, supra note 5, at 144-45.
342. HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 4, at 73 (seen as a means of "protecting the
informer").
343. LYMAN, supra note 5, at 144-45.
344. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 111-19 (recommending against use of "wanted" infor-
mants), § 111-9; LYMAN, supra note 5, at 137; Farris, supra note 334, at 96; Farris, supra note
4, at 36.
345. Morris, supra note 4, II-10 to -11 (discussing alternate control of officers); Farris,
supra note 334, at 92-96; Farris, supra note 4, at 35-39.
346. Farris, supra note 334, at 92-93; Farris, supra note 4, at 37.
347. Farris, supra note 334, at 92-93; Farris, supra note 4, at 37.
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use of informants, including the use of funds for compensation. 48 In
addition, the department should maintain a "blacklist" of bad
informants.349
B. The Conventionalist Approach
The conventionalist's approach views every arrestee as a poten-
tial informant, sees every bit of information as potentially helpful, and
considers abuses of the rewards system to be merely a historical foot-
note.3 50 This deferential, pro-law enforcement approach displays, at
times, utter disdain for constitutional constraints.351
On informant motivation, the conventionalists believe that infor-
mants motivated by fear, survival, or avoidance of punishment are the
most reliable because "they have little to lose and much to gain. 3* 52
They concede, however, that informants motivated by revenge, revul-
sion of crime, mercenary desires, and ego are not easily controlled.53
The conventionalists adhere so vigorously to the use of infor-
mants that they argue for the utmost levels of informant confidential-
ity, statutory protection, and physical protection by the police. 5 4
Further, the conventionalists assume that instructing the informant
not to commit crimes and the handler's lack of direct knowledge of
crimes mean that crimes do not occur or are not the responsibility of
the handler. 5  The assumptions and applications of the conventional-
ists' approach are what the courts have adopted in the assumption of
risk and distancing doctrines. This unitary approach, however, is
neither sound nor reasonable.
348. See Farris, supra note 334, at 92-93, 97; Farris, supra note 4, at 37.
349. MORRIS, supra note 4, § IV-26 to -27.
350. HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 4, at 80, 82, 85 (noting that the abuses of the re-
wards system ended in England in the sixteenth century). But see infra notes 457-467 and
accompanying text (discussing continuation into the seventeenth century).
351. See, e.g., HARNEY & CRoss, supra note 4, at 17 (stating the privilege against self-
incrimination, described as the right to withhold information, "dealt American law en-
forcement savage and disabling blows.")
352. MORRS, supra note 4, § 11-3. See also LYmAN, supra note 5, at 134; Jacobsen,
supra note 330, § 4-71 (noting that informers are more productive as sentencing nears).
353. LymAN, supra note 5, at 134-35; Jacobsen, supra note 330, at 4-70 (discussing infor-
mants motivated by revenge and greed).
354. H mNEy & CROSS, supra note 4, at 71 (keeping all informers confidential), 73
(keeping them off warrants to protect), 74 (calling for stronger laws to protect informants);
Jacobsen, supra note 330, 4-78 to 4-79; Farris, supra note 334, at 97. Even the realists
acknowledge that some level of protection is needed because of violent acts against infor-
mants. See also MARX, supra note 14, at 146-47 (noting changes faced by informants).
355. See, e.g., LymAr, supra note 5, at 137-38, 146 (noting officers must be able to
observe drug buys in order to avoid drug or money skimming by informants).
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C. The Realist Approach
Like the conventionalists, the realists accept the need and use of
informants.356 However, two key differences exist in the realists' ap-
proach to informants. One is that they consider handler training inad-
equate and ineffective because handlers and informants are delegated
too much discretion in the process. Second, the realists recognize that
informant motivations are not the only driving force for cooperation,
but may include manipulation of the system for personal gain. Real-
ists doubt that informants can truly be handled effectively and view
their use as a grant to informants to act as they see fit, a further dele-
gation of discretion.3-7
Realists view informants as "weak links" that should be replaced
by law enforcement personnel as quickly as possible.35 The realists'
skepticism is based on the problems associated with informants. Such
problems are inherent, starting with their motivations, which almost
always conflict with the goals of law enforcement.3 5 9  According to
the realists, informants, although instructed not to commit crimes, will
generally ignore the standards, use prohibited methods, lie, believe
that the handler has granted them immunity, and feel as if they have
"grown a badge.""36 Further, the realists believe that the handler will
ignore informant disregard of the rules, which is viewed as a cost of
doing business.36' Another problem perceived by the realists is that
356. Reuter, supra note 9, at 107-09.
357. Id. at 103-07 ("It is no mystery why the police become issuers of criminal
licenses."); SKOLNICK, supra note 3, at 128 (describing police perception of informant
"criminal tendencies as inevitable"); BLUM, supra note 77, at 188 (describing rampant
licensing).
358. MARX, supra note 14, at 158.
359. See id. at 152; cf BLUM, supra note 77, at 168-69 (noting informant motives change
over time).
360. Marx, supra note 35, at 152-53.
361. Id. at 155; Reuter, supra note 9, at 102-04 (noting specific circumstances). A wide
range of circumstances where the police ignore abuse by informants have been docu-
mented. SKOLNICK, supra note 3, at 128, 141 (drug use); LEROY C. GOULD ET AL., CON-
NEcrIONS: NoTs FROM THE HEROIN WORLD 72-73 (1974) (drug use); PETER MANNING,
THE NARC's GAME 162 (1980) (drug use); REUTER, supra note 4, at 194 (bookmaking);
ANTHONY VILANO, BRICK AGENT 96, 112,116 (1977) (handler thought stealing was less of
a problem than crimes involved in information); ROBERT DALEY, PRINCE OF THm CITY 243
(1978) (cop rushes to court each time informant is arrested). Some officers deliberately
avoid discussing topics with informants so that they will not learn about crimes. SKOLNICK,
supra note 3, at 129. In the Los Angeles jailhouse informant scandal, Leslie White, the
chief informant, had told prosecutors ten years earlier that he had committed perjury in
return for favors. Berke, supra note 59, at 11-12. His confession went unnoticed and his
perjury continued. Id. At this earlier time, White was labelled a "flake." GRAND JURY
REPORT, supra note 15, at 17.
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handlers are very creative in legally corroborating illegally obtained
information. These infractions multiply as the informant realizes that
more latitude is being provided. Thus, informants know what is
needed, know what they can get away with, and know that handlers
will cover for them to obtain the information necessary for an
arrest.362
Realists assert that all of the training and structure imposed to
control the informant are undermined by the nature of the situa-
tion.3 63 By its very nature, an agency's informant policy is more a
"broad statement of principle" than a policy to be implemented.3 4
Necessarily then, the general policy results in "significant delegation
of discretionary power to the individual officer" to make decisions on
how to handle and control informants, including the appropriate
amount of recompense.365  The minor regulations, especially
paperwork requirements, receive little attention. The handler has no
desire and sees little benefit in formalizing the informant relation-
ship.366 More significantly, in order to obtain the necessary informa-
tion for arrests (the only true evaluative method in law enforcement),
"the police, in effect, transfer police power to citizens who have been
given neither a background check into character nor police training in
law." 3 67 As a result, the informant operates with few, if any, limita-
tions. The upper echelons of law enforcement administration are
"continually conscious of the unhealthy or even corrupt relationship
that may develop between an informant and an investigator" and yet
they are unwilling or unable to interpose corrective measures.368
According to the realist critique, the ultimate (and at times only)
form of control is jail or public disclosure, "a kind of institutionalized
362. MARx, supra note 14, at 152-55.
363. See generally id. at 154; Reuter, supra note 9, at 103 (discretion necessary to officer
is problem even with the strictest of guidelines).
364. Brown, supra note 5, at 254 (quoting O.W. WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 129
(1972)).
365. SKOLNICK, supra note 3, at 263.
366. Reuter, supra note 9, at 112 (citing too much paperwork, the ability to "fiddle
with" expense accounts to cover payments, and the prospect that informants who are re-
quired to "sign up" will "clam up"); Kleinman, supra note 322 at 36, 38 (noting internal
FBI review showed that agents fail to document instructing informants that they "shall not
engage in specific activities"), 40 (registering informants causes them to "clam up").
367. SKOI.NICK, supra note 3, at 101-02, 126 ("nature of his role demands that he ingra-
tiate himself with the illegal actor"); Kleinman, supra note 322, at 38 (quoting active FBI
agent as saying, "There's a recognition that the informer's going to be more productive if
you don't spell all the no-nos out to him, and don't take him to task unless you have to.").
368. Justin J. Dintino & Clinton L. Pagano, The Investigative Function: Reassessing the
Quality of Management, 51 Tim POLICE CHmF, June 1984, at 55, 56.
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blackmail. ' '3 69 This coercion is very real and commences at the start
of many informant-handler relationships.370 Therefore, the realists
contend that the informant and the handler equally benefit from
stretching the rules, so long as the informant believes that no negative
consequences will follow and the handler can obtain sufficient cause
to search or arrest the target.3 71
The realists endorse three solutions to cure mishandling of infor-
mants. First, control problems should be decreased. Second, the in-
formant should be replaced with an agent as soon as possible. Lastly,
constitutional concerns regarding the informant-handler relationship
should be incorporated into adjudications.372
Informant history proves that the realists' views are more accu-
rate than the conventionalists.373 Two areas of concern, informant re-
liability and guideline effectiveness, exemplify the validity of the
approach and the need for more accountability and responsibility in
the informant-handler relationship. Acceptance of the unreliability of
informants' information is a necessary precondition to effectively eval-
uating their use, their conduct, and government responsibility for their
actions. As one expert testified before the Los Angeles Grand Jury,
"95% of the stuff you get is bogus. ' 3 74 To the informant, "truthful"
means "consistent with the prosecution's theory of the case. Other-
wise, of course, there is no point in calling the informant as a wit-
ness." 375 The investigative and fact-finding processes are infected by
this perceived purpose of the informant. Further, this results in the
369. Gary T. Marx, Who Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised by the New Police
Undercover Work, 28 CnmEm & DELiNO. 165, 180 (1982); SKOLNICK, supra note 3, at 125
(noting police "can often control the informer only by invoking the law").
370. WILSON, supra note 4, at 73 (efforts to flip suspects begin almost immediately);
Misner & Clough, supra note 20, at 731-34 (discussing both compulsion and indebtedness
as factors influencing the informant to be and remain cooperative); Kleinman, supra note
322, at 38 (noting practice is not to charge informant "unless you have to").
371. Reuter, supra note 9, at 112-13; BLuM, supra note 77, at 170 (noting symbiotic
working relationship between informant and handler).
372. MARX, supra note 14, at 158; Moore, supra note 3, at 28 (constitutional concerns
include (1) "the extensiveness of [the govt's] effort," (2) "the intensiveness of [govt's] ef-
fort," (3) "whether the focus is on persons or on time, place and activity," (4) "the covert-
ness or deceptiveness of the information gathering," (5) "the size and character of
inducements offered" to informants, and (6) "the government's role in instigating or facili-
tating the offense"), 109; Reuter, supra note 9 at 112-13 ("necessary to formalize the rela-
tionship and the payments" but "little we can do to change the current situation").
373. See infra text accompanying notes 413-490 (on history).
374. GRAND JuRY REPORT, supra note 15, at 75 n.27.
375. Id. at 95.
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fact-finder's lack of a basis to evaluate the influence of benefits of-
fered or received.376
Courts, however, predominantly accept the reliability of an in-
formant with a minimal level of corroboration from the police and
prosecutors.377 Prosecutors willingly accept and proffer informant tes-
timony without a critical eye, in part because they are not constrained
to act otherwise.378 They cannot be relied upon to regulate infor-
mants because they have an inherent conflict of interest.379 Further,
they too dislike paperwork requirements and fear discovery of consti-
tutional violations by law enforcement.38 0
Second, the existence and reliance upon inherently ineffective
procedures and guidelines to control the selection, supervision, and
monitoring of the informants lies at the root of the problems. Experi-
ence, both past and recent, shows that guidelines either are not, or
cannot, be followed.3 8 ' As a result, informants can and will operate
with wide discretion, demand favors disproportionate to the quality of
the information provided, and feel licensed to violate the law.
D. The Realist Model, Under Color of Law, and State Action
The realists' approach balances considerations that are otherwise
ignored by the courts when addressing informants. The application of
the assumption of risk and distancing doctrines removes vital linkages
376. Id. at 96. This is particularly so if the trier of fact does not know of any benefit, if
the benefit has not yet been determined, or if the trier of fact does not understand the
value of what may appear to be a minimal reward. See also Donnelly, supra note 5, at
1126-27 (asserting that jurors do not question the veracity or credibility of informants).
377. See supra notes 98-133 (discussing unquestioning use of informants).
378. See, e.g., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 40 (first prosecutor rejects in-
formant, second prosecutor uses), 41 (prosecution rejects informant and informant then
approaches defense counsel), 41 (after prosecution refused to help informant with release
after preliminary hearing testimony, informant wrote letter saying, "the more he thought
about it, the more he believed his conversation with the defendant never took place"), 95-
111 (examples of lack of oversight and review), 111-12 (lack of records leaving all informa-
tion to anecdotes and word of mouth).
379. See supra notes 356-381 and accompanying text. After exposure of informant
problems in Los Angeles, only the informants were prosecuted while the prosecutors and
police were not penalized. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 90-92 (no perjury
prosecutions before the report and uncovering of the scandal despite clear instances of
perjury). In one instance, when an informant had obviously lied on the stand, the prosecu-
tor merely told the jury to disregard the testimony, but took no further action except to
arrange for the informant's release and disposition of the charges against him. Id. at 91.
380. See id. at 112-22 (recommends creation of informant files, but recognizes that this
has been rejected for those reasons). But see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972) (describing prosecutor's duty to disclose despite "burden on the large prosecution
offices").
381. See text accompanying notes 314-326 (describing realist approach).
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that make handlers accountable for their misuse of informants. On the
other hand, the application of a legal doctrine that examines the inter-
play between governmental and private actors embodies a better bal-
ancing of the victim's, society's, and law enforcement's interest. The
"state actor" test, as derived from the under color of law and state
action doctrine, provides such an avenue. This test incorporates the
realists' perspective and requires exploration and consideration of the
informant-handler relationship.
Although the concepts "under color of law" and "state action"
are present in § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively,3 82
the definitions of each have been kneaded together time and time
again by the Supreme Court. s3 For example, in West v. Atkins,3 a
North Carolina prisoner sued a private doctor who was under contract
with the state to provide medical care to prisoners. 85 West claimed
that the medical treatment rendered by Atkins violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.3s
West sued pursuant to § 1983.38 Thus, the Court examined whether
Atkins was acting under color of law. The Court's opinion is replete
with the alternating use of the terms "color of law" and "state ac-
tion. '3 8  At one point, after discussing "color of state law," the
Court's footnote only discusses state action.38 9
382. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
383. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,935 n.18 (1982) (holding § 1983
color of law standard adds nothing to Fourteenth Amendment state action requirement);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,838 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1009 n.20
(1982); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,794 n.7 (1966) (noting that § 1983 color of law
standard, like that found in 18 U.S.C. § 242, is consistent with Fourteenth Amendment
state action standard); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1991). Before Price, the
Court in Classic defined "under color of law" relying on Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346 (1880), a Fourteenth Amendment case examining the coverage of state action.
384. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
385. Id. at 43-45 (plaintiff could not see any other physician because of his security
classification).
386. Id. at 45.
387. Id.
388. E.g., id. at 49 (defining color of law), 49 (defining state action also as color of law),
49 (defining state action), 50-52 (reviewing tests for state action), 53 (discussing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), in terms of color of law), 54 (discussing Estelle in terms of
state action).
389. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 & n.15. Whether or not the two terms are not
synonymous is irrelevant to this inquiry with respect to informants. The goal here is simply
to identify the tests currently in vogue so that in that application and extrapolation to the
informant context can be reasonably and understandably accomplished. The original
meaning of each distinct input must be given before the combination can be understood.
See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935 ("Although we hold that conduct satisfying the state action
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies the statutory requirement of action
Fall 19941
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
1. The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law
In 1961, the Supreme Court resurrected the § 1983 cause of ac-
tion for constitutional deprivations caused by state officials acting
under color of state law. In Monroe v. Pape,390 Chicago police en-
tered the Monroe house without a warrant, "routed [the family] from
bed," taunted them with racial epithets, and compelled them to stand
naked while the police ransacked the house.391 As a result of the
search, detention and interrogation of Monroe, suit was filed pursuant
to § 1983 alleging a violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
In reversing the dismissal of the suit, the Court grappled with and
disagreed over the meaning of the phrase "under color of law." The
majority adopted the meaning previously articulated in United States
v. Classic392 and held that "under color of law" includes wrongful acts
made possible because the actor was "clothed with the authority of
state law."' 393 Thus, the mere privatization of otherwise official activ-
ity does not protect the actor from liability.394 Historically, a major
concern in the interpretation of "under color of" is in addressing the
existence of false appearances and pretense, as well as the abuse of
under color of state law, it does not follow from that all conduct that satisfies the under
color of law requirement would satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of state
action."). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
390. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
391. Id. at 169, 203 (Frankfurter, J., discussing facts).
392. 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) ("power[ ] possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law").
393. Id. at 326, quoted in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184. See also Woodward v. City of Wor-
land, 977 F.2d 1392, 1400 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing sexual harassment under color of
law), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3038 (1993); Skelton v. Pri-Cor Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding that private corporation administering state corrections facility was acting
under color of law), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1682 (1992); Steven L. Wimter, The Meaning of
"Under Color of" Law, 91 MicH. L. REv. 323,341-84 (1992) (detailing the proper historical
meaning of the term), 407-18 (discussing the current Court's limitations on § 1983 liability
based upon constricted construction).
394. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (regarding a prison doctor); Skelton, 963 F.2d
100 (regarding private corporation operating prison). Compare Yeager v. City of McGre-
gor, 980 F.2d 337, 339-43 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that maintaining a volunteer fire depart-
ment was not a traditional and exclusive function of the state because they were
historically private in Texas), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 79 (1993), with Haavistola v. Commu-
nity Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211,214-19 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding no government lease
and no extensive regulation of volunteer fire department, but remanding to determine if
public function).
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one's position.395 The phrase itself applies to "the 'two-faced' quality
of official misconduct. 3 96
2. The Meaning of State Action
Prior to Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,3 97 the Supreme Court used
three approaches to analyze whether state action existed: (1) the
symbiotic relationship test; (2) significant encouragement or signifi-
cant involvement in private conduct test; and (3) the exercise of tradi-
tional state functions test. In Lugar, the Court blended these three
tests and created a two part "nexus" test.398 The nexus, or balancing
test, requires that the conduct be "fairly attributable to the State" and
by "a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. 3 99
395. Winter, supra note 393, at 328 ("seems to be lawful and authorized, but turns out
not to be"), 346 ("the law historically has conveyed the special gravity of the offense that
stems from the wrongdoer's abuse of his or her official status"). In Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945), the Court characterized under color of law as under the
"pretense" of law.
396. Winter, supra note 393, at 346, 384-407. Historically, both the English and Ameri-
can approaches to the meaning of under color of law include "unlawful but nevertheless
official actions." Winter, supra note 393, at 351. The historical development of the term
actually intersected with the history of informants during the fifteenth century and each
has been subjected to manipulation since. Dive v. Manningham, 1 Plowden Rep. 60, 75
Eng. Rep. 96 (Common Bench 1551) (first reported in 1578) (discussing both compounding
by informants and whether illegal release pursuant to a bail bond was under color of law).
See id. at 342-46 & n.80.
397. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1980), and Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), were decided on the same day as Lugar.
398. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-39 (1982).
399. Id. at 937. In addition, joint activity or a conspiracy between a private person and
a state actor will bring the private individual into state action. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S.
914 (1984) (regarding a public defender in a conspiracy with judges); Dennis v. Sparks, 449
U.S. 24 (1980) (regarding a conspiracy between other defendants and a judge); Adickes v.
S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (regarding conspiracy/understanding between
restaurant owner and local police); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)
("jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action.., a willful participant in
joint activity with the State or its agents").
To prove a conspiracy, the plaintiff must show an agreement to commit an unlawful
act or a lawful act by unlawful means. In regard to informants, courts do not always find
that such a meeting of the minds occurs. In the case of Gary Thomas Rowe, the Klan
infiltrator, one court refused to find joint activity where the FBI knew in advance, from
Rowe, that the local police were going to allow the Klan to beat the freedom riders for
fifteen minutes without interruption. The FBI failed to take any action to deter or stop the
beatings and Rowe was rewarded but never sanctioned for his participation in the beatings.
Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003, 1008, 1012 (1979) (finding insufficient pleadings
for § 1983 or § 1985(3) conspiracy, but allowing possibility of showing failure to prevent
private conspiracy actionable under § 1986). But see Hanrahan, 600 F.2d at 628 n.28 (1979)
(finding sufficient evidence of § 1985(2) conspiracy where law enforcement officials con-
spired with informant to obstruct justice in a post-raid cover-up). See also Lomax v. Davis,
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"Fairly attributable," according to the majority, may include a
"deprivation... caused by the exercise of some right or privilege cre-
ated by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a
person for whom the State is responsible." 4" In addition, the state
role and the allegedly unconstitutional act must be rationally linked
under the symbiotic relationship test.401 A symbiotic relationship re-
lies upon the mutually beneficial nature of the relationship and the
"private" actor as an integral component of the larger state.4°
The "state actor" can be a state official, someone acting with a
state official, someone acting with significant aid from a state official,
or someone whose "conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State. 40 3
Recently, the Court described the question as "whether the State pro-
vided a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the harm-
causing individual."' 4°  To determine whether a person is a state actor,
courts examine factors common to the public function and state com-
pulsion tests.405 The public function approach focuses on what tradi-
tionally and exclusively has been the responsibility of the state and has
been delegated or adopted by private persons.40 6 In cases involving
state employment, the Court focuses on whether the individual is
obliged to the state, acts adverse to the state, is subject to direction by
the state, and acts in a professionally independent manner.' 7 The
571 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (finding no conspiracy where informant planted drugs
unbeknownst to the police, who then acted upon the tip).
400. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
401. See generally id. at 937-38 (discussing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
177 (1972), where the state liquor regulation of the private club was not related to the
club's decision to discriminate). The Lugar Court drew upon the symbiotic relationship
test in defining this factor. 457 U.S. at 938 n.19.
402. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,724 (1961) (regarding a restau-
rant lease from state agency).
403. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
404. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
405. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
406. Under this test, the Court found private political associations, towns, and parks to
be state functions. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944) (private political
associations); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (towns); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 302 (1966) (parks), but not shopping centers, utilities and private dispute resolution
systems. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-520 (1976) (shopping center); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 315, 353 (1974) (utilities); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 160 (1978) (private dispute resolution systems).
407. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 321-23 (1981) (finding that a public
defender is not a state actor because she was not obliged to the state, was in an adversarial
position to the state, was not subject to state direction, and acted professionally independ-
ent of the state); cf West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 51-56 (1988) (finding that a private doctor
on contract with a prison is a state actor because the state had an obligation to provide
medical care, the state delegated that function to the doctor, the doctor assumed the obli-
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state compulsion or significant encouragement/involvement test re-
quires a level of encouragement or involvement that exceeds the de
minimis impact of regulation, acquiescence, and funding to constitute
compelled action or involve some delegation of power.40 8
It is unclear whether the Lugar Court's articulation is a new test,
supplanting the previous tests, or an alternative formulation of the
pre-existing tests.40 9 In West, a case decided after Lugar, the Court
acknowledged the continued vitality of each of the previous three ap-
proaches.410 Specifically, the Court in West found the defendant to be
a state actor by considering the function, not the terms, of the prison
doctor's employment and the delegation of obligation by the state.411
Ultimately, the traditional nature of the state's role in providing medi-
cal care superseded the exclusivity requirement of the state function
test.
41 2
3. The Resulting State Actor Test and Informants
The critical elements to establishing a more balanced approach to
informants involve a functional examination of the handler-informant
relationship. If courts, in creating this balance, are interested in how
gation and, although the state deferred to the doctor's professional judgment, he was the
exclusive source of medical treatment for certain prisoners).
408. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-59 (finding extensive regulation insufficient); Flagg Bros.,
436 U.S. at 164-66 (finding acquiescence in private action insufficient where state did not
compel); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. at 830, 840-42 (finding receipt of 90% of funding
insufficient where state did not compel challenged decision); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1011-12 (regarding mere responsiveness of the state); Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 195-96
(finding no delegation of state power).
409. Whether this new test requires more than the pre-existing tests is uncertain.
Although previously one could meet just one test for state action, now meeting just one
test will only satisfy one prong of the nexus test. However, there is evidence that this is a
new and different test. In Tarkanian, the Court interspersed the tests again, but also noted
that prior to Lugar most lower courts had held that the NCAA was a state actor under
§ 1983. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 182 n.5. Following that decision, most lower courts held
that it was not. Id
410. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,49 (discussing nexus test), 51 (discussing symbiotic
relationship noting the close cooperative relationship), 52 n.10 (discussing significant in-
volvement noting the integration of professional standards through state regulation "either
overt or covert"), 53-55 (discussing traditional function noting the state has responsibility
for medical care and has chosen to allocate it through private contract). See also Blum, 457
U.S. at 1005-12 (discussing state regulation of and public funding for nursing home were
insufficient to establish state action under the state compulsion, symbiotic relationship, or
public function tests); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838-43 (following Lugar, Blum, and three
tests to find no state action). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw.
U. L. REv. 503, 503-05 (1985).
411. West, 487 U.S. at 54-56.
412. Id. (finding exclusivity not necessary where state had historically, by common law
requirement, provided medical care to prisoners).
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the handler instructed the informant and whether the informant con-
duct at issue was consistent with or independent of that relationship,
then the Lugar test provides a straightforward framework. The fairly
attributable prong requires an exploration of the causal connection
between the handler and the victim. The state actor prong, which
bears some resemblance to "under color of law," analyzes the instruc-
tions to or empowerment of the informant by the handler. Within this
framework, under color of law, state action and informants can come
together.
VI. Showing Linkages Between Handlers and Informants
The realists' views are consistent with the history of informant
use. The history of informant use, dating from early English common
law, shows informants as an omnipresent element of the developing
criminal justice system. Unifying history and law enforcement under
the state action and color of law tests supports a presumptive linkage
between informant and handler.
A. The History of Approver and Informant Use
The modem day conduct of jailhouse informants is deeply rooted
in the history of the approvers and common informers.41 3 Approvers
and common informers were established, developed, and maintained
throughout most of this millennium in England in a variety of incarna-
tions.414 Regardless of the technical and superficial differences in ap-
pearance between ancient approvers and modern informants, the
method, spirit, and purpose of the ancient approver remain intact in
its modem-day counterpart.415 The inherent problems with each, in
413. The approvers are the predecessors of today's jailhouse informers, while the com-
mon informer is the distant relative of other, non-jailhouse informants.
414. Professor Langbein separates the common informers on misdemeanors from those
reporting on felonies. John H. Langbein, Shaping The Eighteenth Century Criminal Trial:
A View From The Ryder Sources, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 109 n.441 (1983). Although the
practice of approvers was eventually abandoned, 2 MATrHEw HALE, THE HISTORY OF T=E
PLEAS OF T=E CROWN 226 (1847), Parliament continued to be influenced by the practice.
United States v. Ford (Whiskey Cases), 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1878) [hereinafter Whiskey
Cases].
415. Blackstone noticed this reliance on the reward system. After the practice of ap-
provement was discontinued, he noted in detail:
I shall only observe, that all the good, whatever it be, that can be expected from
this method of approvement is fully provided for in the case of coining, robbery,
burglary, house-breaking, horse-stealing, and larciny to the value of five shillings
from shops, warehouses, stables, and coach-houses, by statutes 4 & 5 W. & M. c.
8. 6 & 7 W. III c. 17. 10 & 11 W. HII c. 23. and 5 Ann. c. 31. which enact, that, if
any such offender, being out of prison, shall discover two or more persons, who
[Vol. 22:81
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particular the unreliability of and abuse by the common informer or
approver, and the lack of an effective means of control, are apparent
from the earliest of times. In cyclical fashion, informants were em-
braced, touted, and utilized. Then, at the opposite end of the cycle,
they were chastised, vilified, and restrained only to be embraced once
again. This section summarizes the development of the use of each
type of informant, the common informer and approver, and how these
systems were operated, abused, and criticized, but steadfastly
maintained.
1. The System of Approvers
In existence as early as 1275, the approver was "a convicted crim-
inal who had obtained a pardon conditional on ridding the world of
some half-dozen of his associates by his appeals."416 To commence
the approvement process, the indicted felon would confess the crime
and then "impeach or accuse or appeal others of felony. '4 17 The ap-
peal was the formal accusation an approver made against someone
else.418 A prisoner could only become an approver if he or she was
charged with and confessed to treason or a felony, both capital of-
have committed the like offences, so as they may be convicted thereof; he shall in
case of burglary or housebreaking receive a reward of 40 L and in general be
entitled to a pardon of all capital offences, excepting only murder and treason;
and of them also in the case of coining. And if any such person, having feloni-
ously stolen any lead, iron, or other metals, shall discover and convict two offend-
ers of having illegally bought or received the same, he shall by virtue of statute 29
Geo. II. c. 30. be pardoned for all such felonies committed before such discovery.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *330-31. Thus, the practice of approvers and
approvement became one with the practice of common informers.
416. 3 SIR WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A I-sTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 608 n.11 (quoting 2
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I *631). Courts had discretion to entertain an approver's
appeal. 2 HAM, supra note 414, at 226.
According to the Statute of Westminster, an approver could not get bail. 3 Edw., ch.
15 (1275) (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 45-46 (Owen Ruffhead ed., 1763); 4
HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 526. This remained so for roughly two centuries until relaxed. 3
Hen. 7, ch. 3 (1486) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra at 69-70. In 1554,
because the standards resulted in "oftentimes by sinister Labour and Means set at large the
greatest and notablest Offenders" the practice reverted back to the standards of 1275. 1 &
2 Phil. & M., ch. 13 (1554) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra at 484-85; 4
HoLDswORTH, supra, at 527.
The approver was called a "probator" if he took the witness stand in process against
an appellee because as a confessed felon he was not otherwise entitled to testify at trial. 2
HALE, supra note 414, at 234; see 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 415, at *330-31.
417. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 67; 2 BRACrON ON Tm LAws AND CUSTOMS OF ENG-
LAND 429 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968). The person accused was called the "appellee."
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 415, at *330.
418. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 415, at *312.
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fenses at the time.419 Tuning was essential to become an approver.
An approver had to confess prior to the final presentation of the evi-
dence at trial.420
Limitations also existed on the circumstances of an appeal. An
approver could not appeal a felony that he or she had confessed to by
retracting his confession and accusing another of the same crime.421
Nor could the approver appeal an accessory to the crime.42 2 An ap-
peal, however, could be taken against the approver's felonious
partner.423
The plea to become an approver usually occurred upon arraign-
ment. A coroner was then assigned to the appeal.424 The approver
had several days to confess to the coroner. Any delay in confessing
resulted in hanging.4' Prior to the incorporation of indictments into
the criminal process, the appeal of an approver could initiate a felony
charge.426
Other constraints upon the approver existed. The court had the
discretion to hear an appeal. Once the appeal was heard, the court
issued a warning to the jury that it was dangerous to convict on this
419. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 227-28 (suspicion of felony without indictment is not
sufficient to become an approver); see 4 BLAcKSTONE, supra note 415, at *330.
420. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 415, at *330; 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 228 (even with
a plea of not guilty, the accused could confess prior to entry of all of the evidence, how-
ever, once convicted "he shall not be admitted to be an approver"). If all of the evidence
was heard, but not the verdict, then the court's discretion governed acceptance as an ap-
prover. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 228.
In addition, the person could become an approver in front of a justice of the king's
bench, of gaol-delivery or in eyre, or in front of a bishop's justice, but not before an infer-
ior court, a justice of the peace, oyer or terminer. The difference being that the latter could
not assign a coroner to hear the appeal. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 229; 2 BRACrON, supra
note 417, at 436 (most of these lesser courts dealt with land disputes).
421. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 227 ("if A. being indicted for robbing of B., and he
appeal C., that he robbed A. himself, this is a void appeal, and the appellor shall be exe-
cuted, and the appellee shall not be put to answer to it").
422. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 227 ("if he appeal C. as accessary to the robbery of B.,
either before or after, C. shall not be put to answer, for it is not the same felony charged
upon A. but only an accessary to it").
423. "A. of N., confessing that he is a thief, appeals B. of confederacy and theft (or
'robbery' or 'homicide') that is, that they together stole such a thing at such a place, so that
the aforesaid B. had so much for his share." 2 BRACroN, supra note 417, at 431.
424. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 229.
425. Id. at 230.
426. 3 HoLDswORTH, supra note 416, at 609 (vague on exactly when this occurred). See
also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.2, at 378 (2d ed.
1992) (equally unclear, but intimating the timing around the end of the fourteenth
century).
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evidence, especially if uncorroborated.427 Once an approver ap-
pealed, the approver could not change the substance of the allega-
tions.4' Nor could the approver charge persons not in the kingdom
or not where the approver alleged them to be.429 Further, everything
the approver alleged had to be true.430
In response to the accusation, the appellee could choose to per-
sonally fight the approver or be tried upon the accusation.431 In the
end, an unsuccessful appeal would result in the execution of the ap-
prover.432 Otherwise, upon receipt of the king's pardon, the approver
was free but had to leave the country.433
2. Problems in the Approver System
Many entered the approver system, because the fate of a false
approver was no worse than the fate of a convicted non-approver.
Further, the problems with the approver system were numerous. The
prisoners who took appeals as approvers were viewed as manipula-
tive, abusive, and desperate.434 Questions existed as to the credibility
427. 4 Bt cKs'roNE, supra note 415, at *330; 9 HALSBURy'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 222
(2d ed.).
428. If, after confessing, the coroner confirmed a waived appeal and the approver dis-
avowed the appeal, the approver was hanged. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 230. Similarly, if
upon repetition of his appeal to the court he misstated it, then the approver was hanged.
Id. The coroner's credibility exceeded that of the approver. 2 BRACrON, supra note 417,
at 429.
Hale cited the wrong color of a horse as grounds to believe that the appeal was
feigned. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 230. "The approver must describe some specific thing
and all the circumstances, without any variance or alteration, and must recognize the ap-
pellee when he is produced in court, for if he does not it will be presumed that they were
never confederates." 2 BRACrON, supra note 417, at 431.
429. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 230, 231 (In either event, the approver was hanged).
430. Id. at 231 ("for if he be once found false in what he saith, he shall not be credited
in any thing"). If the action proceeded nevertheless, for instance in the circumstance of an
approver's disavowal, then the king could evaluate the evidence adduced and decide to
proceed against the appellee. Id. at 232. However, if the appeal was not commenced or if
the approver was pardoned, then the appeal was discharged. Id.
431. 4 B..cKsc soNE, supra note 415, at *330 ("he must put himself upon his trial, either
by battel, or by the country").
432. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 234. Essentially, the approver had confessed to a capi-
tal crime and this was seen merely as carrying out the sentence. 2 BRAcroN, supra note
417, at 430. "[F]or the condition of his pardon has failed, viz. the convicting of some other
person, and therefore his conviction remains absolute." 4 BLACKCroNE, supra note 415, at
*330.
433. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 235; 2 BRAcroN, supra note 417, at 433.
434. Hale described them as follows: "[T]he truth is, that more mischief hath come to
good men by these kind of approvements by false accusations of desperate villains, than
benefit to the public by the discovery and convicting of real offenders.. ." 2 HALE, supra
note 414, at 226. Only people who were in frankpledge did not have to answer to the
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of the approver who stood to profit from the accusations. Further,
approvers could blackmail innocent people with threats to pursue
"trumped up" charges.4
35
The abuses even extended beyond the persons who initially stood
accused. Sheriffs, jailers, and prison keepers would compel prisoners
to become approvers and accuse innocent persons to extort ran-
soms.436 According to Hale, the practice of approvement became ob-
solete by the close of the medieval period.437 Although the formal
system of approvers was abandoned, the underlying characteristics
were incorporated into the surviving common informer system. 438 In
addition, the basic premise of negotiating with the prosecution for re-
lief based upon turning in evidence of others' criminal activity
persisted.
accusations of an approver. 2 POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 416, at 631; 2 BRACTON,
supra note 417, at 429 (noting that those who have a lord to avow them are also beyond
appeal).
435. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 226. While much of the criticism of approvers was
either general or anecdotal, the continuous criticism and subsequent abandonment of the
process were testament to the troubles caused. In 1274 an approver proceeded against 13
honest men and extorted 40 shillings, threatening to use others as approvers against the
townspeople. United States v. De Cavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1270 n.7 (3d Cir. 1971).
Holdsworth told of one prisoner in 1445, Janycoght de Gales, who owed 388£ 3s 4d
and procured an approver, George Grenelawe, to appeal him of larceny-that is accuse
someone else of the offense. Later, Grenelawe confessed to the collusion. 2 HOLDS-
woRTH, supra note 416, at 459.
That practice ended by passage of a statute stating that "no recovery, otherwise than
by verdict, obtained by collusion in an action popular, shall be a bar to any other action
prosecuted bona fide." 3 BLAcSroNE, supra note 415, at *160 (discussing 4 Hen. 7, ch. 20
(1487) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 78-79). This appar-
ently treated such outcomes as acquittals, allowing reprosecution. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 415, at *161.
436. 2 HoL.swoRm, supra note 416, at 457-58 (noting that 1 Edw. 3, ch. 7 (1327)
(Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTEs AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 190-91, acknowledged that
this practice existed and involved torture--"have pained their Prisoners"-to obtain the
prisoner's compliance). In 1340, a statute was enacted to prevent these abuses and prohibit
the practice. 14 Edw. 3, ch. 10 (1340) (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 416, at 226; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 415, at *128-29. However, later statutes ac-
knowledged the persistence of the jailer abuses. 1 Edw. 4, ch. 2 (1461) (Eng.), reprinted in
2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 6.
437. 2 HALE, supra note 414, at 226. Although it bore great resemblance to the practice
of king's evidence or king's mercy, both used during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centu-
ries, under the latter practice an unsuccessful "appeal" resulted in prosecution, not death.
Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 599.
438. Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 599.
[Vol. 22:81
A NEW VISION OF INFORMANTS
3. The Common Informer System and Abuses in Great Britain
The common informer was "a person who brought certain trans-
gressions to the notice of the authorities and instituted proceedings,
not because he, personally, had been aggrieved or wished to see jus-
tice done, but because under the law he was entitled to a part of any
fine which might be imposed."4 3 9 Based upon that information, the
informer instituted a civil qui tam action."' Once commenced, no
one, including the king, could pursue an action based on the same
illegal act.441
The justifications for the use of common informers have changed
and adapted. In the absence of organized police forces," 2 it was ar-
gued that the common informers were an evil necessary to crime con-
trol.443 However, the informer system persisted even after crime was
439. 2 LEON RADzINowIcz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMiN-
ISTRATION FROM 1750 138 (1948-1968) (5 vols.). Blackstone explained the situation in this
way:
The same reason may with equal justice be applied to all penal statutes, that is,
such acts of parliament whereby a forfeiture is inflicted for transgressing the pro-
visions therein enacted. The party offending is here bound by the fundamental
contract of society to obey the directions of the legislature, and pay the forfeiture
incurred to such persons as the law requires. The usual application of this forfei-
ture is either to the party aggrieved, or else to any of the king's subjects in gen-
eral.... But, more usually, these forfeitures created by statute are given at large,
to any common informer, or in other words, to any such person or persons as will
sue for the same: and hence such actions are called popular actions, because they
are given to the people in general.
3 BLAcKSToNE, supra note 415, at *159-160.
The earliest record of the payment method, 1692, found that the informer was issued a
judge's certificate for the money due. Langbein, supra note 414, at 107. These became
known as "blood money certificates." Id.
440. This action is brought by a person who sues for himself, as well as on behalf of the
king. 3 BLACKsToNE, supra note 415, at *160; 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 72 (1933)
(listed under "qui tam").
441. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 415, at *160. The statute of limitations on a qui tam
(informer's) action, however, was one year. In contrast, the king had two years within
which to file and seek the penalty. 4 HOLDswORTH, supra note 416, at 525. So effective
were these actions that often offenders would have a friend commence a qui tam action. 3
BLAcKnoNE, supra note 415, at *160.
442. 2 HoLDswORTH, supra note 416, at 453. Organized police forces did not appear in
England until the early Nineteenth Century. 12 HoLDswORTH, supra note 416, at 232;
Langbein, supra note 414, at 114.
443. 11 HoLDswORTH, supra note 416, at 552. But see iL at 552 & n.10 (citing CESARE
B. BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRImEs AND PuNIsHMENTs ch. 36 (David Young trans.,
1986)). Another theory behind their use was the expedience of the criminal information
over the indictment. 9 HOLDswORTH, supra note 416, at 240-41. See, e.g., 11 Hen. 7, ch. 3
(1494) (Eng.) (allowing judges of assize and justices of the peace to hear any non-capital
offense), reprinted in 2 STATuTEs AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 82 (which was repealed in
1509 due to abuses in 1 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1509) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATuTES AT LARGE,
supra note 416, at 108). When the indictment replaced the information for most felonies,
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controlled through the use of police and indictments. The use of the
common informer persisted due to a lack of interest and disdain for
resolving the weaknesses of informers, the institutionalization of the
use of informers, and the informers' ability to adapt to the times.
Common informers, like approvers, abused their positions, and
the government was similarly frustrated in its attempts to control their
activity.444 On a near cyclical basis, statutes were created granting in-
formers benefits, and then later limited by penalizing informer mis-
conduct. Throughout the centuries, varying with the need for and
criticism of common informers, a wide variety of statutes incorporated
informers into the legal process and gave them rewards for their con-
tributions and labors. These statutes regulated land, vagrancy, com-
merce, and even the military." 5
however, common informers were still used to obtain felony indictments. 9 HOLDSwORTH,
supra note 416, at 242-44 (discussing the preference for indictments in the mid to late
1600s). This was potentially a full half century prior to the earliest date cited by Langbein
for the use of informers for felony charges. Langbein, supra note 414, at 106. Langbein
places 1692 as the beginning of the rewards system in England. Id. He distinguished previ-
ously existing qui tam actions as involving only regulatory matters and misdemeanors, not
felonies. Id. at 109 n. 441. This neat line of division may be suitable for his purposes;
however, it places more finiteness where there is obscurity and overlap. For example, in
1589, Parliament enacted "An Act to avoid Horse-Stealing." 31 Eliz. ch. 12 (1589)(Eng.),
reprinted in 2 STAT=TS AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 669-70. Under the Act, an accessory
to the sale of a stolen horse was subject to both felony prosecution and an informer action,
where "one Half of all which Forfeitures to be to the Queen's Majesty, her Heirs and
Successors, and the other Half to him or them that will sue for the same." 31 Eliz. ch. 12
§§ 2, 4, reprinted in 2 STATUTE AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 669-70. See also 8 Hen. 6,
ch. 9 § 5 (1429) (Eng.) (justices can hear claims for unlawful entry upon land "[a]nd if the
Sheriff or Bailiff be duly attained in this Behalf by Indictment, or by Bill, that he which
sueth for himself and for the King have the one Moiety of the Forfeiture of [twenty
pounds] together with his costs and expenses"), reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 416, at 408-10. No doubt the informer who sued would also play a role in any felony
prosecution. Thus, in reality, each of these systems, whether approver, felony informer or
qui tam prosecutor, bore too many common characteristics that persist throughout the cen-
turies and continue to infect their present-day relatives.
444. By statute, in 1589, common informers were described as persons who "daily un-
justly vexed and disquieted" the Queen's subjects. 31 Eliz., ch. 5 (1589) (Eng.), reprinted in
2 STATUTEs AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 660-61.
445. 2 RADrzNowIcz, supra note 439, at 140. The statutes included 23 Hen. 8, ch. 9
(1531) (Eng.) (regulations on Archbishop's courts imposing a fine of 10 pounds sterling, to
be divided equally between informer and the Crown), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE,
supra note 416, at 170-71; 31 Eliz., ch. 6, § 10 (1589) (Eng.) (offense for official of church,
college or hospital to receive money to vacate the office imposing a fine of 40 pounds
where the informer received half), reprinted in 2 STATuTEs AT LARGE, supra note 416, at
661-63; 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3 (1547) (Eng.) (punishing city or town for allowing vagrants or
vagabonds where informer shared the fine, the convicted pauper was branded and given to
the informer as a slave for two years), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416,
at 386 (text in Appendix). This last statute was repealed two years later. See C. J. RMTON-
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Common informers devised ways to gain benefits through less ef-
fort. For example, informers would agree "not to prosecute or to in-
form on one who has committed a crime" in exchange for money,
property, or some other consideration." 6 As a result, compounding
TURNER, A HISTORY OF VAGRANTS AND VAGRANCY Am BEGGARS AND BEGGING 89-94
(1887).
Other statutes involving informers were directed at commerce. 2 RADZINOWICZ,
supra note 439, at 140 n.15; 9 HoLDSWORTH, supra note 416, at 239-240. These statutes
included 5 Edw. 3, ch. 5 (1331) (Eng.) (prohibiting stallholders from selling after the close
of the fair upon penalty of double the value of the goods sold, the informer receiving "the
fourth Part of that which shall be lost"), reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
416, at 208; 9 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1335) (Eng.) (prohibiting the disturbance of merchants), re-
printed in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 212-14; The Statute of Cloths, 25 Edw.
3, ch. 2 (1350) (Eng.) (same), reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 259-
260; 4 Hen. 4, ch. 20 (1402) (Eng.) (customs officer embezzlement), reprinted in 1 STAT-
UTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 452; 2 Hen. 6, ch. 14 (1423) (Eng.) (prohibiting the sale
of unmarked silver wares), reprinted in id. at 529-530; 3 Hen. 6, ch. 3 (1424) (Eng.) (penalty
for customs officer embezzlement is "the treble Value of the Merchandises.... And he
that will sue, shall have the Third Part for his Labour."), reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 416, at 532; 28 Hen. 6, ch. 4 (1449) (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 416, at 621 (see Appendix); 28 Hen. 8, ch. 5 (1536) (Eng.) (protecting
apprentices), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 253-54; 32 Hen. 8, ch. 9
(1540) (Eng.) (regulating the purchase and sale of land, fine of ten pounds), reprinted in 2
STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 280-81; 33 Hen. 8, ch. 27 (1541) (Eng.) (regulating
the sale and leasing of property, fine of five pounds), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE,
supra note 416, at 321-22; 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ch. 7 (1555) (Eng.) (prohibiting the purchase of
stolen horses), reprinted in 2 STATuTrEs AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 490-91; 5 Eliz., ch. 9,
§ 3 (1562) (Eng.) (expanding fine to forty pounds on regulation of purchase of land), re-
printed in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 550; 18 Eliz., ch. 9 (1576) (Eng.)
(prohibiting the export of leather), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at
617-18; 31 Eliz., ch. 12 (1589) (Eng.) (prohibiting sale and purchase of stolen horses), re-
printed in 2 STATurES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 669-670; 6 Anne, ch. 31, § 1 (1707)
(Eng.) ("the Churchwardens of such Parish so making Default, and being convicted
thereof... shall forfeit and pay the Sum of ten Pounds, one Moiety thereof to the In-
former, and the other Moiety to the Overseers of the Poor of the Parish"), reprinted in 4
STATUrES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 325; 2 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1729) (Eng.) (punishment of
forgery), reprinted in 5 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 699-700; 8 Geo. 2, ch. 16,
§ 9 (1735) (Eng.) (reward for apprehending felons), reprinted in 6 STATUTES AT LARGE,
supra note 416, at 188; 15 Geo. 2, ch. 28, § 7 (1742) (Eng.) (reward for conviction of coun-
terfeiters), reprinted in 6 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 464-65; 16 Geo. 2, ch. 15,
§ 3 (1743) (Eng.) (easy conviction of offenders at large), reprinted in 6 STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 416, at 500-01; 8 Geo. 3, ch. 15 (1768) (Eng.) (providing for transporta-
tion of prisoners), reprinted in 10 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 453-54. See also
6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 416, at 405-06; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 415, at *295.
On the military, see 2 RADziNowicz, supra note 439, at 63 n.29. An informant who
gave information about the military was rewarded by one of the statutes with "one
Month's Wages of him that shall be found faulty." 2 & 3 Edw. 6, ch. 2, § 12 (1548) (Eng.)
(felony crimes include, inter alia, allowing soldier to depart, taking another for gain, retain-
ing wages, and departing without leave), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
416, at 408-10. This statute was repealed in 1863. 26 & 27 Vict., ch. 125 (1863) (Eng.),
reprinted in 44 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 312-13.
446. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 259 (5th ed. 1979).
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deals were made between informers and sheriffs (the jailers of the
time), as well as between sheriffs and prisoners. Compounding in-
volved money, property, or the marriage of an heir.' 7 In response to
this extortion, statutes limited the sheriff's term of service." 8 Never-
theless, the practice continued. For instance, the Crown issued com-
missions authorizing the holder to find violations of the law, to
institute the necessary proceedings, and to receive a share of the pen-
alty." 9 These commission holders were specifically allowed to com-
pound and did not have to observe the statutes.450
After much criticism,45' the practice of compounding was prohib-
ited in 1576, when it became punishable as a misdemeanor.45 As a
result, anyone who charged without permission of a court or sought
money from the defendant to drop the charges had to forfeit ten
pounds, stand for two hours in the pillory, and was forever unable to
447. In Dive v. Maningham, 75 Eng. Rep. 96, 1 Plowden Rep. 60 (1551), the court
discussed compounding prior to 1444:
.. where a man was condemned in any sum, and in execution for it, the sheriffs
or other officers would let him at large upon condition to save them harmless; as
if he had been condemned in £100, the sheriff or other officer would take an
obligation of £300 .... And sometimes the sheriff or other officer would for such
favour gain a piece of land, sometimes he would compound with the prisoner by
this means to get his son and heir married to his own daughter, and he never was
without great reward for such favour. And so sheriffs and other officer by such
crafts and devices were enriched ....
Id. at 107, 1 Plowden Rep. at 67.
448. 14 Edw. 3, stat. 1, ch. 7 (1340) (Eng.) (limit term to one year because "they be
encouraged to do many Oppressions to the People"), reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE,
supra note 416, at 224-25; 23 Hen. 6, ch. 7 (1444) (Eng.) (same because of the "many and
divers Oppressions to the King's liege People"), reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 416, at 606-08; 23 Hen. 6, ch. 9, § 1 (1444) (Eng.) (same "considering the great Per-
jury, Extortion, and Oppression which be and have been in this Realm by his Sheriffs,
Under-Sheriffs, and their Clerks, Coroners, Stewards of Franchises, Bailiffs, and Keepers
of Prisons, and other Officers in divers Counties"), reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE,
supra note 416, at 608.
449. 4 HOLDSwoRTH, supra note 416, at 357; 10 HoLwswoRTH, supra note 416, at 233 &
nn.1-2.
450. 4 HoLDswoRT-, supra note 416, at 357 & nn.3-4, 358 & nn.4-5 (giving examples of
one who did not have to follow the penal statutes relating to the leather trade, the wool
trade, the importation of playing cards).
451. Many, including Coke, were vehemently against this sort of favoritism, calling such
dispensations "utterly against law." Id. at 358 & n.5.
452. 18 Eliz., ch. 5, § 3 (1576) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
416, at 613-14. This act was subsequently made perpetual. 27 Eliz., ch. 10, § 1 (1585)
(Eng.) ("since the making of the same Act to be very necessary, beneficial and expedient
for the Commonwealth"), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 644; 31
Eliz., ch. 5 (1589) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 660-61.
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sue under any statute.453 Another statute entitled all defendants to
appear by attorney when "informed against upon any penal Law. '454
This brief reaction against the common informers was neither suf-
ficient to quell abuses nor completely sincere. In 1589 "all former
Statutes made for Reformation of Disorders of such common Inform-
ers, not repealed or altered by this Act, shall be put in due Execution:
... that no Person, other than the Party grieved... shall be received
to inform or sue upon any Penal Statute."45 However, the statute of
1589 carved out exceptions for officers of record and for offenses
where information could be given in any county.456 Further, the com-
mon informer's ability to prevent others from bringing actions was
held illegal in 1605 in the Case of the Penal Statutes,457 where the court
labelled such acts as an abuse of the trust of the people.458 Statutes
then required informers and relators to take an oath upon their
information.459
However, none of these constraints addressed the problems aris-
ing from the large grant of authority to persons acting on behalf of the
government, nor the payment of rewards for successful information.460
While placing limits on common informers, statutes approved the ap-
pointment of aulnagers, government persons who were to investigate
453. 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 439, at 315.
454. 29 Eliz., ch. 5, § 21 (1587) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTEs AT LARGE, supra note
416, at 655.
455. 31 Eliz., ch. 5, § 1 (1589) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
416, at 660.
456. 31 Eliz., ch. 5, §§ 3 & 4 (1589) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE supra
note 416 at 661.
457. 7 Co. Rep. 36 (1605). 4 HoLDswoRTh, supra note 416, at 357-58 & 358 n.6. In
addition, the informer could "interfere" with any cause of action that sought the penalty.
Holdsworth analogized the abuse in giving informer's this status with granting a monopoly.
Id. at 358.
458. 4 HowmswoRTH, supra note 416, at 358-9. The judges held that:
... if by the industry and diligence of any there accrueth any benefit to His Maj-
esty [the King may reward such a person; but] that when a statute is made by
Parliament for the good of the commonwealth, the king cannot give the penalty
benefit and dispensation of such Act to any subject; or give power to any subject
to dispense with it ... for when a statute is made pro bono publico, and the King
.. is by the whole realm trusted with it; this confidence and trust is so in-
separably joined and annexed to the Royal power of the King in so high a point of
Sovereignty that he cannot transfer it to the disposition or power of any private
person or to any private use.
Id. (quoting Case of the Penal Statutes, 7 Co. Rep. 36).
459. 21 3am. 1, ch. 4, § 3 (1623) (Eng.) (oath that the offense did occur, did not occur in
another county and that the offense occurred within the last year), reprinted in 3 STATUTES
AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 94.
460. 4 Hor.wswoRTH, supra note 416, at 359.
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illegalities in a particular industry.461 Not surprisingly, these officials
also abused their positions until this practice ended in 1640.462 There-
after, business monopolies flourished and the only enforcement lay
with the people, or the common informer.463 As a result, more legisla-
tion encouraged the intervention of informers.46 4
In the late seventeenth century, societies in England took upon
themselves the enforcement of laws on temperance and vice. These
societies embraced the use of common informers, in utter disregard of
the criticisms regarding reliability and the lure of a share of the pen-
alty.465 The statutes again strongly supported this use, offering large
compensation to informers in the areas of gaming, lotteries, and disor-
461. Id. (referencing the appointment of Aulnagers in drapery (1594 and 1605), lead
(1619), silk (1639), coal, and ale houses).
462. Id. at 360 (citing 16 Car. 1, ch. 19 (1640) (Eng.), reprinted in 3 STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 416, at 141-42).
463. 4 HoLnswoRTH, supra note 416, at *360.
464. 2 RADZiNOVIcZ, supra note 439, at 141 n.20 (citing 6 HoLDswoRTH, supra note
416, at 332); 1 Jam. 1, ch. 5 (1604) (Eng.) (overcharging by stewards, fine of forty pounds
with "[one] Half to any of his Majesty's Subjects that shall complain in any of his Highness
Courts"), reprinted in 3 STATuTEs AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 5; 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 26,
§ 6 (1662) (Eng.) (butter and cheese trade, half the fine to the informer), reprinted in 3
STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 260; 4 W. & M., ch. 7, § 7 (1692) (Eng.) (same),
reprinted in 3 STATUrES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 516; 5 W. & M., ch. 20, § 14 (1694)
(Eng.) (beer and liquor duties), reprinted in 3 STATuTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 560;
8 Will. 3, ch. 8 (1696) (lending of money), reprinted in 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
416, at 639-40.
465. 2 RADZNOWICZ, supra note 439, at 5-6, 13 n.49, 15. The Gin Act of 1736 was one
such statute. 9 Geo. 2, ch. 23 (1736) (Eng.), reprinted in 6 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
416, at 217-221. Shortly thereafter, a statute was enacted criminalizing assault of an in-
former punishable by transportation for 7 years. 11 Geo. 2, ch. 26, §§ 1, 2, 7 & 8 (1738)
(Eng.), reprinted in id. at 305-08. The societies would obtain blank warrants for the of-
fenses in which they were particularly interested. The warrants were given to agents, who
received information from informers and filled in the form. The agent then had the in-
former deliver the warrant to a magistrate who approved it. The informant returned the
warrant to the agent who then delivered it to the constable. 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note
439, at 14.
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derly houses. 6 Most of these societies suffered and eventually failed,
largely as a result of the disrepute of the informers.467
In the eighteenth century, informers again prevailed. Common
informers received rewards for policing commerce, such as turning in
information about dishonest merchants.468 So vast had this informer
system become that one commentator said "[i]t formed part of the
deliberate and consistent policy of the legislature and pervaded the
entire body of the criminal law." 4 9 In 1722 legislation was enacted to
compensate persons injured or killed while informing.470 Common in-
466. 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 439, at 142 & n.23. These statutes offered rewards up
to 200 pounds. 12 Geo. 2, ch. 28 (1739) (Eng.), reprinted in 6 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 416, at 359-62; 25 Geo. 2, ch. 36, § 2 (1752) (Eng.) (up to 100 pounds for conviction of
running a disorderly house without a license), reprinted in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 416, at 438; 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24 (1757) (Eng.) (ten shillings first conviction and two
pounds ten shillings for the second), reprinted in 8 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at
73-80; 42 Geo. 3, ch. 119 (1802) (Eng.) (500 pounds for illegal game or lottery conviction
and 100 pounds for conviction on offering sale of houses, goods or lands by lottery), re-
printed in 19 STATurEs AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 609-611. But see 4 & 5 W. & M., ch.
18 (1692) (Eng.) (allowing defendants who are found not guilty or not tried to recover
costs against informants), reprinted in 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 525; 9
Anne, ch. 20, § 5 (1710) (Eng.) (allowing costs against relators), reprinted in 4 STATUTES
AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 470.
467. 2 RADziNoVIcz, supra note 439, at 16 & n.68 (noting one society that survived
hired informers full-time, more like detectives).
468. Id. at 142-143; see also 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 8, § 15 (1670) (Eng.) (regulating weav-
ers), reprinted in 3 STATTES AT LARGE, supra note 439, at 357; 11 & 12 Will. 3, ch. 15, § 6
(1700) (Eng.) (shorting on ale), reprinted in 4 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 53;
31 Geo. 2, ch. 29 (1757) (Eng.) (adultering meal, flour or bread), reprinted in 8 STATUTE
AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 255-74. Other areas that offered promise for informers in-
cluded laws governing hackney coaches, 2 RADzrNowicz, supra note 439, at 144, hawkers
and peddlers, id., pawnbrokers, id., 25 Geo. 3, ch. 48 (1785) (Eng.), reprinted in 14 STAT-
UTE-S AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 653-55; 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 99 (1800) (Eng.), reprinted
in 19 STATUrES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 451-61, and other revenue offenses. RADZI-
NOWICZ, supra note 439, at 142-43. See also id. at 144-145 & nn. 35-48; 17 Geo. 2, ch. 5
(1743) (Eng.) (vagabonds), reprinted in 6 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 514-23; 6
Geo. 3, ch. 48 (1766) (Eng.) (injuring or taking plants from cultivated lands), reprinted in
10 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 260-62; 10 Geo. 3, ch. 18 (1770) (Eng.) (buying,
selling or detaining stolen dogs), reprinted in id. at 668-69; 28 Geo. 3, ch. 48 (1788) (Eng.)
(taking too young an apprentice chimney sweep), reprinted in 15 STATuTES AT LARGE,
supra note 416, at 499-502. Jonathan Wild is credited with organizing London's under-
world, returning stolen property for large rewards and sending more than 100 persons to
the gallows. MARX, supra note 14, at 19-20 & n.6 (and sources cited therein).
469. 2 RADZInOWICZ, supra note 439, at 146. He concluded: "It acquired the character
of a regular system in process of continual expansion. The result was a social situation in
which the common informer was expected to act as a policeman, and as a protector of the
community against a vast mass of delinquency." Id. at 146-47.
470. 11 HoLDswoRTH, supra note 416, at 552 & n.12; see also 5 Anne, ch. 31, § 2 (1706)
(Eng.) (discovering housebreaker), reprinted in 4 STATUTEs AT LARGE, supra note 416, at
264; 9 Geo. 1, ch. 22, § 12 (1722) (Eng.) (concealed weapons), reprinted in 5 STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 416, at 461-62.
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formers became specialized, were described as "ruthless and unprinci-
pled," targeted certain areas, and profited greatly.47 One pamphlet
of the era accused solicitors of encouraging common informers to
overcharge felonies to "bring them within the ambit of the reward
statutes." 472
The resulting backlash against the common informer ultimately
failed because the legal system gave new protection to informers. For
example, the Gin Act of 1736471 virtually outlawed drinking. The
common informers' use of the Gin Act turned public sentiment
against informing so that "the people thought all informations mali-
cious," "began to declare war against informers," and attacked and
killed informers in the streets.4 74 After abandoning the Gin Act, the
legal system gave informers penal protection by specifically criminal-
izing attacks upon anyone who gave or was about to give evidence
against another.475
This imbalance of process remained a part of the criminal process
in England throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Fur-
thermore, scandals involving common informers recurred regularly,476
For example, in the early 1800s, informers enforcing insurance laws
could recover before two magistrates and charge the wrongdoers with
several penal violations, each rewarding the informer.4 7 7 The sheriffs
471. 2 RADZINOwICZ, supra note 439, at 147. Some statutes, from which particularly
good profits could be reaped, were known as "theirs." Id. (quoting J. Wade, Treatise on
the Police and Crimes of the Metropolis 302 (1829)). Either the statute, or blackmail and
extortion for not reporting the violations, were the source of revenue. These informers
wrote into the laws their own "due" for finding the offense. Id. Threats of blackmail were
documented in one pamphlet detailing the scheme. Langbein, supra note 414, at 110 n.442.
472. Id. at 108-09 n.441.
473. 9 Geo. 2, ch. 23 (1736) (Eng.), reprinted in 6 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416,
at 217-21.
474. 2 RADziNowicz, supra note 439, at 147 (quoting Lord Bathurst's Speech in 1743.
Par. Hist. (1741-1743), vol. 12, Feb. 15-21, 1943).
475. 11 Geo. 2, ch. 26, § 2 (1738) (Eng.) (transportation for seven years for anyone, in a
group of five or more, for assaulting, beating or wounding someone who has given or is
about to give evidence against another), reprinted in 6 STATUTEs AT LARGE, supra note
416, at 306.
476. 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 439, at 148-155. In Rex v. M'Daniel, 19 State Trials
746 (1755), noted in 11 HoLrswoRTH, supra note 416, at 552. Two prisoners were alleged
to have suborned two persons to commit a robbery so that the prisoners could get the
reward for their apprehension. Id. More recent reporting of the same incident tells of a
larger conspiracy to use confederates to set up an individual as the accused, then collect the
reward. Langbein, supra note 414, at 105-06. The MacDaniel incident added to, or created
additional, anti-informer sentiment. Id. at 113-14.
477. 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 323, at 148-9.
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of London, in response, wrote to the House of Commons complaining
of this abuse.478
In Rex v. Crisp,479 the court limited the scope of the 250 year-old
proscription on compounding480 by excluding offenses cognizable only
before magistrates in their "summary jurisdictions."481 Although a
later report recommended reversing Crisp, no action was taken.482
As a result, common informers could and did extort money in ex-
change for not reporting people.48 3
The advent of the metropolitan police force in 1829, and their
criticism of the use of common informers renewed and reinforced so-
cietal criticism on the subject.484 Many suggestions for reform were
made, including giving magistrates discretion to lower the informer's
share of the reward, prohibiting compounding of informations, requir-
ing informers to be licensed, and making them give security in case
their allegations proved false.4 5 Still, Parliament did not act. Abuses
increased as common informers banded with police officers to prevent
competition from other informers.4 6 Only ten years later did Parlia-
ment address such abuses by granting magistrates discretion to reduce
or deny the penalty and thereby reduce the informer's share.487 Com-
mon informers, however, continued to outstep their critics.4 88
This cycle of schizophrenic treatment of informers continued into
the first half of the twentieth century. For example, forty-eight in-
former statutes remained in force until 1951, only one-quarter of
478. Id.
479. 106 Eng. Rep. 104, 1 B. & Aid. 282 (1818).
480. See supra notes 446-453.
481. Rex v. Crisp, 166 Eng. Rep. at 105, 1 B. & Aid. at 284 ("The object of the Legisla-
ture by that law, was to render the punishment of crimes more certain, and this will equally
apply to offences cognizable before justices as to those which are cognizable before supe-
rior jurisdictions.").
482. 2 RADZNOWICZ, supra note 439, at 315-406.
483. Id. at 151.
484. Id. at 153.
485. Id. at 154.
486. Id. at 151.
487. Metropolitan Police Courts Act, 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 71, § 34 (1839) (Eng.), reprinted in
33 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 416, at 224; 17 CoMPrEDIous ABSMRAcrs OF THE
PUBLIc GENERAL AcTs FROM THE LAW JouRNAL 1839-41, 185, app. xii. (1839).
488. 2 RADziNowIcz, supra note 439, at 152.
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which were enacted between 1825 and 1895.489 All statutes involving
common informers were repealed in 1951. 490
4. Bringing The Informer System to the United States
The English informer system arrived with the colonists in the ear-
liest days, and flourished.49' In the first Congress, legislation gave re-
wards to informers for violations by customs officers.492 Since this
time, the informant system has grown and developed in the United
States. The current form of approvement in the United States is the
cooperation of criminally charged persons in police investigations.
Despite historical experience, many courts in this country believe that
such cooperation is too sophisticated or sufficiently developed to re-
peat past abuses.49 3 To other courts, the incorporation of approve-
ment has been too subtle to recognize.494 Regardless of the historical
influence, current qui tam actions merely give courts an opportunity to
present some history.495
Traditional problems that plagued the informants systems in Eng-
land persist in the modem United States criminal justice system. For
example, there was certainly a high level of informant activity and
abuse in the 1960s and 1970s, involving organized crime, the Klan, and
489. Id. at 155 n.76. "It is not a flattering testimony to the adequacy of our law-enforce-
ment that for over five hundred years we have felt it necessary to set the law in motion by
this means." SIR CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, THE QUEEN'S PEACE 90 (1953), (quoted in 2
RADZINOWICZ, supra note 439, at 155 n.76).
490. 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 39 (1951) (Eng.) ("An Act to abolish the common informer
procedure"), reprinted in PUBLIC GENERAL Acrs OF 1951 151-54.
• 491. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) ("[S]tatutes providing for actions by a
common informer, who himself had no interest whatever in the controversy other than that
given by statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this
country ever since the foundation of our Government."). In Marvin, the Court recognized
the vitality and importance of the informer history to the law enforcement practices in this
country. For examples, see Donnelly, supra note 5 at 1091-92 n.6 (areas include narcotics,
protection of contract laborers, protection of Indians and fraudulent claims against the
United States).
492. See, e.g., Sess. 1, ch. 5, § 8, 1 Stat. 38 (1789) (violator must pay $200 "to the use of
the informer"); Sess. 1, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 45 (1789) (violator must pay $100 plus costs "to
the use of the informer"); Sess. 1, ch. 5, § 38, 1 Stat. 48 (1789) (one moiety to the informer).
493. See, e.g., Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 598-605 (distinguishing current accomplice lia-
bility from approvement); see also Ex Parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855).
494. See King v. United States, 203 F.2d 525, 526 (8th Cir. 1953).
495. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 266 F.2d 924, 928-29 (D.C. Cir. 1959); United
States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 609 (N.D.
Cal. 1989); United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopter, 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1097
(C.D. Cal. 1989); Connecticut Action Now v. Roberts Plating Co., 330 F. Supp. 695, 696-97
(D. Conn. 1971), affd, 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y of Am.
v. Scholze Tannery, 329 F. Supp. 339, 344 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); United States ex rel. Mattson
v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87, 90 n.6 (D. Minn. 1971).
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COINTELPRO. The jailhouse informant scandal in Los Angeles per-
sisted throughout the 1980s. Currently, the experiences of the U.S.
Attorney's office in Chicago and the FBI with respect to the World
Trade Center bombing evidence informant misuse in the 1990s. The
continuing presence of informant-handler relations and the resulting
victimization show that despite over 500 years of history, the flaws in
the informant system have never been effectively reformed.
B. Establishing Informant-Handler Linkages
This article identifies two key problems with the assumption of
risk and distancing doctrines that courts use to analyze informant-han-
dler relationships. First, courts do not recognize the absence of an
effective form of control over abuse and mishandling. Secondly,
courts do not incorporate the historical aspects of the informant/han-
dler relationship that define their function and existence today. Sug-
gestions for solutions to these problems have not gone far enough
toward altering the basic assumptions that underlie the way courts
view informants.496
Therefore, courts should create a presumption that acts of infor-
mants are state action or under color of law. The presumption would
include all informants who provide information, assistance, or some
other benefit to a law enforcement agency in exchange for some bene-
fit, whether immediate or in the future, tangible or intangible, per-
sonal or to a third party. As discussed previously, the test requires
that an informant be a state actor and that the acts be fairly attributa-
ble to the state.497
1. The Informant Clothed as State Actor
The first part of the state action test asks whether the person is a
state actor. This test somewhat overlaps with the under color of law
test for § 1983.498 Actions or conduct of handlers, with respect to in-
formants, are made "under color of" law and by a "state actor." The
handler, whether police, sheriff, or prosecutor, undoubtedly ap-
proaches, enlists, compensates, and utilizes the informant strictly
under the authorization and within the confines of the handler's duties
as an official of the state, county, or municipal entity. This basic au-
thority of law that empowers the police, sheriff, or prosecutor to em-
ploy the informant is at the heart of the problem.
496. See notes 284-310.
497. See supra notes 400-412 and accompanying text.
498. See notes 390-396 and accompanying text.
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Informants themselves require little scrutiny to determine
whether they are clothed with state authority. Historically, the in-
formant has served a traditional state investigatory function.499 No
informant may act beyond the capability of an undercover agent. Al-
beit, the informant may be better situated such that his or her use is
more expedient and less suspicious. This, however, does not under-
mine the traditional nature of the informant's role as one of the state.
The "clothing" of informants, that is the delegation and assump-
tion of authority, is apparent in the abuses rendered by informants.5°°
Here, one must consider the informant's motivations, the handler's
motivations, and the mental manipulations beneath their interrela-
tionship in general. All of these indicate a transfer of the status of
lawful authority or license. First, the handler's instruction not to
break the law and the informant's law enforcement authority do not
alter this relationship if neither treats the instructions seriously.5° 1
Second, no interpretation of "under color of law" or "state actor" re-
quires a formalistic transfer or existence of actual lawful authority.502
The informant's personal belief that actions are sanctioned, necessary,
or authorized by the handler is sufficient to clothe the informant as a
state actor. The existence of guise and pretense is expected by both
informant and handler.0 3 The informants know they are acting under
499. See supra notes 413-490 and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 232-292 and accompanying text.
501. See supra notes 314-326. In Simpson, the handlers instructed the informant, who
was known to the handlers to be a prostitute and drug user, not to get sexually involved
with the defendant. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1987). Absent
explicit instruction or encouragement otherwise, the court refused to place any responsibil-
ity on the government for the resulting sexual relationship between the informant and the
defendant. Id. at 468. See also United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1978)
(no due process violation in informant's, sexual relationship with defendant where "her
official role was limited to that of introducing a willing seller of narcotics to a willing pur-
chaser"); United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 889-90 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming denial of
jury instruction on informant agency where FBI repeatedly admonished informant not to
participate in conduct like that which led to the charges).
502. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1979) (identifying in-
formant acts supporting constitutional violations, but not including any direct transfer of
authority to informant); Matje v. Leis, 571 F. Supp. 918, 925 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (presumed).
Realistically, within a police department and even generally, the delegation of author-
ity will be by means other than formal written notification. Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights
Litigation After Monell, 79 CoLum. L. REv. 213, 228 (1979); Susan Bandes, Monell, Par-
ratt, Daniels, and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthor-
ized Act, 72 IowA L. REv. 101, 147 (1986).
503. See supra notes 390-396 and accompanying text. In Matje v. Leis, the court specifi-
cally rejected defendants' argument that the informant had to "purport" to act under color
of law. Instead, reasoned the court, the very nature of undercover work is sufficient to
"cloth" the nature of the act with authority of the state. 571 F. Supp. at 925. See Simpson,
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"cover" and the handler wants the informant to maintain pretense and
produce results.
The handler's intent and purpose cannot be determinative be-
cause the process from the state's perspective is ends-oriented, not
means-oriented. 5° The handler wants the informant to function, oft-
entimes regardless of cost. The handler views any extra activity, such
as the commission of torts or crimes, or the creation of other distinct
complications, as secondary to obtaining the necessary information.505
The practicalities and psychologies of the informant-handler rela-
tionship incorporate, compensate for, and actually thrive on, the
transfer of authorization or legal authority. Essentially, defining in-
formant actions as "under color of" law is the first step towards mak-
ing handlers more cognizant of and accountable for the problems
associated with informants. By continually embracing a gulf between
the informant and the handler or the state, courts further the unarticu-
lated redistribution of authority to informants.
2. Informant Abuse Fairly Attributable to the State
Careful examination of the factors relating to "fairly attributable"
supports the presumption that informant actions meet this test as
well.50 6 Here, the critical question is whether the challenged action
constitutes conduct by the informant or the handler. While the han-
dler's conduct is in all probability fairly attributable to the state, the
informant's conduct is critical in establishing proximate cause with re-
spect to the handler or the handler's employer.
Examining informant-handler relationships in terms of typical
employment situations is unfruitful. The nature of this relationship is
813 F.2d at 1466, 1468 (government used "artifice and stratagem" even if "neither appeal-
ing nor moral") (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1983), and
United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986)).
504. See supra notes 356-381 and accompanying text; Bond v. Asiala, 704 F.2d 309, 311-
13 (6th Cir. 1983) (discussing officer's liability for failing to verify informant information).
505. See supra notes 356-381 and accompanying text. See also Waller v. Butkovich, 584
F. Supp. 909, 932 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (FBI awareness and failure to prevent criminal activity
created responsibility); Brown v. State's Atty., 783 F. Supp. 1149, 1153-54 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(officers directed informant to search and steal from plaintiff's apartment). However, in
Simpson, the court stated that knowledge of criminal activity was irrelevant absent urging,
approval or violence. 813 F.2d at 1469-70 & n.9. But see Hampton, 425 U.S. at 493 n.4
("Government 'investigation' involving participation in activities that result in injury to the
rights of its citizens is a course that courts should be extremely reluctant to sanction.")
(quoting United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2nd Cir. 1973)) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
506. See supra notes 400-402 and accompanying text. Terminology here is limited to
state action because this is where the divergence between the terms is most likely to occur.
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inherently intertwined and mutually self-serving. Typically, infor-
mants are compelled or subjected to service through some level of
coercion, be it direct or indirect, real or perceived, psychological or
physical. 50 7 Facing incarceration or other harsh treatment from law
enforcement, the informant may see few alternatives to cooperation
with the handlers or the state. From this, a high degree of mutuality in
the relationship develops. This mutuality can exist on several levels,
including a cooperative level, a give-and-take level, and a reliance
level. On each level, however, the informant works closely with the
handler or the state and the same level of transfer of discretion ex-
ists.508 Under this perspective, the nature of the relationship must
predominate over the inspection of superficial employment character-
istics in determining an informant's position. 0 9
If the informant is initially cooperative and accepting of the posi-
tion, then the relationship would be characterized by mutual trust and
close cooperation in the fulfillment of the informant's responsibilities.
This type of relationship will also, logically, include some benefit or
form of compensation for the informant. Trust will result and the han-
dler will exercise less control and grant more discretion to the inform-
ant. Here, the compensation, trust and discretion are similar to an
employment relationship that courts usually desire when finding ac-
tion fairly attributable to the state.510
If the relationship is initially more give and take (that is, a negoti-
ation of informant status) or dependent upon reliance (that is, the in-
formant is less volitional); the result should not differ significantly.
The level of control used, the level of trust given, and the amount of
discretion allocated may vary, but the essential nature of the relation-
ship remains unchanged. In terms of degree, unless the informant
does not know that he or she is providing information and serving the
507. Misner & Clough, supra note 20, at 715 n.12. See also supra note 455 (on the
exclusion of voluntary informants from this analysis); United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782,
788-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1976) (no due process violation when govern-
ment pressured informant with threats of criminal prosecution and irreparable damage to
health from imprisonment).
508. See supra text accompanying notes 356-381. But see Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1469 n.8
(court suggested that only means to show that informant was unwillingly enlisted is lack of
competence).
509. See, e.g., Ghandi v. Police Dept. of Detroit, 823 F.2d 959, 963-64 (6th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting the per se rule that informants are acting under color of law in favor of inspect-
ing factors such as compensation, acts "together" with the government, aid from govern-
ment, and "placement" of the informant by the government). But see York, 830 F.2d at
889-890 (evidence that FBI failed to follow internal guidelines and procedures for handling
informants irrelevant).
510. See supra notes 400-402 and accompanying text.
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handler, the relationship will develop such that interdependence and
discretion predominate. Thus, this interdependence and intertwining
reflects the mutuality and close cooperation needed for actions to be
fairly attributable to the state. Fixation upon a pure causal connection
at this stage merely ignores the nature of the informant-handler
relationship.
3. Informant State Action
Why, then, have courts been so intent upon distancing informants
from their handlers and the government? One answer is that the sep-
aration is a by-product of deference to law enforcement. Courts have
been very unwilling to intercede into the operations of police depart-
ments, especially those deemed day-to-day operations.5 11 This defer-
ence, however, is inappropriate with respect to informants because
informants are not completely internal fixtures of the department.
Rather, they function as the tentacles of law enforcement that reach
out into the community. Courts must allow greater exploration of the
informant's background and the nature of the informant-state rela-
tionship. 12 Further, the courts should fairly evaluate and balance the
desires for informants to receive rewards against existing and poten-
tial ills.
Courts may also operate with false assumptions about the nature
of informants and their relationships with their handlers. Rather than
assuming that misconduct and mishandling encountered is the norm,
most courts mistakenly assume this to be an anomaly.513 Therefore,
courts should adopt the presumption of state action and shift the bur-
den to the handler.
The state action and color of law presumptions bring the inform-
ant directly within liability under § 1983 and narrow the proof needed
to establish a causal connection between the handler and the inform-
ant's conduct. This showing is necessary to bring a claim against the
informant under § 1983. The essence of the color of law inquiry fo-
511. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) ("endless exercise of
second-guessing municipal employee-training programs ... is an exercise.., the federal
courts are ill suited to undertake"); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-380 (1976) (over-
turning order requiring the Philadelphia Police Department to draft a comprehensive pro-
gram for responses to civilian complaints of police misconduct).
512. But see York, 830 F.2d at 889 (the exclusion of all documents regarding the inform-
ant-State relationship was appropriate where court allowed some documents and cross-
examination into the relationship).
513. But see Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909, 943 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (presumes
agency relationship where two informants infiltrated the Klan and Nazis and actively par-
ticipated in planning and encouragement of attacks).
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cuses on the relationship between the informant and the handler. This
proposal does not necessitate any change in the state actor or color of
law legal standards, but merely brings into the analysis law enforce-
ment experience and theory and a historical perspective. This analyti-
cal framework will allow courts to clearly view and examine the true
nature of the informant-handler relationship.
C. Consequences of the Presumption
Limitations on law enforcement, even those implemented for
good reason, are usually viewed as too constrictive. A brief discussion
of how the presumption may affect criminal law enforcement and civil
liability will illuminate some of the implications of adopting this
presumption.
This presumption will alter the legal approach to informants in
both civil and criminal litigation. In criminal cases, courts place blame
on the defendant, turning attention away from the informant-handler
relationship when informant misconduct and mishandling arises. No
such shifting of blame would occur, however, if the informant were a
law enforcement officer or other agent of the state. Presuming in-
formant actions are state actions will redirect responsibility for mis-
handling and misconduct of informants back to the state, which can
choose whether to accept and to use the informant.
On the civil side, the obstacles to relief for informant mishandling
and misconduct are more extensive. Suing the informant will most
likely result in little gain in relief or systemic change. Civil litigation
against the individual handler or the employer (the municipality)
would yield different results. Although the victims may be unappeal-
ing, the current magnitude of mishandling and misconduct may coun-
terbalance this factor.
1. Criminal Law Enforcement
The effect on law enforcement can take two different forms.
First, the presumption could affect how basic law enforcement pro-
grams are implemented on the street. Second, the presumption could
change the outcome of criminal defense challenges to informant mis-
conduct. A study of using law enforcement personnel instead of infor-
mants will be used to discuss the first effect. Weatherford will be
revisited to discuss the second effect.
One chief goal of law enforcement, according to both convention-
alists and realists, is the substitution of law enforcement personnel for
informants. The targeting of particular individuals for particular
[Vol. 22:81
A NEW VISION OF INFORMANTS
crimes is relatively simple to implement and assess. 514 The greatest
cost in this respect would be a need for new personnel for undercover
details. Further, administrative concerns regarding the use, shifting,
and reallocation of exposed undercover personnel would increase. If
this is truly a goal of law enforcement, however, then some effort at
implementation should follow.
With respect to less focused investigations, the substitution of law
enforcement personnel for informants has proven successful. For ex-
ample, one study of several metropolitan operations revealed high
levels of success in substituting law enforcement personnel for infor-
mants in a fencing operation.-1 5 While the operations did not neces-
sarily reduce crime, they did eliminate the need for informants in
those types of operations.5 16 Finally, and most advantageously, a
higher degree of law enforcement control over the criminal environ-
ment resulted from the undercover operation involving law enforce-
ment personnel. 7 Thus, law enforcement can effectively function in
many areas without tremendous dependence upon informants.
In Weatherford, the Court specifically found that Weatherford's
attendance at meetings between Bursey and his counsel did not vio-
late the Sixth Amendment right to counsel nor the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause because: (1) the attendance was not
to seek information, (2) the informant did not ask questions, (3) the
informant did not relay information back to the government handlers,
(4) the attendance was only to maintain the informant's cover, and (5)
no identifiable prejudice resulted. Presuming that Weatherford was
acting under color of law or was a state actor, several of these factors
are either met or no longer offer valuable insight.
The most obvious change in perspective is in relation to the third
factor. As a state actor, Weatherford's presence and listening immedi-
ately brought the information back to the government. Second, the
informant's mere listening without asking questions (factor two) is not
patently innocent. Third, the harm in Weatherford's presence (factor
five) is more obvious because he is a conduit back to the prosecution.
Finally, the lack of a specific intent to seek information (factor one) or
that he attended only to maintain the cover (factor four) would be
secondary to Weatherford's motivations as an informant and the po-
lice and prosecution's motives for using him. In this respect, the case
514. MARX, supra note 14, at 108.
515. Id. at 109-12.
516. Id. at 112-14.
517. Id. at 127-28.
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presents a very different situation. The conduct is more intrusive.
The relationship between informant and handler is more important,
and the handlers must have more responsibility.
For those who may still wonder why Weatherford should be so
closely linked with his handlers, the court of appeals decision re-
counted how Weatherford was identified as an informant: He was
seen vacationing with several state drug agents at Hilton Head Island
between the arrest and the trial. The prosecutor had given his permis-
sion for the trip. 18
2. Municipal Liability for Customary Use of Informants
Section 1983 allows claims against every "person" who "subjects,
or causes to be subjected" any citizen to the appropriate violation.5 19
The definition of "person" includes municipalities when their policy,
custom, or practice causes the injury.5 20 Thus, the victim of informant
misconduct or mishandling can sue the municipality if the informant
activity is the product of municipal policy, custom, or practice. The
prospect of compensatory damage awards for informant mishandling
and misconduct would then influence municipalities either to reallo-
cate resources away from informants, or to acknowledge the potential
for abuse and to curb informant use.
No municipality has been held liable, and by implication account-
able or responsible, for the mishandlingor misconduct of an inform-
ant. Those cases in which municipal liability claims were made but
lost shed little insight into the underlying reasoning.52' However, the
impediments here stem from the incorrect presumptions and precon-
ceptions regarding informants. It is easy to isolate and discount or
distinguish the circumstances of one informant and one handler, espe-
518. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 485 n.2. (4th Cir. 1975).
519. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
520. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978).
521. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 53-55 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court refused to impute
knowledge of police infiltration and disruption to supervisors and "scattered events" in-
volving informants were not custom, policy or practice); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp.
909, 934 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (policy allegations were too conclusory). In addition, the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act's exclusions of discretionary functions and challenges to formulation
of policies have resulted in drastic limitations on liability. See, e.g., Bergman v. United
States, 689 F.2d 789, 794 (8th Cir. 1982) (under FTCA, absence of guidelines and resultant
discretion in selection of informants is not actionable); Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F.
Supp. 923, 931 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (cannot challenge formation of informant policy under
FrCA, but can challenge implementation). See also supra notes 381-444 and accompany-
ing text [civil liability cases].
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cially where the practice itself is labelled "highly individualistic."' 22
However, when taken in the context of that particular law enforce-
ment agency, law enforcement agencies in general, the history of in-
formant use,5" and the replete record of abuses, the decision to
isolate, discount, distinguish, or otherwise distance the mishandling
and its impact from the municipality is less convincing.
Municipal liability requires (1) the existence of some policy, cus-
tom, or usage that (2) directly causes a (3) constitutional depriva-
tion.524 The preceding discussion of state action and color of law
greatly impacts upon the proximate cause analysis.52 The ensuing
discussion will address the policy, custom, or usage requirement. In
Monell v. Department of Social Services,526 the Supreme Court re-
versed Monroe insofar as that decision found municipalities were not
"persons" within the meaning of section 1983.527 The Court specifi-
cally held that a class of women could sue the municipality for relief
based upon a written departmental policy that required women to
take unpaid maternity leave after the fifth month of pregnancy. The
Court, in further explaining the bases for municipal liability, held that
municipalities are equally liable for a "decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers" and for "governmental 'custom'
even though such a custom has not received formal approval through
the body's official decisionmaking channels." Finally, the Monell
Court excluded liability based upon respondeat superior.52 8
In particular, a custom must be the result of "persistent and wide-
spread.., practices of state officials.., so permanent and well settled
as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law. ' 529 The
essence of custom is toleration of such activity resulting in actual or
522. Farris, supra note 4, at 33. In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985),
the Court held that a single isolated shooting by a police officer did not sufficiently prove a
municipal policy, custom or practice and therefore, the claim was not actionable against the
municipality.
523. See supra notes 413-490 and accompanying text.
524. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). The question of the specific
constitutional deprivation or violation will not be addressed here.
525. See text accompanying notes 498-513.
526. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
527. Id. at 665-690 (overruling Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187).
528. Id. at 690-92.
529. Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes, 398 U.S. at 167-68). See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n.56
(quoting Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940) ("Settled state
practice ... can establish what is state law ... Deeply embedded traditional ways of
carrying out state policy... are often tougher and truer than the dead words of the written
text.").
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constructive knowledge of the offensive behavior. 3 The factors nec-
essary are not rigid. A custom need not be longstanding.53' Nor is the
level of participation determinative of custom, although for a long-
standing custom "a smaller rate of official participation will be neces-
sary to qualify." 532 The seriousness of the injury or gravity of the
conduct impacts as well, where a higher degree creates more of an
impression of official tolerance. 33 Thus, custom can arise where no
written policy on the offensive behavior exists, where the written pol-
icy only partially addresses the offensive behavior, or where the writ-
ten policy addresses and prohibits the offensive behavior but the
prohibition is ignored and the transgressions are ratified by
inaction. 34
Because of the lengthy history of informants both generally and
within every federal, state, or local law enforcement entity, the estab-
lishment of custom is the most viable means of showing policy to re-
dress informant mishandling. Admittedly, some difficulty in
generalizing exists here. Each entity will have its own history of infor-
mants, of efforts to control informants, and of mishandling and mis-
conduct of informants. That does not, however, render an exploration
of the history meaningless. For those municipalities that have scorned
the use of informants, municipal liability may not exist-a just reward
for their insight. For others, the time has come for introspection, eval-
uation, and, absent any change, accountability. 35
530. Bandes, supra note 502, at 151 (footnotes omitted). See also Bordanaro v. Mc-
Leod, 871 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989) (actual or constructive knowledge), cert. denied sub
nom. City of Everett v. Bordanaro, 493 U.S. 820 (1989).
531. Schnapper, supra note 502, at 230 ("the official tolerance towards racial and polit-
ical violence with which Congress was concerned in 1871 was thought to have arisen only
in the previous year or two").
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Bandes, supra note 502, at 152 (custom exists where "the entire police force ig-
nores the policy and engages in a long-standing practice ... with the police chief's aware-
ness"); Schnapper, supra note 502, at 229 ("supporters of section 1983 were concerned ...
[with] the widespread and persistent practices of ordinary sheriffs, judges, and
prosecutors").
The constitutionality of the challenged policy is of no significance. In City of Canton,
the Court held that constitutional policies are as actionable as unconstitutional policies so
long as the policy directly results in constitutional violations. City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 387 (1989).
535. Municipalities have no immunity from liability under Monell. Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). Thus, no argument could be made that the wide-
spread, prior approval of the use of informants by the courts somehow misled law enforce-
ment or lulled them into believing that their practices were beyond reproach.
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Custom is not always easy to prove. Often, the proof is depen-
dent upon identification and presentation of the generally accepted
workings of the law enforcement agency. This may not be difficult
because the uses, abuses and handling of informants are open and no-
torious. Nevertheless, law enforcement officers have been known to
become silent when internal practices are opened to review and criti-
cism.536 Given the general historical acceptance of informants as an
integral part of law enforcement, however, a court could certainly
make inferences about the existence of informant custom, require the
law enforcement entity to prove otherwise, infer custom, and force the
code of silence to confirm its existence.
The historical use and acceptance of informants readily supports
the custom requirements of being persistent, widespread, "permanent,
and well-settled." The broader historical perspective and ineffective
means of control should be known to most law enforcement hierar-
chies. Likewise, given the newsworthy nature of abuses, law enforce-
ment supervisors would be hard pressed to show lack of notice or
knowledge of informant abuses and mishandling.
A general tolerance of the abuses is beyond question. The courts'
continual receptiveness and protection of informants, handlers and
law enforcement agencies can only breed complacency in the use of
informants. The accepted practice is the deep integration of infor-
mants into the day-to-day workings of law enforcement, relying on
their production of information and set-ups for crimes. To say that
handlers would tolerate what is commonplace verges on redundance.
While tolerance denotes hardship or endurance of something harsh or
painful, the entity's receptiveness to following the custom is not evalu-
ated subjectively but rather by the harm resulting from the custom.
"Courts have countenanced the use of informants from time immemo-
rial.' '5 37 Law enforcement agencies and municipalities have basked in
this approbation.
536. See, e.g., Thomas v. City of New Orleans, 687 F.2d 80, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1982) (in-
volving suit by officer after discharge for breaking code of silence by failing to sign a report
that did not include fellow officer's brutality); Bonsignore v. City of New York, 521 F.
Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (suit by wife of officer who shot her alleging that code of silence
prevented adequate detection of officers in need of psychological evaluation), affd, 683
F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1982). See also DAVID RUDOVSKY & MICHAEL AVERY, POLICE
MiscoNDucr LAW AND LITIGATION §14.8 (1993).
537. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 224.
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VII. Conclusion
Law enforcement has long reaped and extolled the benefits of
informants. Courts have uniformly relegated the interests of victims
of informant misconduct and mishandling to those of law enforce-
ment. Meanwhile, informant mishandling and abuse remain
unchecked.
Law enforcement's decision to use informants must be balanced
with the realities and flaws of the informant system. Ideally, society
would be enhanced by the abolishment of informants. It is unrealistic,
however, to expect slow moving institutions like law enforcement and
the courts to completely abandon the use of informants.
Expanding constitutional protections for informant violations is
beneficial, yet insufficient. The more challenging and far reaching so-
lution, however, is to instill a realistic treatment of the informant-han-
dler linkages and hold handlers and their employers responsible for
the results. Reform aimed solely at the constitutional avenues is in-
sufficient because it fails to address judicial presumptions. Only by
discerning that those presumptions are wrong and by reforming the
evaluative process can the balance sought be reached.
The color of law and state action approaches are merely two dif-
ferent ways to show the linkages between informants and handlers.
While neither theory arises in most criminal cases, the question is im-
pliedly addressed all the time. Insight obtained by this or through
other means is beneficial if the end product is to reassess the
relationship.
Likewise, the existence of municipal liability for the handling and
control of informants is integral to instilling responsibility and ac-
countability for that conduct. Currently, civil liability offers little
promise for an aggrieved plaintiff or society in terms of imposing a
disincentive to unwelcome conduct. Although not addressed directly,
both aspects (linkages and municipal liability) bear on the analysis of
individual liability under § 1983 for handlers.
The use of informants and their relationship to government han-
dlers has not changed much since Thomas May warned of their evils in
1863.38 Although current use of informants has not reached the pro-
portions envisioned by George Orwell, in 1984,539 the courts now have
an opportunity and means to prevent our nation from becoming a so-
ciety of spies.
538. See supra note 1, at 277-78.
539. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1st America ed., Harcourt Brace 1949).
[Vol. 22:81
